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Abstract 
 
Veterinary negligence within the United Kingdom is under-litigated and under-theorised. 
Further, the owner-property dyadic means those who have suffered emotional harm cannot 
claim whilst veterinarians lack external guidance on evolving expectations. To address this 
tension, this thesis aims to provide guidance to veterinarians on their legal obligations 
stemming from the triangular relationship between veterinarian, owner, and animal, and to 
advance the position of the animal within this relationship by advocating a best interests 
approach. At the damage stage, a sentient constitutive property model, in which the 
reciprocal relationship between owner and animal is central, will be advocated. The 
veterinarian’s duty will similarly shift from one which protects the claimant’s financial 
interest, to one protecting the integrity of the reciprocal relationship. Where the animal’s best 
interests are at risk, veterinarians may be protected from liability where they have acted to 
protect this interest. Looking to breach, the importance of expert testimony necessitates 
profession-wide support of these ideas. To achieve this, new professional guidance 
developed by a representative council who embrace the aims of this thesis is advocated. 
Grounding these ideas is the position that courts should be alive to doctrinal aspects of 
vulnerability and reason decisions based on compassion and fairness.     
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Introduction 
1 
 
 
“Not long ago, there lived in London a young married couple of Dalmatian dogs named 
Pongo and Missis Pongo...They were lucky enough to own a young married couple of 
humans named Mr. and Mrs. Dearly, who were gentle, obedient, and unusually intelligent—
almost canine at times...Like many other much-loved humans, they believed that they owned 
their dogs, instead of realising that their dogs owned them.”1 
Introduction 
 Contextualising the Positions of the Animal, the Owner, and the Veterinarian a)
In my first year tort module I was taught, by one of the supervisors of this thesis, the 
ingredients of a negligence action. Alongside the duty of care, breach, and causation 
requirements, the claimant had to establish that she suffered from some form of actionable 
damage. Traditional categories of actionable damage remain property and physical injury,
2
 
however, courts have come to recognise exceptional categories in the form of pure economic 
loss and psychiatric harm; this all seemed quite straightforward. I then turned my attention to 
the case of Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust.
3
 I recall reading the facts and 
                                                 
1
 Dodie Smith, 101 Dalmatians (Egmont 2006) 1.  
2
 See for example: Le Lievre v. Gould [1893] 1 QB 491, 504, where it was stated by Lord Esher that, ‘if one 
man is near to another, or near to the property of another, a duty lies on him not to do that which may cause a 
personal injury to that other, or may injure his property.’ This quote illustrates the types of damage initially 
accepted by the courts, but also the importance of proximity in the duty of care analysis, which is discussed in 
greater depth below.   
3
 [2004] 1 AC 309. In this case the claimant was severely visually impaired. Believing that she would be unable 
to care for a child if she ever became pregnant, the claimant underwent a sterilisation procedure. The procedure 
itself was negligently performed and the claimant became pregnant, later giving birth to a healthy child. The 
claimant sought to recover damages for the costs of raising the child. At trial, the claimant was denied the 
additional costs, however, on appeal the court allowed those costs which could be attributed to the mother’s 
additional needs to assist in raising the child. At the House of Lords, it was held that quantifying the benefits 
and burdens of being a parent were impossible and that viewing the child as nothing more than a financial 
burden went against viewing the human life as sacred. The claimant was, however, awarded non-compensatory 
Introduction 
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trying to determine for myself the nature of the damage claimed and whether it could be 
classed as physical injury, psychiatric, or more complex still, loss of autonomy. Attempting 
to relate the damage to the remaining negligence requirements was more difficult still and 
the judgments provided little clarity. However, it was Lord Scott’s judgment which had a 
lasting impact and in many ways acted as a catalyst for the research I undertake in this thesis.  
 
Particularly controversial was the issue of assessing the claimant’s damages. Here, Lord 
Scott made what he believed to be an uncontroversial comparison using an analogous 
profession to illustrate the complexity of valuing a human life.
4
 According to Lord Scott, 
whilst it would be impossible to assess the value or the burden of a particular human life, his 
example was designed to demonstrate how damages would be assessed in an analogous 
professional negligence scenario ‘that did not involve these difficulties.’5 In his example, a 
veterinarian negligently gelded a colt with the result that one of the mares became pregnant, 
later giving birth to a healthy foal. Whilst negligence on the part of the veterinarian would 
not be contested and damages could be awarded in line with the cost of the veterinarian’s 
negligently-provided services, additional compensation for the rearing of the foal was 
thought to be “absurd.”6 According to Lord Scott: 
 [The owner] could have the foal destroyed as soon as it was born. 
 But this would be an unlikely choice for the foal would be likely  
 to have some value...Or the owner could decide to keep the foal 
 until it could be weaned and then to sell it. Or he could decide to 
 keep it until, as a yearling or a two year old, it had reached a little 
                                                                                                                                                      
damages in the amount of £15, 000.00 in recognition of the legal wrong that was suffered and the claimant’s 
loss of opportunity to live her life in the way she had planned. 
4
 ibid 352. 
5
 ibid.  
6
 ibid. 
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 more maturity and then sell it. Or he could try and add value to it 
 by breaking it in...and selling it. Or he could keep it for his own 
 use.
7
  
     
According to Lord Scott, then, the young foal presented no problem in terms of valuation 
because, to the owner, the foal was only ever an “it” with an ascertainable property value; 
the only question for the fictional owner in Rees was which option provided the best return 
on his investment. The problem with this conclusion is that whilst it accords with the letter 
of the law insofar as animals are regarded as the property of their owner, it makes far-
reaching assumptions about the owner-animal relationship and how it should be 
characterised. In short, Lord Scott’s decision raised far more questions for me than it 
answered.   
 
In the forefront are issues surrounding the position of animals under the law and how the law 
constructs the owner-animal relationship. On the periphery, however, is the role of the 
veterinarian. Lord Scott’s passing acknowledgment to the care provided by the veterinarian 
belies an area of the law rich with legal and ethical complexity. Important legal and ethical 
issues are raised, for example, when the veterinary relationship is placed in opposition to the 
human medical relationship, or where the owner, acting on his property interests over an 
animal, wishes, for example, to have a healthy animal destroyed. This raises questions as to 
the doctrinal nature of veterinary liability and whether there does, or should, exist a clear 
division between human medical negligence cases and those involving veterinarians and 
nonhuman animals. Taking this further, larger questions relating to the veterinary 
                                                 
7
 ibid [emphasis added]. There is a resemblance here to Honoré’s theory on full liberal ownership. On this 
point, see: Tony Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP 1961).  
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relationship as to whose interests and what relationships matter and deserve protection under 
the law also arise. For example, whilst animals are classed as property and therefore “things” 
under the law,
8
 an increase in both spending on veterinary care
9
 and veterinary stress levels 
in the face of treatment and welfare dilemmas
10
 indicates that animals are not mere 
inanimate “things”. To what extent negligence can be adapted and stretched to protect the 
interests of animals and consequently impact the veterinary relationship, emerge as inter-
related questions of central importance.   
 
Looking at the veterinary relationship through the lens of a negligence claim allows 
important questions to be asked of what is legally owed to owners, and potentially also to 
animals, and why. Regardless of whether negligence is seen as an institution whose aim is to 
correct injustices between parties,
11
 or a tool to achieve certain social policy ends,
12
 or to 
vindicate rights,
13
 or compensate for wrongs and deter similar conduct,
14
 negligence is first a 
form of fault-based liability. In determining duties of care, the court decides what equates to 
right conduct ‘in the sense that breaches of them generally stand to earn the breaching party 
criticism for acting without sufficient regard for the interests of others.’15 Further, because 
duties of care are relational, an argument which will be expanded upon in Chapters One and 
                                                 
8
 See: Joan E. Schaffner, An Introduction to Animals and the Law (Palgrave 2011) 19. 
9
 See: Christopher Green, ‘The Future of Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion Animals,’ 
(2004) 10 Animal Law 163, 170-171. 
10
 See: C. E. M. Batchelor, D. E. F. McKeegan, ‘Survey of the Frequency and Perceived Stressfulness of 
Ethical Dilemmas Encountered in UK Veterinary Practice,’ (2012) 170 Veterinary Record 19, 21 and Vet 
Futures Project, Taking Charge of our Future: A vision for the Veterinary Profession for 2030 (London, 
November 2015) 27-28 <http://vetfutures.org.uk/launch-of-the-vet-futures-report/> accessed 8 July 2016. 
11
 See: Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice in a Nutshell,’ (2002) 52 Univ. of Toronto LJ 349 and Ernest J. 
Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice,’ (2001) 2(1) 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1.  
12
 See: Andrew Robertson, ‘Policy-based Reasoning in the Duty of Care Cases,’ (2013) 33(1) Legal Studies 
119 and Andrew Robertson, ‘Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law’ in Andrew Robertson and 
Tang Hang Wu (eds.), The Goals of Private Law (Hart 2009) 261. 
13
 See: Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007) 
14
 See: Glanville Williams, ‘The Aims of Tort Law,’ (1951) 4 Current Legal Problems 137. 
15
 John C.P. Goldberg, ‘Ten Half-Truths about Tort Law,’ (2008) 42 Valparaiso Uni.L.R. 1221, 1243. 
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Four, only those who stand in the correct relationship— those argued to be beneficiaries of 
the duty breached— have standing to complain.16 Again, because these duties are imposed 
by the courts, we see what relationships are considered “correct” or, in essence, what 
relationships matter in the sense that the law looks to both precedent and changing social 
attitudes to answer these questions. Lastly, because duties found in negligence ‘are duties of 
non-injuriousness, persons who have not suffered the right sort of adverse effect because of a 
breach have no grounds to sue for the breach.’17 Questions can therefore be raised about 
what right sorts of actionable damage qualify in terms of what harms matter and why they 
should matter.   
 
I argue that the negligence assessment ought to be a holistic assessment and that when it is, 
we stand to learn a considerable amount about evolving social behaviour and expectations 
between people. With regards to veterinary negligence, however, as it currently stands, 
courts in the United Kingdom (“UK”) have either approached the issue from the perspective 
that such considerations are “absurd,”18 as evidenced in Rees, or as will be discussed in 
Chapter One, these important questions are simply ignored. Academic scholarship in the area 
of veterinary negligence is similarly undeveloped. The result is that assumptions regarding 
the types of relationships owners can form with their animals and questions relating to 
professional obligations and expectations go unchallenged.  
                                                 
16
 ibid.  
17
 ibid 1244. 
18
 Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309, 352. 
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 Aims of this Thesis: Adopting a Professional Negligence Framework to Better b)
Understand the Veterinary Relationship 
To this end, the purpose of this thesis is to take seriously the complexities and legal 
problems raised as a result of the triangular, veterinary relationship between veterinarians, 
owners and animals discussed above and resolve them so far as possible, utilising the 
requirements of a negligence claim as the overarching structure.
19
 I undertake this task with 
the aim of achieving two primary goals: first, to provide veterinarians with guidance as to 
their legal obligations stemming from the veterinary relationship and second to improve the 
position of the animal patient within this relationship by advocating that, so far as possible, 
the animal’s best interests should be of primary concern. As Cane has argued, two of the 
intrinsic characteristics of tort are ‘to provide guidance to individuals about how they may 
and ought to behave in their interactions with others [and] to provide protection for certain 
interests of individuals...’20  
 
As it currently stands, however, the few reported veterinary cases adopt a strong commercial 
perspective and though ultimately the claims are framed in negligence, a contractual 
undertone is also present. I submit that whilst it is open for the owner in possession of a 
contract with the defendant veterinarian to bring a claim in either contract or tort,
21
 it does 
not follow from the point that one can bring a claim in contract that one should; negligence, I 
argue, should be the preferred route. Problematically, a contractual approach to the 
                                                 
19
 My thesis does not, however, consider issues of causation. First, the scenarios that I contemplate would not 
typically give rise to issues concerning the link between fault and the damage suffered and second issues 
relating to causation are heavily reliant on the specific facts of each case, making it difficult to analyse specific 
scenarios within the confines of this thesis. 
20
 Peter Cane, Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart 1997) 206. 
21
 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. (1995) 2 AC 145, 194. That concurrent liability can exist outside pure 
economic loss cases, see: Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese GmbH [2008] EWHC 6 
(TCC) para 169. 
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veterinary relationship engenders the idea that ‘fees pay for veterinary services, not for 
animal health.’22 In these instances, questions asked by the court centre on the scope of the 
retainer and the parties’ commercial expectations.23 Where, however, the relationship 
between owner and animal is constitutive in nature, such that both the owner’s and the 
animal’s sense of self is constituted in part by their mutual companionship, characterising the 
relationship as commercial in nature, as in Rees, represents a gross mischaracterisation. 
Commentating on one of the earliest recorded negligence cases in which a horse died after 
the defendant veterinarian undertook its care,
24
 Holmes stated that ‘...the duty was 
independent of contract...and stood on the general rules applied to human conduct...’25 I 
agree and submit that to provide veterinarians with guidance as to their legal obligations and 
to forward the best interests of the animal patient, questions asked by the court should follow 
those asked in negligence. Focus in this regard should be placed on the proximity and the 
nature of the relationship between veterinarian, owner and the animal, and the nature of the 
wrong to determine the obligations that are owed when care is undertaken.  
 
It should be stated from the outset that this thesis principally concerns the potential 
negligence liability of veterinarians and improving the best interests of the animal within the 
triangular veterinary relationship by exploring the limits of negligence jurisprudence. In 
Chapter Three, I argue that owned animals should continue to be legally regarded as 
property. However, in order to improve their position within the veterinary relationship, 
animals should be viewed as a special form of constitutive property and that veterinarians 
                                                 
22
 James Yeates, Animal Welfare in Veterinary Practice (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 52. 
23
 This is evidenced by available case law, in particular, Glyn (t/a Priors Farm Equine Veterinary Surgery) v. 
McGarel-Groves [2006] EWCA Civ 998. See also discussion in Chapter 1.3(b)(i). 
24
 Waldon v. Marshall (1367) Y.B. 43 Ed. III, f.33, pl. 38. The distinction would have been between an action 
on the case and assumsit (an early form of contractual breach). 
25
 See discussion in: Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Macmillan & Co. 1882) 276.  
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should act so far as possible to protect the animal’s best interests when they undertake to 
care for the animal. It will not be in all cases that a constitutive relationship is present and 
understanding the owner-animal bond is not straightforward; indeed, this relationship has 
been described by Fudge as being both messy and complex.
26
 ‘[Animals] are things of value; 
they are living symbols; and they are…members of the household with whom humans share 
bodies...and blessings. And all these states happen at the same time.’27 This is in stark 
contrast to the picture painted by Lord Scott in Rees and so a particular aim of this thesis is 
to advocate a form of actionable damage and a corresponding duty which can protect and 
forward the animal’s best interests. 
 
As regards the owner, to claim, as I argue, that the harm suffered is both proprietary and 
emotional places the damage on relatively unprecedented footing. In essence, the harm 
suffered ‘sit[s] somewhere in between two recognised forms of damage in negligence law;’28 
here, property and emotional harm. As such, the harm suffered by the claimant owner is, 
again, not straightforward and instead best conceived of as being hybrid in nature. In this 
regard, Priaulx, referencing Horsey and Rackley, states that these hybrid forms of harm are 
claims for “messed up lives;”29 they are not wholly divined by looking for deleterious 
changes in the body, such as a broken arm (or in this case, a deleterious change in the animal 
property), nor will they be easily diagnosable in terms of the emotional harm suffered.  
 
Damage sustained to the constitutive relationship between owner and animal is similar to the 
hybrid damage construction discussed by Priaulx. As the divide between subject and object 
                                                 
26
 Erica Fudge, ‘The Animal Face in Early Modern England,’ (2013) 30 Theory, Culture & Society 177, 196. 
27
 ibid 190. 
28
 Nicky Priaulx, ‘Humanising Negligence: Damaged Bodies, Biographical Lives and the Limits of Law,’ 
(2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 177, 184. 
29
 ibid, referencing Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley, Tort Law (3rd ed., OUP 2013) 160.  
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becomes blurred
30
 and owner and animal cease to see each other as a means to an end and 
instead contribute a significant benefit to a central aspect of each other’s lives,31 the damage 
sustained can no longer be classified as straightforward property damage. Thus, in many 
ways the constitutive relationship is about revealing ‘the features human beings share with 
animals—being born, ageing, mortality, and vulnerability.’32 Whilst in the past it used to be 
the case that discourse on these subjects resulted in the “othering”33 of animals, or 
maintaining the object-subject divide, one of the primary aims of this thesis is to argue that it 
is, in fact, the reciprocal experiences of these “human features” that characterise the 
constitutive relationship. For the veterinarian, then, an integral part of their professional role 
and legal duty is linked to a greater understanding of this relationship and the damage that is 
suffered when the constitutive relationship is severed. Thus, in aiming to provide guidance to 
veterinarians and protecting the interests of both animals and owners so far as possible, a 
large portion of this thesis will be devoted to understanding the constitutive relationship and, 
in essence, making sense of the mess.  
 Developing Negligence: Veterinary Negligence and Evolutionary Change c)
One of the greatest strengths of the common law, of which negligence is but one area, is its 
ability to evolve alongside shifting social norms. In this way, the life of the law has not been 
logic or the predictable developments of mathematical formulae, but rather experience.
34
 We 
describe the common law as a corpus in one way to illustrate the law as a collection or body 
of laws, but also, arguably, to personify the idea that the common law is living, evolving, 
                                                 
30
 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘The Colin Ruagh Thomas O’Fallon Memorial Lecture on Reconsidering Personhood,’ 
(1995) 74 Oregon Law Review 423, 426. 
31
 Jerrold Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition and Collegiality (2nd 
ed., Mosby 1995) 184-185 
32
 Anca Gheaus, ‘The Role of Love in Animal Ethics,’ (2012) 27(3) Hypatia 583, 595. 
33
 ibid. 
34
 Holmes, The Common Law (n5) 1.  
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and experiential. Ibbetson, for example, has described the process of legal change as 
occurring:   
…through filling gaps between rules in the way that seems most  
convenient or most just at the time; through twisting existing rules,   
or rediscovering old ones...; through reformulating claims into a  
different conceptual category...; through inventing new rules that   
get tacked onto the existing ones...; [and] through injecting shifting 
ideas of fairness or justice...’35   
 
It is through a similar process that I argue the limits of veterinary negligence are to be 
discovered. For example, in the actionable damage requirement, discussed in Chapter Three, 
the hybrid form of damage that is presented depends on a reformulation of current rules on 
property damage by including the crucial element of consequential emotional harm, founded 
on the idea of constitutive property. For as much as negligence can be seen as an evolving 
body of law, it can also be accurately described as anthropocentric and individualistic. Being 
the ‘product of human actors, it entrenches the interests of humans over virtually all others 
and centres the reasonable human person as a main legal subject;’36 therefore, advocating in 
favour of a constitutive property framework for animals requires not only a twisting of 
existing rules, but also the placing of veterinary negligence claims into a new conceptual 
category within property damage.    
 
In Chapters Two and Four, which consider aspects of the duty of care, I argue for a return to 
a more robust, relational duty assessment focusing on proximity and a normative assessment 
                                                 
35
 David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford 1999) 294. 
36
 Maneesha Deckha, ‘Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law and Animal 
Vulnerability Under a Property Paradigm,’ (2013) 50 Alberta Law Review 783, 784. 
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of what it means to assume responsibility for the care of another. In this way, I argue that 
courts should adopt a flexible approach to the duty assessment, taking into consideration 
normatively-relevant principles that reflect underlying values within the law,
37
 but also 
developing and crystallising social norms that point to a changing understanding of that 
particular normative relationship.
38
 This method of determination exists in stark contrast to 
current veterinary negligence case law, which simply attributes to the defendant, as a matter 
of course, an assumption of responsibility in order to find a single duty to act reasonably.
39
  
 
In terms of breach, the dominance of the commercial model in the veterinary profession and 
the importance courts place on expert witness testimony arguably makes it more difficult to 
depart from the Bolam
40
 test despite a greater willingness to scrutinise accepted practice in 
other professions, and more recently, the medical profession.
41
 Assisting courts in their 
standard setting capacity, I submit, can be achieved by the development of detailed 
professional guidance, which embraces the triadic veterinary relationship, whilst also 
emphasising the best interests of the animal, which ought to remain primary. This change, 
which is considered in Chapter Five, will itself necessitate reforms to the Royal College of 
Veterinary Surgeons (“RCVS”) as the official regulator of the veterinary profession. In 
                                                 
37
 Ken Oliphant, ‘Against Certainty in Tort Law’ in Stephen GA Pitel et al (eds.), Tort Law: Challenging 
Orthodoxy (Hart 2013) 7. 
38
 John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson,’ (1998) 146(6) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1733, 1816. 
39
 David Howarth, ‘Many Duties of Care⎯ Or A Duty of Care? Notes from the Underground,’ (2006) 26(3) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 449. In this regard, I argue that the duty follows a Hedley-Byrne approach 
based on the defendant’s assumption of responsibility for the claimant’s financial wellbeing. See: Chapter 
1.3(b)(i) and Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465. 
40
 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. The Bolam test currently sets the 
standard for determining whether a professional person has breached her duty of care. In Bolam itself, which 
concerned the potential negligence liability of a doctor, McNair J stated that a doctor ‘is not guilty of 
negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical 
men skilled in that particular art’ (at 587). 
41
 See, for example: Margaret Brazier and Emma Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (Manchester Univ. 
Press 2016) xx and Rachael Mulheron, ‘Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s “Gloss,”’ 
(2010) 69(3) Cambridge Law Journal 609. 
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particular, I argue that reforming the RCVS Council to include greater diversity of lay and 
professional opinion and instituting widely-disseminated professional codes of conduct 
carries the potential to change professional mindset in line with the veterinary relationship I 
advocate. New codes will also provide courts with objective information to consider 
alongside professional witness testimony when determining the expected standard of care. 
Underscoring these points is that at the heart of the veterinary relationship is the animal and 
that shifting, and sometimes conflicting, social perceptions about the animal-owner 
relationship
42 should encourage courts to reason decisions which reflect notions of justice 
and fairness in these circumstances. 
 
Lastly, although I do seek to critically challenge existing notions of what various elements in 
the negligence inquiry require, the ultimate position that I take regarding these arguments is 
that they are evolutionary changes, not revolutionary. As such, I accept that negligence is 
limited in terms of what it can achieve and that certain arguments— for example, the 
argument that animals should be granted full legal standing— would likely be unsuccessful 
before the courts. The stronger argument, then, is to develop the law. To do this, I draw on 
existing doctrine and analyse it for its potential to develop veterinary negligence and 
negligence law more broadly. Doctrinal analysis, which looks to the language adopted by the 
law itself to determine its foundations and internal structures, reveals lines of reasoning 
adopted by judges and the courts as a whole and can point toward changing social sentiments 
or legal perspectives. It is submitted that in certain important areas germane to the 
                                                 
42
 See: Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee, and Robert G. Weedon, ‘Modern Trends in Veterinary 
Malpractice: How Our Evolving Attitudes Toward Non-Human Animals Will Change Veterinary Medicine,’ 
10 Animal Law 125; Vet Futures Project, Taking Charge of our Future: A vision for the Veterinary Profession 
for 2030 (London, November 2015) 19-20 <http://vetfutures.org.uk/launch-of-the-vet-futures-report/> 
accessed 8 July 2016 and Jerrold Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, 
Competition and Collegiality (2nd ed., Mosby 1995) 9. 
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development of veterinary negligence, this change is occurring. This is perhaps most obvious 
in Chapter Two, which argues a vulnerability-based approach to the law relating to 
negligence, but also, importantly, in the actionable damage and duty of care chapters that 
follow. In these chapters, I utilise doctrine to illustrate the process as evolutionary change 
and nascent development, but also to make clear that courts should approach legal questions 
creatively and with a willingness to respond to novel situations and relationships. Lord 
MacMillan famously stated that the ‘categories of negligence are never closed;’43 my thesis 
sets out to confirm this sentiment and give effect to the notion that negligence is a changing, 
responsive body of law which can accomplish the specific aims I have set for this thesis.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 619.  
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1. Reframing Veterinary Negligence Liability: Setting the Scene 
1.1 Introduction  
In a recent lecture, Lord Justice Jackson stated that the ‘legal principles regulating the 
liability of professional persons have mutated over time and they have done so in a way that 
reflects the changing perception of the professions in society.’1 The result, according to 
Jackson LJ, is that the privileged position once held by professionals is rapidly waning and 
that in some cases courts have shown a willingness to extend professional liability beyond its 
traditional bounds because of the defendant’s position as a professional and their role in 
society.
2
 In one area of professional liability, however, Jackson LJ may be guilty of putting 
the cart before the horse. Although cases of veterinary negligence can be traced back to 
1367,
3
 predating England’s first recorded human medical negligence case in 1375,4 the 
liability of veterinarians stemming from professional negligence remains greatly under-
theorised. It is submitted that the reason for this is twofold: first, the position of the animal 
                                                 
1
 Lord Justice Jackson, ‘The Professions: Power, Privilege and Legal Liability’ (Peter Taylor Memorial Lecture 
to The Professional Negligence Bar Association, London, 21 April 2015) 5.7.  
2
 ibid. Here, Jackson LJ goes on to cite the case of White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, which concerned the ability 
of an intended beneficiary under a will to sue the solicitor who had negligently failed to update the will in line 
with the testator’s wishes, thus disentitling  the intended beneficiary. Finding the solicitor liable, Lord Goff 
‘expressly relied upon “the role played by solicitors in society” as one of the justifications for his decision’ (at 
5.1-5.2). 
 
As regards the role professionals assume within society, Jackson LJ notes that although at one time 
professionals were seen as possessing a combination of specialised skill and a sense of heightened morality 
which transcended the mere provision of a service to an understanding that the provision of their professional 
skill was intrinsically valuable (at 2.6), now, professional status is seen to bring with it enhanced responsibility 
(at 5.7). ‘Courts have reflected this general shift in public perception by (a) slowly stripping away the 
protections which they previously accorded to the professions and (b) devising new ways of imposing liability 
upon professionals.’ (at 5.7)  
3
 Waldon v. Marshall (1367) Y.B. 43 Ed. III, f.33, pl. 38. See also: The Farrier’s Case (1372) Y.B. 46 Ed. III, 
f.19, pl. 19. 
4
 The Surgeon’s Case (1375) Y.B. 48 Ed. III, f.6, pl.11. 
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under the law being that of fungible property and second the nature of the legal relationship 
between the owner of the animal and the veterinarian being characterised under the law as 
purely commercial in nature. The reality of the situation, I argue, is far more complex than 
available case law indicates; the animal is not merely a thing, the owner is not simply the 
client, and the veterinarian is not simply the service provider.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is first to provide an overview of the internal and external forces 
that have and continue to influence the veterinary profession. The second portion of this 
chapter will then look to how the law interprets this picture and later constructs its vision of 
veterinary liability. Whilst much of this chapter and the thesis as a whole looks to resolve the 
current lacuna of clearly-articulated guidance on veterinarians’ legal obligations, 
understanding the detailed role played by courts deciding on veterinary negligence cases 
cannot take place without first understanding how the veterinary profession has changed 
over time and the challenges that continue to affect how they provide care. In this regard, it 
is submitted that whilst the past saw the veterinary profession evolve alongside the 
predominantly commercial-based needs of its client base, a new, more complex clientele and 
a lack of effective external regulation has stalled professional evolution. Thus, the emphasis 
courts place on the commercial aspects of the veterinary relationship serve only to misdirect 
veterinarians as to where the full extent of their professional and, importantly, legal 
obligations lie. The result, I argue, is that veterinarians, confronted with internal changes at 
the professional level and external changes from society, are increasingly ill-prepared to 
meet the needs of owners and animals.            
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1.2 The Veterinary Profession: Why Re-Frame?  
 The Veterinary Profession: Shifting Expectations and a Profession in Transition    a)
According to Tannenbaum, ‘the more vibrant, interesting, and important a profession, the 
more difficult it is to briefly characterise the ethical [and legal] problems it faces.’5 
Following from this, in the section that follows, my aim is to provide an introductory 
account of the professional issues and challenges which have played an important role in 
shaping veterinary medicine. The aim here is not to resolve all of these tensions, merely to 
situate the veterinary profession amongst other professions, in particular the medical 
profession. Key within this analysis is that though under-theorised, the complexity of the 
legal and ethical issues raised demonstrates that veterinary medicine warrants greater 
academic attention.   
 
Not unlike human medicine, at the turn of the century, the greatest problem facing the 
veterinary profession was how to define themselves as professionals, separate from lay 
individuals claiming professional knowledge.
6
 Legislation set out that only those on the 
Royal College of Veterinary Services’ (“RCVS”) register could call themselves veterinary 
surgeons,
7
 however, the challenge for the profession was how to convince the public that 
receiving their services provided an additional advantage. Put another way, why should the 
animal owning public choose the services of a veterinary surgeon over a lay husbandry 
                                                 
5
 Jerrold Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition and Collegiality (2nd 
ed., Mosby 1995) 12.  
6
 Abigail Woods, ‘The History of Veterinary Ethics in Britain’ in Christopher M. Wathes and others (eds.), 
Veterinary Ethics and Law in Veterinary & Animal Ethics: Proceedings of the First International Conference 
on Veterinary and Animal Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 6. See also: Lord Justice Jackson, ‘The Professions: 
Power, Privilege and Legal Liability’ (n1) 3.20-3.21 for an account which illustrates the same process was 
happening for the professions generally during this time.  
7
 See: Michael Radford, Animal Welfare Law in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (Oxford 2001) 74 and 
307 and Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 s19(1). 
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expert? According to Woods, the answer lay in equating veterinary treatment with the ethical 
and proper treatment of animals.
8
 ‘[Taking your animal to a veterinarian] would not only 
serve the interests of the animal but also those of the owner, state and society;’9 indeed, it 
was in the best interests of the animal to be placed under the care of a veterinarian.
10
 It was 
veterinarians, not lay experts, who were best placed to make determination as to what 
constituted cruelty toward an animal, or when an animal was suffering.
11
 According the 
Rollin, this power to persuade derives from the veterinarian’s Aesculapian authority, or ‘the 
powerful authority possessed by all medical professionals that comes with the title “Dr.”...’12  
 
Problematically, however, issues such as the intensification of farming practices involving 
animals (or “factory farms”)13 and a sharp increase in companion animal ownership14 
arguably altered concepts of ownership and the ways in which owners related to their 
animals, resulting in an increasingly disparate and nuanced clientele base. As Tannenbaum 
highlights, ‘the elevation of the status of companion animals raises serious ethical issues for 
a profession many of whose patients are eaten, worn, or ridden... —  in short, viewed not as 
companions but economic resources.’15 Within this dyadic paradigm of companion animals 
and agricultural animals, however, are animals that straddle the divide, such as horses. In the 
section that follows, claimants suing for the loss of their horse currently represent the only 
                                                 
8
 Woods, ‘The History of Veterinary Ethics in Britain’ (n6) 8-9. 
9
 ibid 8. 
10
 ibid 7. 
11
 ibid pp 6 and 8. 
12
 Bernard Rollin, Putting the Horse Before Descartes: My Life’s Work on Behalf of Animals (Temple 
University Press 2011) 62. 
13
 Peter Sandøe and Karsten Klint Jensen, ‘The Idea of Animal Welfare ⎯ Developments and Tensions’ in 
Christopher M. Wathes and others (eds.), Veterinary Ethics and Law in Veterinary & Animal Ethics: 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Veterinary and Animal Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 
20. 
14
 Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee and Robert G. Weedon, ‘Modern Trends in Veterinary Malpractice: 
How Our Evolving Attitudes Toward Non-Human Animals Will Change Veterinary Medicine,’ (2004) 10 
Animal Law 125. 
15
 Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition and Collegiality (n5) 9. 
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reported case law on veterinary negligence in the UK. In all of the cases, the animal’s high 
market value made it economically viable to bring a claim, yet, horses are now increasingly 
companion animals whose value is not determinable solely by their market worth. Thus, as 
the idea of animal ownership has become more complex, so too have the demands on the 
veterinarian’s role within that relationship.   
 
Further, in terms of client expectations:  
 Animal owners were demanding higher levels of veterinary 
 competence, ethical conduct and value for money...and were fast 
 moving away from the attitude that the word of the professional 
 man...had to be accepted without question.
16
    
 
The tensions these changes created eventually led to a societal perception that the veterinary 
profession, along with other professions, in particular the medical profession with its adage 
that “doctor knows best,” could not be trusted.17 Further, the need to serve the interests of an 
increasingly diverse client base has arguably contributed to an actual and perceived conflict 
in professional approach. As Marshall noted almost eighty years ago, ‘commercialism is the 
opponent of professionalism in the private sector...’18     
 
                                                 
16
 Woods (n6) 10-11. 
17
 ibid 10. See also: Lord Justice Jackson, ‘The Professions: Power, Privilege and Legal Liability’ (n1) 8. For 
the human medical context see: Law Commission, Regulation of Health Care Professionals, Regulation of 
Social Care Professionals in England, (Law Com No 202, 2012) para 1.14 
<http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/5813/3051/2520/dp153.pdf > accessed 17 June 2016. 
18
 TH Marshall, ‘The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy,’ 
(1939) 5 The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 325 quoted in David Mangan, ‘The 
Curiosity of Professional Status,’ (2014) 30(2) Professional Negligence 74, 77. See also: D.C.J. Main, 
‘Offering the Best to Patients: Ethical Issues Associated with the Provision of Veterinary Services,’ (2006) 158 
Veterinary Record 62, 63 and Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition 
and Collegiality (n5) 10.  
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A further issue which has had an effect on the veterinary profession is the dramatic shift 
from an agriculturally-focused profession to a companion-focused profession. Indeed, this 
shift from the pastures to the cities and suburbs has, according to Tannenbaum, had a 
“transformative”19 effect on the veterinary profession. Whilst the focus of a veterinarian’s 
practice once rested on animals that were valued for their market price tag and concern was 
placed on the health and vitality of the herd, as opposed to an individual animal, 
veterinarians now increasingly practice in small animal hospitals, where the focus is placed 
on companion animal care.
20
 Here, the relationship between animal and owner ‘tend[s] to be 
lengthy, intense, and decidedly nonexploitive (on both sides).’21 Fundamental to this shift is 
the way in which veterinarians approach their practice, or the values they bring to bear on 
the veterinary relationship.
22
 As McEachern Nunalee and Weedon note, the shift from an 
agrarian focus to companion has meant that ‘the profession is now more aligned with the 
field of human medicine than with the field of agriculture.’23 Although there is an element of 
generalisation in this discussion, it is, nonetheless, useful to reflect on how some values, 
such as the concept of animal health, varies between practices. For the agricultural owner, 
                                                 
19
 Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition and Collegiality (n5) 9. 
20
 ibid. See also: Vet Futures Project, Taking Charge of our Future: A vision for the Veterinary Profession for 
2030 (London, November 2015) 35 <http://vetfutures.org.uk/launch-of-the-vet-futures-report/> accessed 24 
November 2015 and Bernard Rollin, An Introduction to Veterinary Medical Ethics: Theory and Cases (Iowa 
State University Press 1996) 59.  
21
 ibid. 
22
 ibid. See also: Rollin, An Introduction to Veterinary Medical Ethics: Theory and Cases (n20) 59. A separate 
issue which would also arguably bear on the values and methods by which veterinarians approach their practice 
is the gender of the veterinarian. Unfortunately, there is very little empirical evidence on this topic, however, 
statistics show that of veterinarians currently practising in the UK, 57% are women and in 2014, 78% of 
graduates were women (see: Vet Futures Project, Taking Charge of our Future: A vision for the Veterinary 
Profession for 2030 (London, November 2015) 36-38 <http://vetfutures.org.uk/launch-of-the-vet-futures-
report/> accessed 24 November 2015). There are arguably large employment and ethical complexities involved 
with this shift, but as of yet, the issue has not been fully explored within the UK context. Unpublished research 
has indicated that female veterinarians do approach their professional obligations in a more care-centred way, 
akin to that of a paediatrician, than her male counterparts; however, the implications of this have not yet been 
explored in great detail (For details, see the reference to this in: Stephen A. May, ‘Veterinary Ethics, 
Professionalism and Society’ in Christopher M. Wathes and others (eds.), Veterinary Ethics and Law in 
Veterinary & Animal Ethics: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Veterinary and Animal 
Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 50). 
23
 McEachern Nunalee and Weedon, ‘Modern Trends in Veterinary Malpractice’ (n14) 138. 
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she is likely to be concerned with the animal’s health only insofar as it would later affect the 
amount of money she would obtain from the animal’s intended use, whether for slaughter, 
for breeding etc. The owner’s interests in this regard are likely to be purely economic. As 
regards companion animals, however, optimal animal health is likely to be defined by 
longevity and quality of life factors, thus bringing care more in line with human medicine. 
The focus of animal health under the agricultural perspective is, therefore, arguably 
outward-facing to the market, whilst the companion is inward-looking, focusing on the 
individual animal and its relationship with its owner. For the veterinarian, this is likely to 
mean a very different set of values will apply in each context.          
 
The purpose of this section was to highlight some of the more pressing issues currently 
affecting the veterinary profession. What is perhaps most clear from the above discussion is 
that the veterinary profession is currently in a period of transition and uncertainty. Whilst 
what distinguishes veterinarians from other healing professions is that they are animal 
doctors
24
 and veterinarians swear an Oath to ‘ABOVE ALL’25 make it their constant 
endeavour ‘to ensure the welfare of animals committed to [their] care,’26 to what extent the 
client, the animal, the purpose of the animal, and the veterinarian’s need to ultimately turn a 
commercial profit affects this endeavour varies. In the end, the confluence of these issues 
and the tensions they continue to create can be reduced to one fundamental question; it is this 
question which forms the basis of the next section.  
                                                 
24
 Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition and Collegiality (n5) 12. 
25
 Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, ‘Code of Professional Conduct for Veterinary Surgeons and 
Supporting Guidance,’ (RCVS 2012) 12 <http://www.rcvs.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/> accessed 11 
November 2015 [emphasis in original]. 
26
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 The Fundamental Question of Veterinary Ethics...and Law  b)
According to Rollin, the fundamental question of veterinary ethics is, ‘to whom does the 
veterinarian owe primary obligation: owner or animal?’27 Rollin continues by presenting two 
opposing metaphors. On the first account, the veterinarian is seen as a garage mechanic and 
the animal a car. Here, the veterinarian owes a primary obligation to the owner, and repairs 
the car in line with the owner’s wishes; the relationship is purely commercial and the animal 
a mere object.
28
 This model resembles the early Cartesian model, which saw animals 
relegated ‘to the status of an automaton, a being capable of acting in the world but only by 
virtue of its instincts and bodily mechanism.’29  
 
On the paediatric model, however, the veterinarian ‘owes primary obligation to the animal, 
just as a paediatrician does to a child...’30 The child here is unable to consent to treatment, 
weigh or balance the risks involved with particular treatments, and cannot verbally express 
her thoughts and feelings. The veterinarian must then act as the animal’s advocate in much 
the same way as the paediatrician must act in the best interests of the child; here, the 
relationship is decidedly care-based. This is not to disavow the important position of the 
owner in care decisions, only to emphasise that the veterinarian’s primary duty rests with the 
animal patient.  
 
Support for Rollin’s paediatric model has been evidenced in the UK context, however, their 
interpretation ultimately misses Rollin’s central thesis. Williams and Jewell, for example, 
argue that following Rollin’s paediatric model and adopting a family-centred approach to the 
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veterinary relationship in which the owner and animal are seen as a family unit is to be 
preferred over the garage mechanic model.
31
 Whilst in one way it is good to see veterinary 
practitioners engage with Rollin’s model, to consider alternative perspectives to the 
veterinary relationship and to the relationship between owner and animal, the authors here 
misinterpret an important part of Rollin’s argument. It is submitted that rather than viewing 
the role of the veterinarian as limited to maintaining the bond between owner and animal, 
Rollin puts forward the image of the paediatrician because of their additional role as 
advocates for the patient;
32
 to have both the concerns of the animal and the owner as primary 
is, arguably, to invite further confusion when the interests of these two parties conflict. Thus, 
a family-centred approach can only take veterinarians so far.  
 
Indeed, both Rollin’s paediatric model and Williams and Jewell’s family-centred model 
ultimately fall short of being able to effectively change current practice. From the 
perspective of the veterinarian the pull between, on the one hand, reasoning in favour of the 
paediatric or family-centred model, but then having to adopt the mechanic model in order to 
accord with legal concepts of ownership in property, could prove emotionally harmful and 
detrimental for the veterinarian.
33
 In these instances, it is ultimately unhelpful to simply 
problematise the issue or come to the conclusion that the only workable solution to adopt is 
that veterinarians will simply always be the ‘servant of two masters;’34 this does nothing to 
help veterinarians make difficult care decisions or improve the position of the animal patient 
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who receives care. In instances of conflict, veterinarians will likely opt to stay on the right 
side of the law, which means that the wishes of the owner remain determinative under a 
commercial approach. In these circumstances, then, it is submitted that if veterinarians are to 
receive greater decision-making guidance and the animal’s best interests given greater place 
of prominence within the veterinary relationship, change needs to occur at a legal level. 
Going forward, it is submitted that when veterinarians find themselves confronted by a 
conflict between the interests of the owner on one side and the animal on the other, they 
should act to uphold the animal’s best interests. To assist veterinarians in making these 
decisions and to protect them if their conduct is called into question before the courts, 
additional legal mechanisms and tools are needed. Guidance is therefore needed on the limits 
of being able to act for the benefit of the animal patient; indeed, it is endeavouring to clarify 
and reconcile these inter-related issues that form the principal aims of this thesis. 
  
Whilst these arguments would significantly alter the nature of the veterinary relationship, a 
best interests approach also presents the greatest opportunity to positively influence the 
position of the animal under the law and provide veterinarians with greater clarity as to how 
to fulfil their legal obligations to owners and animal patients. Importantly, society has 
developed an increasing concern for the quality of treatment that animals receive
35
 and 
though the developments I argue for here would have the corollary of increasing the 
negligence liability of veterinarians, I agree with Radford that the best way forward when 
considering the law as it relates to animals is to recognise that: 
 ...it is far more important to secure a level of legal regulation which 
 recognises the needs and capacities of animals, imposes a clear and 
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 explicit duty on those who assume responsibility for them to 
 ensure that prescribed standards are met, and— crucially —to 
 ensure that this strategy is supported by adequate means of 
 enforcement.
36
  
 
The next section will take Radford’s argument forward and introduce the veterinary 
negligence framework I adopt. 
1.3 Veterinary Negligence: Limitations of Current Case Law 
In comparison to other professions, the case law relating to veterinary negligence is sparse; 
an extensive search revealed only three reported cases containing enough information to 
undertake greater analysis.
37
 It would be wrong, however, to assume that the reason for there 
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being so little case law is the fact that owners of animals are wholly satisfied with the 
services they receive from veterinarians.
38
 More likely the reasoning lies in how the law 
conceptualises animals and the value of the relationships they are capable of forming with 
their owners. A close reading of the reported case law reveals that the law relating to 
veterinary negligence reflects only a very narrow and simplistic construction of the human-
animal relationship and is based largely on the commercial underpinnings present between 
owner and animal, leaving unanswered the duties and obligations owed in more diverse, 
complex relationships.   
 
The purpose of this section is to assess the case law on veterinary negligence in light of 
current professional negligence principles relating to damage, duty and breach, and identify, 
within this framework, limitations and gaps which arise. The subsequent chapters of this 
thesis will address these gaps and, so far as possible, resolve them by applying orthodox tort 
principles utilised in slightly novel ways. By way of introduction, this section will provide 
alternative arguments for assessing the various stages of a veterinary negligence claim, 
taking into account not only the owner’s loss, but also the welfare of the animal patient, 
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which, it is argued, is best represented by acting in the best interests of the animal. From the 
outset, there is the admitted concern of relying too heavily on what the cases reveal in terms 
of what the law is given their very narrow application; however, it is submitted that the value 
to be derived from the cases lies in what they do not discuss. Thus, the case law will be 
utilised as a platform to advance the argument that more needs to be done in the area of 
veterinary negligence if the law is going to act as a guide for veterinarians and a mechanism 
to effect positive changes in animal welfare, as opposed to merely a mechanism for imposing 
liability.
39
 Given the importance of the damage element in setting out the existence and 
extent of a duty of care, it is with actionable damage that this discussion will begin.   
  Actionable Damage a)
i. Establishing a Framework: A Sentient Constitutive Property Model 
It is important from the beginning to emphasise that this chapter, indeed the whole of this 
thesis, will work from the primary premise that to forward the animal’s best interests within 
the veterinary relationship and provide adequate guidance for veterinarians on their rights 
and liabilities in tort, sentient animals that are owned should hold a legal status above mere 
fungible property for the purposes of the actionable damage aspect of a veterinary 
negligence claim. Arguably, one of the primary reasons why so little case law on the issue of 
veterinary negligence has been reported is the fact that damages for an animal which has 
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been negligently killed or injured can be set no higher than the animal’s market value.40 The 
traditional property damage paradigm may work, for example, in exceptional categories of 
damage where the loss is easily calculable and is sufficiently high to warrant bringing a 
claim in the first place, however, the vast majority of animals possess very little, if any, 
economic value. Thus, the question remains as to how the courts would evaluate loss in these 
circumstances.   
 
The position adopted here, and expanded upon in the Chapter Three, is that a more accurate 
representation of an animal’s value, both from an animal welfarist perspective and to more 
accurately reflect the owner’s loss, is to recognise sentient animals as a form of sentient 
constitutive property embodying a value which extends beyond its market price. Recognising 
this elevated property status would allow a more nuanced and accurate representation of the 
damage sustained by the owner and the animal. In addition, it will be argued that this model 
can better advance the argument that veterinarians should act, so far as possible, to further 
the animal’s best interests. Several academic commentators41 have suggested the adoption of 
a sentient property paradigm, however, this thesis will advocate a novel version of this idea 
                                                 
40
 This has traditionally been the accepted method of evaluation in American jurisprudence. For academic 
commentary on this point see: Christopher Green, ‘The Future of Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care 
of Companion Animals,’ (2004) 10 Animal Law 163, 192 and 196-198; Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee & 
G. Robert Weedon, ‘Modern Trends in Veterinary Malpractice: How Our Evolving Attitudes Toward Non-
Human Animals Will Change Veterinary Medicine,’ (2004) 10 Animal Law 125, 132; Steven Barghusen, 
‘Noneconomic Damage Awards in Veterinary Malpractice: Using the Human Medical Experience as a Model 
to Predict the Effect of Noneconomic Damage Awards on the Practice of Companion Animal Veterinary 
Medicine,’ (2010) 17(1) Animal Law 13, 16-17 and Joan E. Schaffner, An Introduction to Animals and the Law 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 163-165. Some literature has also described the market value approach as viewing 
animals as a commodity with no value beyond what the property owner chooses to give. For this point see: 
Gary Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Temple University Press 2000) xxiv 
and Mike Radford, Animal Welfare Law in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (OUP 2005) 101. One point 
to highlight here is the issue that of the many works which discuss the market value approach to determining an 
owner’s loss ⎯ of which only a few are extracted here ⎯ only a handful cover a British perspective. It has been 
shown in the cases discussed in this chapter that British courts adopt a similar approach to North America; 
however, the lack of British commentators on the more contentious (ie. economically less viable claims) 
highlights the need for greater jurisdiction-specific research. Indeed, this thesis aims to address this point. 
41
 See for example: McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, ‘Modern Trends in Veterinary Malpractice,’ (2004) 10 
Animal Law 125, 130 and Diane Sullivan and Holly Vietzke, ‘An Animal is Not an iPod,’ (2008) 4 Journal of 
Animal Law 41, 44. 
1. Reframing Veterinary Negligence Liability 
28 
 
and thus alter how animals should be viewed under this definition and how courts should 
adjudicate on veterinary negligence cases. Briefly, the current literature appears to consider 
only those animals which would be considered companion animals (ie. dogs, cats) or those 
animals—  almost exclusively dogs and cats—  that occupy a position in the home akin to a 
child or other beloved family member.
42
 The position advocated here is that, in keeping with 
current literature, the sentience element is utilised to elevate the status of the animal in 
question beyond fungible property. However, this model will utilise sentience to go further 
and highlight the constitutive nature of the relationship between animal and owner as the 
driving force behind claims in veterinary negligence, and importantly, to highlight that 
animals, companion or otherwise, should have their best interests prioritised by veterinarians 
engaged in providing care.  
 
A related issue that comes to the fore is to what extent the type of animal concerned, for 
example, “companion animal,” “agricultural” or “high market” bears on the question of 
damage. There is perhaps an inclination to think that only expensive animals or those 
animals which have traditionally held a more companion place in the hearts of their owners 
should be considered; indeed, the reported cases in Britain have only considered a very 
narrow category of animal— thoroughbred horses that possess a sizeable market value. 
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However, the argument I adopt is that the type of animal or its primary purpose should be 
irrelevant in considering the damage sustained by the owner. This would mean that as long 
as the animal in question is capable of participating in a constitutive relationship, the type of 
animal involved, whether a dog, a pig or a cow, is irrelevant. In this way, this thesis seeks to 
depart quite substantially from much of the academic literature in this area. In many 
instances, academic commentators focus on the position of those animals traditionally 
conceived of as companion animals, here, the focus will be on the relationship the owner 
shares with the animal as the driving force behind why certain legal duties are owed by the 
veterinarian.
43
 
  
Crucial for understanding the nature of the damage claimed is, therefore, the constitutive 
element. This framework will be developed in Chapter Three, but for present purposes, the 
model looks to the relationships humans construct with their property. Adapting the model 
advanced by Margaret Radin’s44 theory on constitutive property, I argue that animals can 
positively contribute to and constitute the owner’s sense of person. Where, for example, our 
animals feature in our life plans and, importantly, are capable of actively participating in the 
relationship, this will necessarily impact how our life plans and visions of our future self are 
constructed and experienced.
45
 In essence, then, the animal is constitutive of the owner’s 
personhood. It is this constitutive relationship, I argue, that should be afforded greater 
protection under the law. To some extent, the range of possible animal-owner relationships 
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can be seen in the available veterinary negligence case law. In Blass v. Randall,
46
 for 
example, the claimant purchased a horse vetted by the defendant veterinarian. Not long after, 
the horse become lame, yet the owner continued to work the animal intensively despite 
medical advice given by the defendant to the contrary. The horse later had to be destroyed.
47
 
However, in Glyn v. McGarel-Groves,
48
 which involved the negligent administration of 
steroidal medication to a dressage horse, the claimant described her relationship with Anna 
(the horse) in the following way: 
Words cannot explain how special she was to me. As a horse 
lover, I am fond of all the horses that I own and have owned...I get 
a huge amount of pleasure from looking after the horses and 
training them to a competition standard...In Anna’s case she was 
not only the most talented horse that I have ever owned (or am 
likely to ever own) she was a kind a gentle mare...She was the 
horse of a lifetime.
49
 
 
Thus, the type of animal remains the same, here, an expensive thoroughbred horse, however, 
totally divergent relationships are evident. The owner in Glyn, for example, almost certainly 
saw her relationship with Anna extending over a long period of time. It was also a 
relationship in which both owner and animal appeared to actively participate through the 
conveyance of affection for one another. In this regard, I argue that a constitutive 
relationship exists in the latter case, but not the former. A more detailed analysis of this 
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argument and its parameters will be addressed in Chapter Three.
50
 Importantly, then, the 
property element simply categorises the nature of the relationship between owner and animal 
for the purpose of defining the damage sustained. However, alongside the property element, 
is the emotional harm element represented by the constitutive relationship, which would 
allow those claims where the animal possess no, or very little, monetary value to proceed. 
How courts currently view animals for the purposes of a veterinary negligence claim is, 
however, quite different, as the next section will show. 
ii.  Current Constructs: The Limitations of Viewing Animals as Fungible Property  
As previously mentioned, for the purposes of a veterinary negligence claim, the relationship 
between owner and animal is currently that of property-holder and property. Thus, any harm 
sustained by the animal is seen as property damage to the owner, plus any consequential 
economic damages that may have been sustained (ie. veterinary bills). Damages are therefore 
assessed by calculating what the animal could have been sold for to a willing purchaser.
51
 
Evidence of this approach can be seen in the case of Glyn,
52
 where the Court of Appeal 
awarded the owner damages for the death of her horse when the owner’s primary 
veterinarian failed to prevent the second defendant from administering multiple high doses 
of two different steroidal medications, contrary to established practice. The treatment 
resulted in an overdose causing the horse to develop a serious disease, at which point she had 
to be destroyed. For the actionable damage portion of the claim, the court referred to the 
damage sustained as the ‘death of a top-class international dressage mare...owned by the 
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defendant.’53 Further, in determining the market value of the horse, the court noted that, 
‘Anna was a very successful and valuable dressage competition horse...’ and that her value 
was agreed to by the parties in the sum of £350,000.
54
 Though in this case the only damage 
claimed was the property damage sustained, the more important point to be considered is 
whether this method of assessment is capable of representing the measure of loss occasioned 
by a veterinarian’s negligence in all cases. 
 
In particular, three important issues arise as a result of the basic property conception 
represented in the current law. First, by framing the damage in terms of property with 
consequential economic loss, the court has limited its conception of damages to those sums 
which represent the ascertainable commercial/financial loss sustained, and closing its eyes to 
the potential for any consequential emotional harm sustained by the owner. As Chapter 
Three will discuss, in response to quickly-changing social ideas and perceptions of harm, 
courts have shown themselves to be accepting of novel forms of actionable damage and have 
found creative ways in which to accommodate such claims under more well-established 
heads of damage, including property damage.
55
 It is submitted that the current approach of 
viewing the loss sustained by the owner in purely financial terms for the damage or loss of 
property sustained, as evidenced in Glyn, ignores the more complex companion relationship 
that can exist between owner and animal.  
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Secondly, this economic approach to damage fails to recognise that a harm has primarily 
been suffered by the animal. Under the current fungible property model, the animal is 
viewed as a tradable, purchasable commodity with a determinable market value extending 
solely to its contemplated purchase price or replacement value. This conception, however, 
fails to take into account the animal as an entity capable of suffering harm as a result of a 
veterinarian’s negligence. A primary aim of this thesis is to advocate in favour of the best 
interests of animals within the veterinary relationship, yet, the present view of animals as 
fungible property precludes any consideration of even their most basic interests. A sentient 
property model would not only formally recognise the status of animals as feeling, intelligent 
beings within negligence law, but also ensure that veterinarians are protected from liability 
where they have accepted the animal as a patient and undertaken a positive duty to protect 
the animal’s best interests. This, I argue, provides a more solid and realistic foundation from 
which to evaluate the profession that provides animal care.   
 
Third is that the animals in all current reported veterinary negligence claims are 
thoroughbred horses of an exceptionally high value.
56
 Interestingly, and indeed this 
argument could be made for any of the animals considered in this thesis, horses have the 
potential to bridge the gap between a primarily utilitarian purpose or a companion purpose 
and that, as a result, their market value can vary widely. Crucially, the arguments advanced 
in the actionable damage chapter will illustrate that for the purposes of a claim in veterinary 
negligence, it should not be the case that only those animals which possess a sufficiently 
high market value are worth being litigated. Indeed, as Schaffner highlights, unless the 
animal is an economically valuable race horse or show dog, for example, the fair market 
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value of the animal is negligible compared to the costs of suit, and therefore, few lawsuits 
are filed.
57
 Negligence, it is argued, exists independent of an animal’s market value or the 
animal’s classification as a thoroughbred or pedigree; yet, the point that veterinary 
negligence is currently bound to this fungible property model means that only exceptional 
cases are litigated. What this point highlights, then, is the inadequacy of the market value 
assessment in producing results that capture the sentient quality of the animal and the full 
measure of loss sustained by the owner. 
 
Importantly, though in some cases the market value approach may satisfy the loss 
occasioned by the owner in certain limited circumstances, this model will not always leave 
the claimant fully compensated. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases where veterinary 
negligence has occurred, the animal will possess a market value which would not make it 
economically viable to pursue a claim.  A mechanism should, therefore, exist where those 
who have suffered the loss of an animal possessing an insignificant or non-existent market 
value, but where other, arguably, compensatable loss has occurred, to pursue a claim. Thus, 
it is submitted that conceiving harm in purely proprietary terms will not achieve this aim, but 
that such a mechanism presents itself utilising the sentient constitutive property approach. If 
we take as a matter of principle, as Eisenberg argues, that courts are authorised to lead by 
establishing principles or rules based on existing social standards and overturn those that 
have lost support, then, arguably, the courts stand in a strong place to see this mechanism 
established.
58
  It must not be forgotten, however, that the nature of the damage suffered is 
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also relevant to the existence and extent of any duty to avoid or prevent it
59
 and so how the 
duty of care is conceptualised must be able to accommodate the provisions of the sentient 
constitutive property model. As the discussion in the next section will highlight, extensive, 
but certainly not insurmountable change must occur at the duty stage for this to take place.       
 Duty of Care       b)
It has been argued by many tort commentators that the duty of care assessment in a 
negligence claim possesses little if any value to the ultimate determination of liability; 
instead, the emphasis should be placed on the breach assessment and that a singular duty to 
act reasonably be adopted across the board for all interactions between people.
60
 Though 
such a rejection is not made explicit in the current case law dealing with veterinary 
negligence, the duty of care assessment itself is either completely ignored or rooted in the 
contractual arrangement between the parties and restricted to a simple articulation that the 
veterinarian should act reasonably.
61
 In this regard, the formulation mirrors that found in the 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd.
62
 assumption of responsibility line of 
jurisprudence—  a point which will be discussed in greater detail below.  
 
The position adopted in this thesis and expanded upon in greater detail in Chapter Four is 
that rather than a duty which is restricted to a simple statement that one should act 
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reasonably, a veterinarian, in fact, owes many specific duties of care. Further, those duties 
will necessarily vary depending on the nature of the relationship shared between the owner 
and the animal, and the owner and the veterinarian, but also the nature of the wrongful 
conduct alleged. If, as it is argued in this thesis, the court’s role in veterinary negligence 
actions is to guide conduct and not simply to impose liability, a singular duty to act 
reasonably simply does not go far enough. Veterinarians find themselves in the special 
position of having to consider multiple interests and resolve difficult treatment-related 
conflicts which inevitably occur as a result of the triangular relationship between animal, 
owner and veterinarian. A singular duty conception, however, precludes a deeper analysis of 
these issues as determinations under the single duty theory tend to focus attention on what 
did happen between the claimant and the defendant, as opposed to what ought to have 
happened. 
i. A Duty Akin to Contract 
Before discussing how the courts applied assumption of responsibility reasoning to the 
reported veterinary negligence cases, it is first important to note that much of Hedley Byrne’s 
genesis lies in contract theory. Indeed, as Lord Devlin stated in Hedley Byrne itself, the 
special relationship required to found an assumption of responsibility in tort is the equivalent 
to that in contract— what prevents these claims from proceeding in contract is a lack of 
consideration.
63
 In response, ‘the law of negligence... adopts an interstitial, gap-filling role to 
make good deficiencies in the law of contract, by rectifying damage caused by promises 
which the law of contract cannot enforce.’64 With regards to veterinarians, it may be the case 
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that a formal contract is in place between the two concerned parties, however, if a harm 
occurs and no contract exists, negligence can fill this gap where it can be shown that an 
assumption of responsibility on the part of the defendant for the financial interests of the 
claimant has occurred and the claimant has reasonably relied on the advice or services of the 
defendant. When the two ingredients are found, it can be said that a special relationship 
exists between to the parties to which the law can then attach a duty of care.
65
 
 
The dicta found in veterinary negligence claims adopt this Hedley Byrne- type reasoning. An 
example of such language can be seen in Glyn, for example, where the lower court judge 
(later upheld by the Court of Appeal) emphasised that:  
...[the claimant] wanted [the defendant] to be present at High 
Meadows when Anna was examined and treated by [the second 
defendant], because he was Anna’s vet and [the claimant] relied 
on him to protect her own interests and to ensure that Anna was 
not endangered in any way...
66
   
 
Importantly, it was found by the lower court and approved by the Court of Appeal, that the 
duty undertaken by the defendant was restricted to that which could be found in the 
instructions or retainer, express or implied, which covered the visit giving rise to the incident 
leading to Anna’s death and not the fact that the defendant was Anna’s vet.67 This statement, 
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again, emphasises the duty arising from the contractual understanding between the parties, 
but nothing further. 
  
In Blass v. Randall,
68
 the claimant brought an action against the defendant veterinarian for 
damages sustained as a result of purchasing a lame horse. As part of the purchase procedure, 
the defendant veterinarian conducted a pre-purchase examination of the horse.
69
 From there, 
it was the claimant’s position that, ‘acting in reasonable reliance on the certificate and 
information and advice set out...above [namely that the horse had never been lame], the 
claimant purchased Panther [the horse] for £45,625.00.’70 Importantly, the court did not 
address the particulars of whether, ultimately, a duty should be imposed, but appeared to use 
the terminology to illustrate that a breach had not occurred. Hence, the court determined 
that, contrary to the claimant’s allegations, factual evidence supported the finding that the 
defendant had advised not to purchase right away and rather to see if the claimant could 
lease the horse,
71
 and that the claimant had not relied on the information contained in the 
certificate when she did decide to purchase the horse.
72
  
 
These two cases highlight several problems with utilising a Hedley Byrne-based assumption 
of responsibility in the context of veterinary negligence claims. First, the duty of care is said 
to emerge as a result of the special contractual arrangement between the parties. This 
represents a very specific and narrow construction which may not correspond with how 
owners (and possibly even veterinarians) view the veterinary relationship and the obligations 
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that stem from it.
73
 Further, viewing the duty of care in this manner also precludes 
consideration of the animal’s best interests, as the duty arises as a result of what the owner 
and veterinarian contemplated, which may not always include consideration of the animal’s 
interests. Lastly, using reasoning similar to that found in the Hedley Byrne jurisprudence 
fails to give veterinarians much in the way of guidance or concrete scenarios from which to 
order their behaviour. Unlike other methods of determining whether a duty of care exists, the 
assumption of responsibility test although ‘a very attractive way of summarising a result,.. 
has very limited utility as a mechanism to assist in reaching that result.’74 A similar outlook 
was shared by Longmore LJ when his Lordship stated that an assumption of responsibility is 
a ‘conclusory phrase to describe the result of the imposition of a duty of care rather than an 
essential step in the reasoning to be used in progressing the argument on the question of 
whether a duty of care should arise.’75 Combining these statements with the treatment by the 
courts in the cases considered above, the duty inquiry in veterinary negligence claims 
assumes an instrumentalist purpose, allowing the courts to determine liability based on either 
a positive or negative finding of breach.
76
  
 
                                                 
73
 Owners may, for example, view the veterinary relationship and the duties as revolving around the provision 
of care, not a service. Thus, if a duty is breached, it is not simply a breach of contract, a “thing” constructed 
between the owner and veterinarian, or even a breach of promise, but rather a duty owed to care for and treat a 
sentient being. On the point that a contract can be viewed as a “thing,” see: P.S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract 
(Clarendon 1990) 14. See also: James Yeates, Animal Welfare in Veterinary Practice (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 
39.  
74
 Keith Stanton, ‘Professional Negligence: Duty of Care in the Twenty First Century,’ (2006) 22(3) 
Professional Negligence 134, 138.  
75
 Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclay’s Bank plc [2005] 1 WLR 2082 at 41. 
76
 Interestingly, Prosser, who adopted the view that the concept of duty was meaningless and doctrinally 
redundant, also said of duty that it is simply ‘a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to 
analysis in itself.... “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ This 
would seem to mirror the arguments made in respect of the Hedley Byrne line of reasoning. This could be then 
be seen as bolstering the argument that the courts in the veterinary negligence cases imposed a general duty of 
care as a result of the relationship between the parties being akin to contract to then focus on breach. See 
William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts (1st ed., West Publishing Co. 1941) quoted in John C.P. 
Goldberg and B.C. Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (n39). 
1. Reframing Veterinary Negligence Liability 
40 
 
To conclude this section, two potential arguments are put forward to explain why the courts 
reasoned the cases in this manner; however, it is submitted that neither are satisfactory and 
that the relational method of determining the duty of care question discussed below should 
be adopted. First, there is the argument advanced by Stanton
77
 that no single test for 
establishing a duty of care exists and that courts have, instead, adopted whichever method 
they feel is ‘best’ to achieve the policy aims it feels important.78 If the courts in the above 
cases believed simply that they were applying the best method possible to achieve the policy 
aims desired, for example adequate compensation, arguably adopting Hedley Byrne- type 
reasoning would, for the reasons discussed above, not always capture the true nature of the 
loss. Further, it remains questionable whether answering questions regarding the duty of care 
based solely on policy analyses is actually to be preferred. As Chapter Four will argue, a 
return to active judging and to fundamental negligence principles and values provides a 
sounder approach to the duty analysis. The final argument suggested that because emphasis 
was placed at the breach stage of the negligence inquiry, it can be said that the courts were 
content to find that a single general duty of care as a result of the contractual arrangements 
between the parties existed. This argument would also seem to accord with my argument 
above that a finding of assumption of responsibility is a conclusory phrase, used to say that a 
duty existed (ie. the courts made a determination as to breach and simply needed a method of 
then saying a duty also existed). As the next section will seek to show, however, the duty of 
care assessment needs to be far more extensive and multiple duties must be recognised if the 
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law is to provide adequate guidance to veterinarians and prioritise the best interests of the 
animal patient.               
ii. Multiple Duties: A Relational Concept 
If a general duty to act reasonably is adopted, in Prosser’s words, ‘the duty is always the 
same⎯ to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.’79 
Hence, the question is not whether a duty arises, but whether the standard has been met, 
which is necessarily a factual inquiry occurring at the breach stage.
80
 In this way, then, the 
heavy reliance on the specific facts of each case, which is evident upon reading the three 
judgments, is consistent with the general duty analysis. The problem with this analysis, and 
why it should be rejected, is that it prevents the development of a set of normative principles 
which can guide veterinarians in their everyday practice. Because the courts in the three 
cases place such heavy reliance on the breach stage, each decision is essentially a one-off 
based solely on the particular facts as they arose in the given case. It is, therefore, only when 
the courts look at the duty question in terms of the relationships between the parties as 
generating specific duties that conduct can be shaped and specific interests forwarded.   
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In this regard, Goldberg and Zipursky, view duties being relational in two ways: first, any 
relationship, even those between strangers, can give rise to duties of care. Second, those 
relationships which pre-date the tortious incident or where certain power or knowledge 
inequalities exist, are termed “relationship-sensitive” and can give rise to more onerous 
duties of care because a special relationship is said to exist between the parties.
81
 For 
example, whether the defendant would owe an affirmative duty to act or to protect would be 
largely dependent on a finding that some type of pre-existing relationship was in place at the 
time the tortious incident occurred. A more in-depth analysis of these issues will be offered 
in Chapter Four. For present purposes, however, what is important, and what is not captured 
by the current case law on veterinary negligence, is how this concept affects veterinarians.     
 
Veterinarians operate under unique conditions in comparison to other professions. To start, 
though only legal duties can be owed to the owner,
82
 actual care and treatment is 
administered to the animal. This creates a triangular relationship between veterinarian, 
owner and animal, giving rise to various complex legal and ethical obligations.
83
 
Unfortunately, the reported cases on veterinary negligence fail to consider this complex 
relationship, or any relationship between owner and veterinarian outside one which may 
arise out of a contractual arrangement. Looking briefly at just some of the duties owed to the 
owner, it can be seen how inadequate the general duty to act reasonably is in capturing the 
reality of veterinary practice.  
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Building from the relational model introduced above, veterinarians may owe duties of care 
stemming from two primary scenarios: those which arise from an act of misfeasance and 
those arising from nonfeasance. Within these two broad areas, further duties may arise 
relating to the treatment and diagnosis of the animal’s condition, and those related to 
disclosure of risk relating to any proposed treatment of the owner’s animal. With treatment 
and diagnosis, duties may arise from a positive act of misfeasance where, for example, the 
veterinarian negligently performs an operation on an owner’s dog or, as in Glyn⎯ though 
duty was not explicitly discussed by the courts⎯ the veterinarian negligently administers a 
particular drug or combination of drugs. Potential duties stemming from an omission could 
be found in a situation where the veterinarian fails to attend the owner’s seriously ill horse 
after accepting a call from the owner, or where the veterinarian has through his or her 
omission created a source of danger, for example, in the way animal patients are boarded. 
There may also be separate duties to disclose the risks associated with a certain treatment
84
 
which, given the medical advancements currently being made in veterinary medicine, would 
certainly be conceivable.          
 
With regards to the animal patient, one of the primary aims of this thesis is to forward the 
best interests of the animal. In this regard, it is argued that veterinarians should view their 
obligations through the perspective of a best interests lens. Although it cannot be currently 
said that veterinarians owe direct legal duties of care to the animal itself⎯ for this would 
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imply a corresponding right to bring an independent claim against the veterinarian, which 
because of animals’ status as property currently does not exist⎯ considering the animal’s best 
interests may also have a bearing on the duty owed to the owner. For example, a conflict 
between the interests of the animal and the owner may arise when dealing with the issue of 
‘overtreatment’ or life-prolonging treatment. Overtreatment, Corr states, is treatment sought 
by the owner which either, ‘results in a poorer quality of life than no treatment or 
euthanasia...or [can be described as] a treatment or test that makes no difference in the 
animal’s condition or quality of life.’85 Here, then, a situation could easily be envisioned 
where a veterinarian, believing he was acting in the best interests of the animal, refused to 
give life-prolonging treatment to a seriously ill and suffering animal, which then died. In 
these circumstances questions need to be asked as to whether the owner’s wishes in having 
that treatment administered remain operative if a negligence claim was brought and whether 
acting in the best interests of an animal could potentially offer the veterinarian some form of 
protection from liability. Thus, an important aspect of determining the nature of the many 
duties potentially owed to owners is determining how conflicts could affect those duties and 
how they are likely to be dealt with by the courts.         
iii. Concluding Thoughts on Duty of Care 
In none of the cases considered do the courts detail their findings as to the duty of care. 
Though language resembling that consistent with a finding of an assumption of 
responsibility in line with Hedley Byrne can be identified, this is never made explicit. It 
would appear from the dicta that the courts were satisfied to find that a general duty arose as 
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a result of the claimant hiring the veterinarian, having decided the issue largely at the breach 
stage. Quite simply, conceptualising the duty of care inquiry in this framework skirts far 
deeper issues. Writing soon after the decision in Hedley Byrne, Stevens stated that the 
decision in Hedley Byrne ‘represents the most interesting exercise in the judicial 
development of the common law since Donoghue v. Stevenson.’86 Though it is true that 
Hedley Byrne has done much to impact the duty of care inquiry in negligence claims, when 
applied in the veterinary negligence context, it only serves to obscure deeper questions 
which require attention. The focus courts place on the commercial and economic interests of 
the claim gives the impression that they are the only interests which require attention by the 
veterinarian. What remains to be answered, therefore, is a more complete understanding of 
the various duties of care to which veterinarians may be exposed to as a part of their daily 
practice, the types of relationships which give rise to those duties, and how considerations 
such as the animal’s best interests bear on how the duty is conceptualised. If, as it is argued 
in this thesis, negligence is not simply about imposing liability, but rather guiding conduct, a 
deeper consideration of these issues must occur.    
 Breach of Duty c)
A necessary consequence of finding that a single general duty to take reasonable care exists 
is that breach becomes a focal point of the negligence assessment. Essentially, those 
elements which would represent duty considerations if the relational duties approach were 
adopted become subsumed by the breach assessment. One of the problems with this 
approach and why it should be ultimately rejected is that leaving matters to the breach 
assessment results in answers which are largely case or fact-specific. Difficulties, therefore, 
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arise in establishing a body of law which sets out normative principles capable of informing 
how one ought to act within a particular legal relationship. Arguably, this places too great an 
emphasis on the breach stage. Rather, the preferred course, as previously argued, is to 
undertake a far deeper analysis at the duty stage and leave breach to determine the important 
question of whether the veterinarian’s conduct met the standard expected within the 
profession.
87
  
 
A further point which is raised in the case law concerning veterinary negligence is to what 
extent the use of Bolam
88
/Bolitho
89
 principles bear on the determination of breach. Given 
that veterinarians are professionals dealing with matters of clinical skill and judgment, 
reliance on this area of jurisprudence is to be expected. A reading of the case law would 
appear to support this view, although how the courts deciding veterinary negligence claims 
have interpreted this case law and the extent to which they have applied it, varies. This 
leaves several unanswered questions relating to the use of expert evidence and judicial 
scrutiny of such evidence. These issues will be introduced below and later expanded upon in 
Chapter Five of this thesis.  
 
A related point is the extent to which professional guidelines are utilised to assist in 
determining the expected standard of care. There is currently great debate in the professional 
negligence arena over the use of professional guidelines in shaping the breach of duty.
90
 This 
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has perhaps been most strongly felt in the human medical context with a multitude of 
regulatory and professional bodies developing clinical and professional guidelines, some of 
which have then subsequently been utilised by the court to help determine questions relating 
to professional standards of care.
91
 Though professional guidelines are not determinative 
when assessing breach, guidance can track very close to expected tort standards
92
 and 
provide courts with an example of professionally-held standards relating to patient care and 
professional practice.
93
 With regards to veterinarians, the RCVS has recently updated its 
Professional Code of Conduct outlining good professional practice.
94
 Though it will be 
argued that the use and understanding of professional guidance is to be encouraged, both in 
litigation and practice, to what extent it can be said that existing guidance is fit for purpose in 
terms of the interests it considers merits analysis.  
i.  Expert Evidence in Veterinary Negligence: The Use and Misuse of Bolam and 
Bolitho Jurisprudence 
Before discussing the application of Bolam and Bolitho in the context of the veterinary 
negligence cases considered here, it is necessary to briefly set out how these two cases bear 
on the breach assessment. Next to Lord Atkin’s speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson,95 the 
direction given by McNair J in Bolam is perhaps one of the most influential in negligence 
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law. In this case, the jury was directed that the defendant will not be found to have breached 
his duty if he:  
…has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of opinion skilled in that particular art... Putting 
it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in 
accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of 
opinion who would take a contrary view.
96
  
 
For the next forty years, it was widely held that if a doctor
97
 could proffer expert opinion to 
the effect that he or she would have undertaken a similar course as the defendant, breach had 
not occurred.
98
 Importantly, the decision in Bolitho altered the position of the courts giving 
them authority to scrutinise the expert evidence delivered to ensure that the evidence meets 
not only logical scrutiny, but could also be considered reasonable and responsible.
99
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Writing soon after the decision in Bolitho, Teff
100
 noted that increasingly medical negligence 
claims ‘contain elaborate treatment of the medical issues, coupled with signs of more 
independent and critical judicial appraisal of expert evidence on the requisite standard of 
care.’101 What remained unanswered at the time Teff wrote this piece, however, was whether 
courts were scrutinising substantive evidence given by experts or simply their professional 
credibility in relation to one another. At the time, this discussion highlighted the possibility 
that an over reliance on the expert evidence and a hesitancy to engage with the normative 
aspects relating to proffered standards existed within the judiciary. Whilst it now seems 
settled that courts are considerably more willing in human medical claims to challenge 
evidence which objectively falls short of expected standards,
102
 in the veterinary context, this 
tension may still prove problematic for some of the reasons initially cited in human medical 
negligence claims. In this regard, the court may place particular weight on a knowledge 
deficit which they themselves possess and an acknowledgement that medicine is not an exact 
science, but an “art”103 based on clinical observation, past experience, knowledge of the 
patient, and intuition.   
 
An example of this reasoning could be said to exist in the case of Calver.
104
 Here, the 
defendant was called by the claimant to attend his thoroughbred mare, which had aborted her 
foal the previous evening. The veterinarian attended, but after examining the afterbirth and 
the state of the mare, decided not to administer antibiotics and a uterine flush, which 
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represented professional practice if the afterbirth was not all there or the mare appeared ill.
105
 
The mare soon after developed laminitis resulting from retained biomaterial and had to be 
destroyed.
106
 Two experts gave evidence at the trial, both with converging views on the 
treatment which ought to have been administered. At first instance, the veterinarian was 
found to have been negligent in determining the horse to be fit and well, however, the 
decision was overturned on appeal. Near the conclusion of the judgment, Simon Brown LJ 
raised, what he considered the “critical question arising out of the appeal:”107   
Was the judge entitled to regard this as one of those “rare case[s]” 
in which one body of veterinary opinion (represented by Mr. 
Vogel) demonstrated that the other (represented by Mr Hughes 
and Mr Greenwood) was not capable of withstanding logical 
analysis, or was it not one of “the vast majority of cases” where 
the reasonableness of Mr Hughes’ opinion was demonstrated by 
the fact that it was shared by Mr. Greenwood, a distinguished 
expert in the field?’108  
 
Looking at how the question was posed, it appears to frame the breach assessment in light of 
the consistency of the expert evidence, as opposed to the cogency and reasonableness of that 
evidence in practice. On the facts as presented, the administration of antibiotics would have 
been an inexpensive and easy precaution and one which would have completely eliminated 
risk to the horse.
109
 In her article looking at the human medical context, Mulheron cites 
judicial support for the point that if ‘the risk of an adverse outcome for the patient could 
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have been easily and inexpensively avoided by an alternative course of medical treatment or 
diagnosis, then the doctor’s conduct will be held to be negligent, even if a body of medical 
opinion did endorse that conduct.’110 What Calver highlights, then, is the important point 
that when courts are deciding on veterinary negligence claims, it should not be the case that 
they abdicate their responsibility of determining the expected standard of care to an expert 
witness simply because that witness could be classed as ‘distinguished in the field.’ Writing 
during the same time period Calver was decided, Maclean stated that within the judiciary 
there existed an unwillingness to undertake an assessment of the ‘proffered standard which 
would be necessary if the [breach] test is to have an appropriate normative standard,’111 
deferring instead to the opinion of the medical profession. Going forward, whilst the 
involvement of expert witnesses remains fundamental to the determination of professional 
negligence cases, I argue, in Chapter Five, that courts hearing veterinary negligence claims 
actually sit in a strong position to start challenging outmoded professional norms and should 
take a firmer stance on setting normative standards of care which would apply across the 
profession. In this regard, courts should focus on achieving a balance between the internal 
consistency of the evidence and the cogency and reasonableness
112
 of that evidence, which is 
what Bolam, as reinterpreted by Bolitho, originally intended.
113
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Underlying these arguments is the crucial point that before the courts can be expected to 
develop a normative standard of care for the veterinary profession, the reliance placed on 
expert evidence means that a profession-wide change in mindset must logically come first. 
Methods as to how this change can be achieved is featured in Chapter Five, however, what is 
salient here and what is not represented in the case law, is that the change must be directed to 
advancing the best interests of the animal and the constitutive relationship between owner 
and animal. The point that courts look to expert opinion in professional negligence claims 
raises the parallel point that along with active judicial scrutiny of witness evidence must 
come an acceptance of the constitutive property model and best interests approach. It cannot 
be the case, if the dual aims of this thesis are to be met, that the commercial approach is the 
only, or even the dominant, method of approaching the veterinary relationship. I argue in the 
next section and in Chapter Five that effecting this change is best achieved through the 
introduction of new professional guidelines commissioned by the RCVS.       
ii.  Impact of Professional Guidelines on the Breach Assessment: Current 
Application and Future Possibilities   
There has been much debate amongst academics about the use of professional guidelines or 
so-called “soft law” to more clearly articulate the standard of care expected from a 
professional.
114
 In a rapidly changing area of practice, professional guidelines can assist the 
practitioner by outlining standards considered good practice and the client by outlining the 
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conduct professionals must follow.
115
 Importantly, guidelines may also be utilised by the 
courts when determining complex issues relating to the normative standard of care and, 
where they possess institutional legitimacy, provide support where the court deviates from 
professional opinion.
116
 Though I submit that guidelines should play an important supporting 
role in the breach assessment, questions must be asked, however, regarding the validity of 
the guidelines themselves and what interests they seek to promote and, conversely, leave out.  
 
In the veterinary negligence context, the courts in all three cases made reference, either 
directly or indirectly, to professional guidance. Both Glyn and Blass made explicit use of 
guidelines produced by professional bodies, specifically guidance created by the RCVS and 
an independently-developed manual written by the British Equine Veterinary Association 
(“BEVA”). Though the question of how the guidance was utilised is of importance, greater 
consideration will be given here and in more detail in Chapter Five, as to whether it can be 
said the guidance, particularly the RCVS guidance, can be utilised to greater effect within 
veterinary negligence claims and whether it can be said that such guidance is fit for purpose.  
 
In the case of Glyn, for example, Rix LJ, in finding that the defendant’s contemporaneous 
notes of the treatment administered represented the best evidence as to his understanding of 
the scope of his responsibilities on that day, then highlighted that the RCVS guidance 
recommended veterinarians maintain clear and accurate case records.
117
 Thus, it would 
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appear that the guidance was utilised to justify the heavy reliance the courts placed on the 
notes in determining the scope of the defendant’s responsibility. Combine this with 
corroborating expert evidence as to professional practice on the actual actions undertaken by 
the defendant and breach can be established. Looking beyond how the actual guidance was 
applied, however, further consideration ought to be given to the relationship or interplay 
between expert evidence and professional guidelines. In this instance, the expert opinion and 
the guidance worked in tandem to support the breach analysis undertaken by the court. 
Uncertainty may occur, however, where, for example, expert opinion diverges from RCVS 
guidance. Further, if it is shown that the guidance itself is contradictory or merely sets 
standards in line with professional etiquette, serious questions arise as to the weight each 
piece of evidence should carry. This would be especially important where questions are 
raised regarding the veterinarian’s expert evidence, perhaps because the practice adopted by 
the defendant and supported by the expert appears outdated.             
 
Taking this forward, it will be argued in Chapter Five that the human medical context can 
provide assistance on the use and development of professional guidance. Although the 
RCVS did, in 2012, produce new guidance for its veterinarians, it will be argued that in its 
current form the document fails to provide veterinarians with necessary guidance. As 
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evidenced in Glyn, courts are prepared in the veterinary negligence context to engage with 
professional guidance, however, to be effective, I argue the guidance must reflect the 
arguments introduced in the previous sections concerning sentient constitutive property and 
a relational approach to the duty of care. In this regard, regulatory lessons learned by the 
General Medical Council (“GMC”) can provide assistance. In particular, as this thesis 
advocates a paediatric approach in guiding veterinarians as to their professional and legal 
obligations, Chapter Five will look at the development and content of the 0-18 Years: 
Guidance for all Doctors
118
 and determine to what extent elements of the guidance, namely 
the best interests assessment in section 12, could be adapted to fit the veterinary context.  
 
Importantly, however, to effect the greatest positive change, it is submitted that reform to the 
guidance must be accompanied by a change in professional mindset that would see the 
sentient constitutive property model broadly supported.
119
 To achieve this, a change in 
Council representation within the RCVS to include greater diversity of opinion will be 
advocated. As official drafter of the Code, diversity between lay professional within the 
Council itself is necessary to ensure that professional concerns do not dominate.
120
 Thus, to 
give effect to the primary aims of this thesis, these changes at the professional level must 
occur. As evidenced by all of the veterinary negligence cases, courts will look to expert 
evidence and, as shown in Glyn, are willing to consider professional guidance in assembling 
their findings as to breach; however, the current RCVS guidance does not go far enough in 
articulating the full range of veterinary obligations. Because, as Lee stated, professional 
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guidance can track very close to the expected tort standard,
121
 there is scope to create the 
basis for legitimate change in favour of the animal’s best interests and the constitutive 
relationship.   
iii. Concluding Thoughts on Breach of Duty      
The current law concerning veterinary negligence places breach at the centre of the 
negligence inquiry. Though it was argued that much more of the court’s consideration should 
be directed at the duty of care stage, the current situation does not reflect this. Instead, 
liability appears to be determined largely on the unique factual situation before the court. It 
is submitted that the courts and the various professions work together— not always 
harmoniously, but together nonetheless— to develop the common law and the various duties 
and standards of care to be expected. It is from case law that professionals are guided as to 
their legal duties and requisite standards of care, and conversely, the courts look to the 
professions to help them understand and interpret evolving standards of care through expert 
evidence. To maintain this relationship, deeper consideration needs to be given to boundaries 
between duty of care and breach, and the tests and considerations found in each one. This is 
currently missing in veterinary negligence jurisprudence. 
 
The primary aim of Chapter Five, then, will be to reassess the breach inquiry in light of the 
argument that a shift of emphasis to the duty of care stage should occur and attempt to more 
clearly define the breach assessment taking into consideration not only Bolam and Bolitho 
jurisprudence, but more importantly the role of professional guidelines within that 
framework and the feasibility of including a best interests provision. 
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1.4 Conclusion        
The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the current challenges and uncertainties facing 
the veterinary profession and to demonstrate that within veterinary negligence claims, the 
wrong questions are being asked by the courts. As it currently stands, the veterinary 
profession is undergoing considerable change from numerous sources, however, an 
increasingly disparate and complex clientele with evolving expectations regarding the 
treatment of their animals means that, going forward, a clear vision of veterinary liability is 
necessary. In its current state, both the profession and the courts have adopted a commercial 
perspective to the veterinary relationship, however, this provides an increasingly myopic 
view of what is both ethically and, I argue, legally, a triangular relationship. From a legal 
perspective, the lens needs to be refocused and emphasis placed on understanding the nature 
of the harm sustained by the claimant and in response to this analysis, what the defendant 
veterinarian ought to have been mindful of.  
 
The next chapter of this thesis will provide a lens through which to view veterinary 
negligence. As this thesis will make arguments which challenge orthodox perceptions to, or 
argue a re-working of, the various requirements of a negligence claim, understanding the 
underlying rationale from which these arguments are made is crucial. When presented with 
arguments that seek to advance the law in new ways, courts will often look to ground their 
reasoning in theories or principles which already possess doctrinal support. However, it must 
be asked whether any of these approaches, for example, corrective justice or rights-based 
theories are capable of elucidating the basis of veterinary liability; I argue in the next chapter 
that they are not. Instead, it will be argued that an instrumentalist approach in which focus is 
placed on protecting the interests of the vulnerable party should be adopted. From here, the 
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remainder of this thesis will then address the damage, duty, and breach requirements within a 
negligence claim taking on board the changes introduced in this introductory chapter. 
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2. The Nature and Purpose of Negligence Law: Situating Veterinary Liability 
Within a Vulnerability Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted that although veterinary negligence operates as a 
recognised form of professional negligence liability, its reach in practice is restricted to 
animals with a high market value. Further, the reasoning behind the court’s decisions 
revealed a strict application of orthodox negligence principles relating to property damage, 
prioritising the claimant’s financial interest and maintaining an arm’s-length, commercial 
structure between owner and veterinarian. Going forward, I argue that the aims of my thesis, 
namely to advocate in favour of a best interests approach to animal care and provide more 
detailed guidance to veterinarians as the extent of their legal obligations, will be prevented 
from developing in a positive way if current practices remain unchanged. Before discussing 
the substantive issues relating to actionable damage, duty of care, and breach, it is important 
first to discuss the lens through which I argue veterinary negligence operates; this is the 
purpose of the present chapter.  
 
It is submitted that although persuasive in some respects, looking at veterinary negligence 
through a purely philosophical lens fails to capture the nuance of the veterinary relationship 
and fails to provide a solid foundation from which to argue that animals’ best interests 
should be prioritised within that relationship. Instead, an instrumental perspective, in which 
protection of the vulnerable is central, will be advanced. Unlike the various philosophical 
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approaches to negligence, discussed in this chapter, an instrumental perspective can better 
represent the strongly relational veterinary liability model I adopt in this thesis and offers a 
more pragmatic approach to analysing special legal relationships more broadly. In this way, 
developing an instrumental approach in which the court’s primary aim is to protect the 
vulnerable can be viewed as a legitimate aim within negligence jurisprudence and represents 
a logical and pragmatic extension of existing case law when considering negligence more 
broadly. Furthermore, although a vulnerability-based approach does not represent a truly 
novel or radical departure from current judicial reasoning— courts have, in a number cases, 
incorporated reasoning which looks to the idea of being vulnerable to arrive at decisions it 
considers fair and just. This chapter will develop and attempt to reconcile these ad hoc 
applications and provide a grounded rationale for this approach which can be taken forward. 
 
To demonstrate this, the first section of this chapter will analyse the more influential 
philosophical theories relating to negligence including corrective justice, distributive justice, 
and rights-based approaches to negligence. It will be argued that these theories cannot be 
sufficiently adapted to allow the animal’s interest to be considered and must therefore be 
rejected as explanatory mechanisms for veterinary negligence liability. Of primary 
importance is the rigid adherence of all three models to a binary, correlative structure which, 
although rooted in strong jurisprudential history, relies too heavily on the individualistic, 
autonomous models of personhood this thesis ultimately rejects. Section two of this chapter 
will introduce the instrumental perspective which I adopt and argue why it is to be preferred, 
particularly in the veterinary context. This section will also introduce the way in which I 
utilise vulnerability. Although vulnerability discourse in the tort context has been addressed 
by academic commentators and the courts in the past, this has been done without detailed 
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explanation or analysis. An important component of this section will therefore be to put 
forward a more unified view of how vulnerability can be utilised in the doctrinal context 
whilst also accounting for the various legal relationships negligence considers.  
 
The final two sections will analyse in greater detail the vulnerability framework adopted in 
this chapter, looking first at how vulnerability discourse has been creatively applied by the 
courts in the past to achieve practical justice aims. A final analysis is devoted to the 
relationship between the best interests assessment and vulnerability. Both models play a 
fundamental role in how veterinarians and the courts ought to view veterinary negligence 
and the triangular relationship; therefore, it is important to highlight how the two are able to 
support one another within a negligence inquiry. It is submitted that this type of analysis is 
best undertaken at the duty of care stage and that such an analysis should be based on the 
flexible application of normatively-relevant considerations, which underpin the law as it 
relates to negligence.   
2.2 Tort Theories Scrutinised  
Naffine argues that:  
While the law of the person is most conspicuously dealt with when 
a case explicitly considers the legal personality of a given 
entity...the nature of law’s person is also to be discovered within 
the underlying assumptions about legal being embedded within the 
general principles of law.
1
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The purpose of this section, then, is to bring to the fore some of these underlying 
assumptions and argue that, as currently conceived, the structural and in some cases 
substantive elements of the dominant theoretical approaches to negligence cannot be 
stretched to accommodate the interests of the animal or properly account for the constitutive 
relationship shared between owner and animal. When I introduce the animal as a single 
entity into consideration, this is done to situate their position within the specific theory under 
discussion. As none of the tort commentators discussed below contemplate the potential 
positions of non-legal actors and rather assume the full legal status of any concerned parties, 
this analysis is necessary to demonstrate the deficiencies created when these theories are 
measured against the integral parts of the veterinary negligence construct I adopt.  
 
One final point relating to the structure of this section concerns the division between 
distributive and corrective justice models.
2
 Whilst it is the case that important lessons can be 
learned from their separation,
3
 for example, why it is important to restore a harmed 
individual and correct the wrong occasioned by another. Indeed, influential tort theorists like 
Honoré
4
 and Weinrib
5
 see corrective and distributive justice operating in distinct spheres, in 
practice, the two are more likely to be considered alongside one another. As Campbell makes 
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clear, ultimately, in both corrective and distributive models, issues of distribution
6
 and the 
treatment of persons as responsible agents are at stake.
7
 An example of this can be seen in 
the duty of care assessment within the Caparo
8
 test used in novel duty of care situations. On 
one level are the considerations particular to the claimant and defendant, such as 
foreseeability of risk and proximity between the parties, yet the final consideration (that it 
would be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant), is a question 
answered by looking to broader social policy questions. This is not to imply, however, that 
answers in response to those questions which consider corrective issues and those that 
consider distributive issues exist in harmony.
9
 The answer in a duty of care assessment must 
embrace either a positive or negative finding, yet, the tensions created by blending questions 
of corrective and distributive justice is well-evidenced and inherent in negligence case law.
10
 
Negligence is an evolving body of law, which must respond, simultaneously, to allegations 
of a private wrong as between claimant and defendant and changing societal norms, which 
may bear on the corrective question at hand. With this in mind, I treat corrective and 
distributive justice issues separately to highlight the different ways in which these theories 
approach negligence liability and also to consider how each branch would address the role of 
the animal within the veterinary relationship.  
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 Corrective Justice Theory a)
Corrective justice theory is simple in its structure and substance, yet is capable of explaining 
the nuance and interconnectedness of the relationship between claimant and the defendant. 
According to Weinrib, the position of the claimant and the position of the defendant is only 
intelligible in light of the other’s.11 Thus, in finding that the defendant is liable to the 
claimant, ‘the court is making not two separate judgments (one that awards something to the 
plaintiff and the other that coincidentally takes the same from the defendant), but a single 
judgment that embraces both parties in their interrelationship.’12 Hence, it is frequently said 
of the claimant and defendant that they are ‘doer and sufferer of the same injustice.’13 This 
idea manifests in the principle of correlativity, which holds that, insofar as tort (more 
specifically negligence) is concerned, obligations arise when the claimant’s right forms the 
basis of the defendant’s duty, or when the scope of the duty owed includes the particular 
type of right-infringement that the claimant suffered.
14
 Corrective justice, then, looks only to 
the relationship that exists between the claimant and defendant and excludes those 
considerations which are external to the parties before the court. This, therefore, removes 
from the equation questions of policy, which focus on public interest or community welfare 
arguments.
15
  
 
In many ways, excluding external policy questions can be viewed as a good thing. For 
example, taking a strong corrective justice stance would prevent judges from hiding under 
                                                 
11
 Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice in a Nutshell,’ (n2) 351. 
12
 ibid. 
13
 Ernest Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice,’ (2001) 2(1) 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 107, 107. 
14
 ibid 118.  
15
 Andrew Robertson, ‘Policy-based Reasoning in the Duty of Care Cases,’ (2013) 33(1) Legal Studies 119, 
120 
2. The Nature and Purpose of Negligence Law 
65 
 
the guise of the fair, just, and reasonable criterion when deciding whether the defendant 
owed the claimant a duty of care. Instead courts would need to engage openly with relational 
factors and principles directly impacting the parties. This could arguably do much to remove 
incoherence arguments which currently plague the duty of care assessment.
16
 However, this 
is not the position this chapter takes. Negligence cannot exist in vacuum and in certain 
circumstances taking into account societal viewpoint or welfare goals can be an asset and not 
a hindrance when it widens access to justice and allows the law to evolve and modernise.  
 
Returning to principles of corrective justice, in addition to the structural component between 
claimant and defendant, each party must also possess legal personality. Personality for 
Weinrib follows a Kantian account rooted in rationality and agency, which animals lack.
17
 
Thus, personality means that: 
 From the standpoint of the doer of injustice...the ascription of 
 responsibility for one’s actions...[and] from the standpoint of the 
 sufferer, personality is the basis of the rights that mark out the 
 sphere that others must treat as inviolate.
18
        
 
On this account, from the standpoint of the claimant, or the sufferer of the injustice, 
personality relates to the inward capacity for purposive agency, but also ‘achieves external 
existence in social interactions through its exercise by or embodiment in an agent.’19   
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Moving to the veterinary context obvious problems arise when the corrective justice model 
is applied in its pure form. First, although simple in its structure, the binary nature of 
corrective justice would not allow for the interests of the animal to play a role. It has already 
been mentioned that veterinary negligence is best conceptualised as triangular in nature with 
the legal interests of the owner running in many cases alongside the animal’s best interests, 
but in others diverging. Therefore, a structure is needed which is capable of recognising the 
triangular nature of the veterinary relationship, but is responsive when the interests of the 
two harmed parties diverge.
20
 Corrective justice does not allow for this type of construction.  
 
Fundamental to this discussion is the further point that animals are not currently capable of 
being rights-holders under the law. Animals are viewed as lacking the capacity and agency 
necessary to exercise rational thought and autonomous decision-making and, more 
controversially, it needs to be asked whether granting animals this standing truly represents 
the best way to improve their welfare position. With these points in mind, the theory which 
underpins corrective justice, though highly persuasive in many contexts, cannot be used in 
its pure form to explain the structure or content of the veterinary relationship. Its strict 
adherence to formalism, both structurally and substantively, ultimately makes corrective 
justice theory an unsuitable candidate to explain the underlying characteristics of a 
veterinary negligence claim.          
 Distributive Justice  b)
Unlike corrective justice, which looks strictly to the interests of the parties before the court, 
distributive justice is ‘premised on a scarcity of resources or funds...[which] aim to provide 
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justifications for apportioning and sharing the common pie,’21 or some proportionately- 
based criteria to assess merit or need.
22
 Simply put, distributive justice aims to ensure that as 
between the parties ‘that neither equal persons have unequal things, nor unequal persons 
things equal.’23 In one sense then an equality is reached, however, this is done to achieve the 
more pressing objective of furthering a common good within society as a whole, yet there is 
also ‘no reason to suppose that treating everyone identically when distributing...resources’ 
contributes to this.
24
 Various “yardsticks” are needed to achieve this idea of a common good, 
whether it be need-based, risk-based, etc., however, all are premised on some form of 
ranking. This becomes a problem, however, when animal interests are weighed against those 
of humans.   
 
With primary goals centred on achieving community and societal welfare and a downplaying 
of individual considerations, distributive justice has much to recommend itself and, in 
premise, could provide a workable framework from which to develop veterinary negligence. 
However, its utilitarian underpinnings present problems when the interest of the animal is 
introduced as a relative factor in the decision-making process. Importantly, ‘a distributive 
justice claim...is based solely on a person’s status as a member of the political community,’25 
a status which animals currently lack. Epstein, for example, argues that while animals are not 
treated as inanimate objects, this fact does not establish that they are in some way entitled to 
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treatment as human beings.
26
 This ranking of relative interests is something which, according 
to Epstein, is inherent in how we live our lives and necessarily includes elements of 
speciesism.
27
 According to Epstein, then, animals will always come second to human 
interests. This point is re-enforced by Deckha who states that, ‘as legal subjects who occupy 
the centre around which the law revolves, it is the rights of the human and corporate owners 
that are protected and privileged when interests [between animals and humans] conflict.’28 
Of course, whether this state of affairs should continue is certainly debatable, however, the 
point that human interests are given greater weight than those of an animal weighs heavily 
against any steps taken to improve animal interests when this theory is applied in the 
negligence context. The point that the majority of existing animal welfare laws, even though 
aimed at improving animal welfare, are carefully worded to ensure human interest outweighs 
animal serves as further support for Epstein’s position.29 Given that this thesis goes one step 
further to argue that veterinarians should act in ways which forward the animal’s best 
interests (sometimes in direct opposition to the desire of the owner), the ranking of human 
over animal interests makes putting forward a distributive-centred account of veterinary 
negligence more difficult.  
 
Taking a more moderate approach, Cane argues for a combination of distributive and 
corrective justice principles stating that what ‘wrongs’ or ‘harms’ are tortious is a 
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distributive question and that how that wrong ought to be corrected is a corrective justice  
question.
30
 There is certainly an appeal to this perspective as I would agree that part of how 
we define the harm is socially constructed and changes with time.
31
 However, the 
particularised way in which harm can be suffered means that certain harms may not always 
reflect an overall majority shift in community view, but perhaps the faint beginnings of that 
change. Put another way, the process of deciding what harms are tortious may not always be 
straightforward in terms of the distributive objectives which can be met. Unfortunately, Cane 
does not discuss the process of determining what harms can be regarded as tortious, but if 
the assessment would work on some form of ranking or interest-based system, arguably we 
would be no further ahead when trying to prioritise the best interest of the animal within the 
relationship. This is particularly important, I argue in the veterinary negligence context given 
the complex nature of the animal’s position. On a more fundamental level, the same 
problems regarding the ranking of animal interests against human exist, as do the structural 
issues discussed in the previous section on corrective justice once the question shifts from 
one of defining the harm to its correction or repair.   
 Rights-based Theory      c)
Of the three forms of justice considered, rights-based theory is perhaps the most familiar to 
those wanting to improve the status of animals under the law. Many commentators have 
written on the position that animals should hold moral rights,
32
 whilst others such as 
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Cochrane
33
 have argued that sentient animals possess moral rights, some of which ought to 
translate to legal rights held against organs of the state.
34
 Currently, however, the legal 
position regarding animals is that although humans owe certain duties to animals (for 
example, not to inflict unnecessary suffering upon an animal), this does not result in a right 
being held by the animal in the correlative sense discussed previously. Feinberg describes 
this situation as having duties regarding animals, but that is not the same thing as saying we 
have duties to animals.
35
 Animals, therefore, ‘are incapable of claiming a right on their 
own.’36 Whether animals should be given rights is an issue which is far beyond the remit of 
this chapter. What needs to be addressed is to what extent rights discourse in tort law can 
assist in understanding and explaining veterinary negligence liability. 
 
Like distributive justice and corrective justice theories, rights-based theory also follows a 
strict bilateral structure— here, based initially on the infringement of a primary right.37 As 
previously discussed, this poses problems given the triadic nature of the veterinary 
relationship. Ultimately, there must be scope within the given theory to permit courts to 
consider the interests of the animal, independent of the owner. Strict bilateral structures, 
which rely on agency, prevent this type of analysis. More pressing for the rights-based 
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model, however, is the imprecise way in which the term ‘right’ is used to describe the 
infringement suffered. In Torts and Rights,
38
 for example, Stevens appears at first to discuss 
rights in a claim right, Hohfeldian way,
39
 but then discusses broad moral rights,
40
 legal 
rights, and human rights without discussing clearly how they all interrelate or are different; 
thus, the initial tenor of Stevens’s argument that rights are clear and specific, turns out to be 
far more complicated. Indeed, according to Stevens, ‘the varieties of legal rights we could 
have are as many and varied as the wit of human imagination allows.’41 Further, in critiquing 
Beever’s discussion on rights theory, which, as an aside, appears to adopt a conceptually 
different
42
 approach to rights than Stevens, Witting asks whether anything is gained in terms 
of the precision of the law by the use of rights-based language.
43
 His answer is, simply put, 
‘no.’ Ambiguity is increased not only because the origin of the right itself differs depending 
on context, but also the extent to which rights can be enforced against another party also 
differs.
44
  
 
Recalling that the goals of this thesis are to advocate that the best interests of the animal 
within the veterinary relationship be protected and provide additional guidance and clarity to 
veterinarians, the use of rights-based language in negligence does not deliver. At the heart of 
this problem— beyond the point that rights-based theory lacks the necessary definitional 
clarity and application to animals to properly develop and inform veterinary negligence— is 
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that these rights are entitlements held against others.
45
 Thus, holding a right ‘is to have a 
claim to something and against someone.’46 Therefore, at its core, rights discussion runs 
counter to the deeply relational nature of veterinary medicine argued later in this thesis. The 
next chapter in this thesis, for example, characterises the relationship between owner and 
animal as constitutive in nature: both receiving benefits and burdens of companionship, 
which constitute the owner’s and animal’s sense of self.47 Splitting this relationship into one 
of competing rights would arguably damage the integrity of this relationship. Further, 
Chapter Four, which discusses the role of the duty of care, argues that the relationship 
between owner and veterinarian should be based on mutual trust and that the veterinarian’s 
duty should stem from a deep concern for the well-being of the animal and preservation of 
the constitutive relationship.
48
 The antagonistic undertone of holding rights against or over 
others would arguably impede the development of these important relationships within the 
law.  
 
One final point to make about the rights-based approach to tort, specifically negligence, is 
that it does not appear to deal well with complex damage situations. The next chapter of this 
thesis characterises the damage suffered by the claimant-owner as damage to sentient 
constitutive property embracing both an orthodox form of damage (here, property) and an 
emotional harm element (here, damage to the constitutive relationship between owner and 
animal), however, the requirement that the right be capable of specific definition prior to the 
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interaction between the parties
49
 limits the court’s ability to respond to new forms of 
damage. Stevens’s50 confusing treatment of Rees v. Darlington AHA51 illustrates this.  
 
Briefly, in his analysis of this case, Stevens notes that the award given to the claimant as a 
result of a failed sterilisation was done to vindicate the mother’s right, not to compensate for 
a consequential loss.
52
 However, he does not state what the mother’s right actually was. He 
mentions in a few places “the birth”53 of the child or “the conception”54 of the child, but does 
not specifically articulate how this fits with his primary rights analysis. If it is a right to 
bodily integrity, this is an interest generally protected by the trespassory torts, not 
negligence. If it is personal injury stemming from negligence, pregnancy is conceptually 
difficult to make work under the actionable damage requirement.
55
 A much deeper analysis 
from Stevens was therefore needed. From Stevens’s analysis, it would appear that a rights-
based approach simply cannot explain these more complex damage cases. A similar problem 
for the rights-based approach would arguably appear in damage to sentient constitutive 
property. How is the primary right in this instance to be expressed? To understand these 
more complex forms of damage, the interest infringed must be seen as part of the bigger 
negligence picture and open to reformulation. The inability, seemingly, of a rights-based 
analysis to account properly for these mixed forms of damage illustrates a further concern 
when determining whether a rights-based approach can properly explain veterinary 
negligence.  
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As the above discussions have shown, although persuasive in some aspects none of the these 
prevalent theories relating to tort are able to fully account for the various structural and 
substantive characteristics in play within the veterinary relationship. Further, because all of 
the theories hold strongly to various formal requirements, none possess the flexibility to deal 
with the previously unaccounted for variables and interests found in a veterinary negligence 
claim. The purpose of the next section is to introduce the theory behind an instrumental 
approach and later to demonstrate that in the context of veterinary negligence, this model, in 
which negligence is seen as a mechanism to protect the vulnerable, provides the best 
framework going forward. 
2.3 Adopting an Instrumental Approach: Negligence and Protection of the 
Vulnerable 
 The Instrumental Approach Explained a)
Conaghan and Mansell state that to ask the purpose of negligence is, in itself, to adopt a 
specific ideological position because it assumes, implicitly, that law can and should be 
viewed as an instrument of social engineering; that is, as a means to a chosen end.
56
 In 
essence, to ask negligence’s function is to approach the problem affecting the claimant and 
defendant from a perspective which forwards a particular end or sees a particular goal as 
guiding the court’s reasoning. Adopting an instrumental perspective is not to deny the 
continued relevance of some of negligence’s other theoretical understandings, only to argue 
that negligence, and veterinary negligence in particular, should not be viewed in a vacuum 
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and that much can be gained from looking beyond rigid formalism. Once it is established 
what ends can be furthered by negligence jurisprudence, courts and academics are arguably 
in a better position to determine how and under what circumstances the law can be extended 
and revised; thus, approaching the law in an instrumental way can reflect the practical and 
normative approaches taken to adjudication and to law making.
57
 Indeed, instrumentalism is 
itself ‘a practice-focused, practice-minded, anti-theoretic theory...,’58 which lends itself to 
evolution and adaptation. In this way, adopting an instrumentalist approach presents the 
strongest framework from which to advance veterinary negligence.     
 
An explanatory account of veterinary negligence must embrace a perspective which takes on 
board the fact that within a veterinary negligence claim the legal interest of the owner should 
be taken into account alongside the best interest of the animal. Further, to develop the 
position of the animal as a sentient being that is entitled to have her best interests upheld, it 
will also necessarily be the case that when these interests come under threat, the animal’s 
interests are given priority over those of the owner; a primarily instrumental approach allows 
for this needed flexibility. To be clear, then, an instrumental perspective views tort as being 
an instrument to achieve a particular social end or goal. For the purposes of this chapter, and 
the thesis as a whole, it is submitted that the aim negligence ought to strive to achieve, in its 
decision-making, is to protect the vulnerable party.   
 
This flexibility is particularly important in the veterinary negligence context. Seeing how we 
want the law to be developed and being able to shape decisions which reflect both fairness in 
the decision reached and forwarding new, specific ideals, for example, the constitutive 
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relationship and the animal’s best interests, is a great advantage. In this way, I adopt an 
instrumental approach which sees negligence as an instrument to protect the vulnerable to 
make specific arguments about how the law should relate to veterinarians and how the law 
can be re-framed to achieve greater understanding of the veterinary relationship. 
 
Keating, however, argues that using tort as an instrument of social engineering fails because 
‘instrumentalism does and must look forward. Tort adjudication, however, is principled and 
it does and must look backward. As a result, instrumentalism cannot adequately explain and 
justify tort.’59 On one account, for example, an economic approach to negligence, this 
criticism may be true. Under the economic account, decisions are made with the dual aim of 
allocating loss to those best placed to handle it and encouraging risk-reducing behaviour in 
the future. In a similar vein, West states that when focus is placed on consequences such as 
compensation and deterrence, definitional issues relating to what types of harm matter are 
left out.
60
 Instead, ‘a robust instrumentalism should illuminate—  and surely should also 
interrogate—  all the ways in which law impacts upon harm...’61 My account of 
instrumentalism, in which negligence looks to protect the interests of vulnerable parties, is 
necessarily wrong-based and therefore does look backward to the relationship between the 
parties and the wrong that was suffered. In this way, I do borrow some aspects from 
corrective justice in that there does exist a need to do justice between the claimant and 
defendant in the sense that the defendant’s obligation corresponds to the claimant’s interest, 
but that such a tie cannot be as formalistic as corrective theorists such as Weinrib would 
require.
 
 Instead, it looks to the role of the animal in the relationship, the nature of the 
relationship between claimant and defendant, and the need for a creative and compassionate 
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approach by the courts when seeking to correct the wrong committed.
62
 My account of 
instrumentalism does, however, also look forward to how the law can be positively shaped to 
give place of prominence to various interests not currently accounted for and to help shape 
behaviour by providing guidance as to how these relationships ought to be formed and 
developed. As previously stated, because there currently exists almost no information for 
veterinarians on their obligations stemming from their professional position, this forward-
looking aspect is particularly important and cannot be disregarded.  
 
This view of instrumentalism which looks both backward to the relationship and the wrong, 
and forward to future consequences, corresponds to van Rijswijk’s analysis of Lord Atkin’s 
decision in Donoghue v. Stevenson.
63
 According to van Rijswijk, Lord Atkin’s duty analysis 
in which it was held the defendant manufacturer owed a legal duty of care to a subsequent 
consumer was not only an assertion of moral value as between claimant and defendant, it 
was also an instrumental morality that recognised power relationships more broadly.
64
 Thus, 
‘the neighbourly mind is a pre-emptive, relational mind.’65 Importantly, this analysis could 
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 your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a 
 restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which 
 you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, 
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 and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
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 omissions which are called in question (at 580). 
 
Lord Atkin therefore combined the geographic sense of proximity or closeness (ie. being geographically close 
to the claimant at the time of the injury or damage), but also a relational closeness based on the nature of the 
relationship between the parties (ie. consumer-manufacturer; patient-doctor).    
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also be directed to addressing relational power imbalances between consumer and 
manufacturer, which was an important social issue at the time of the decision in Donoghue.
66
 
Going forward, the connection drawn here is important for two reasons. First, it 
demonstrates that a normative evaluation can also achieve pragmatic ends; the two inquiries 
need not be mutually exclusive and can, instead, work together. Secondly, this analysis 
confirms the central role that duty plays when extending the law to consider novel 
interactions between parties.     
 Vulnerability and the Instrumental Approach b)
In the past, only a very small number of academic commentators have discussed the role that 
vulnerability plays within tort.
67
 As a result, this area remains significantly under-analysed 
within negligence. From the outset, it is important to make clear that when the word 
vulnerability is used, this is to describe being in a state of vulnerability, not to adopt its 
theoretical meaning.
68
 I, therefore, adopt the language of vulnerability following its use by 
the courts and its plain usage. The argument which I develop further in the next section of 
this chapter is that a primary aim of negligence is to protect vulnerable parties and this 
motivation animates recent judicial reasoning across several important areas within its 
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boundaries. The way in which vulnerability has been utilised in negligence in the past, as the 
below discussion will make clear, is to highlight the inequities between two parties in a legal 
relationship, typically a professional-lay relationship. In these circumstances, the relationship 
is described as being one in which the defendant exercised some level of control over the 
claimant, or there existed a particularly high level of trust between the two parties; thus, a 
level of disempowerment is detectable on the part of the claimant. Also common is a 
knowledge imbalance between the professional and the lay individual.
69
  
 
Similarly, where tort commentators have discussed vulnerability, it follows the legal usage in 
the sense of the concerned party being vulnerable; thus, where Stapleton has utilised 
vulnerability, this was done to highlight relational imbalances, namely between doctor-
patient,
70
 builder-purchaser,
71
 and solicitor-third party.
72
 In this way, Stapleton is able to 
unify diverse types of claimant under a common umbrella, or, more appropriately, weave 
together in a common thread. Stapleton also describes the most extreme form of 
vulnerability as where one ‘person is exclusively dependent on another to take care, even if 
that person is a stranger.’73 Unfortunately, Stapleton does not go into great detail on her 
vulnerability argument and so her analysis is rather brief. I adopt a similar perspective 
regarding how vulnerability is here being used; however, I will approach the issue from a 
UK perspective and expand the doctrinal analysis to include why protecting the vulnerable 
should be viewed as a legitimate aim within the law as it relates to negligence.   
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Arguably, the most obvious way in which someone could be considered exclusively 
dependent is where the individual concerned is a child.
74
 This will be discussed in greater 
depth below, but it is worth highlighting at the outset, the parallels shared between child and 
animal in this respect. Children and animals will, for example, both lack the ability to protect 
themselves from harm, comprehend risk and, in many cases, lack the capacity to grasp the 
harm they have suffered. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that an antecedent relationship 
exists, but what is common to both points that the claimant is unable to protect herself 
because of a relationship imbalance which exists between the two parties. According to 
Neal, it is the dependence on the co-operation of others to achieve certain ends which, in so 
doing, exposes us to harms of various kinds.
75
 In this way, vulnerability presents itself as a 
departure from the ideal self-sufficient, autonomous, free agent that negligence imbues in its 
various tests and principles. Thus, the use of vulnerability in this context is episodic in nature 
and the court’s goal is to acknowledge the imbalance and restore the claimant (so far as 
possible) to the position she would have been in had the tort not occurred; in essence, had the 
claimant’s vulnerability had not been realised.  
 
In this regard, I take on board this episodic, legalistic formulation, but also recognise that 
vulnerability itself is far more complex and manifests itself within the veterinary relationship 
in ways which extend beyond what courts have thus far acknowledged as regards lay-
professional relations. Thus, rather than being only episodic in nature, vulnerability exists 
within our lives and within the relationships we form, and although the law recognises 
specific instances of this⎯ for example, where a child lacks capacity to make a medical 
decision or where the two unequal parties enter a special type of legal relationship⎯ it is 
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important to recognise vulnerability extending in other directions and over longer expanses 
of time. Thus, when looking at the veterinary relationship there is arguably a relationship of 
power and relative vulnerability that exists between veterinarian and owner, which may be 
episodic or long-term, however, also vital is the relationship between owner and animal, 
which when dealing with constitutive relationships, is more likely to be long-term.
76
  
 
I argue in the next chapter of this thesis that from the perspective of the owner, the 
relationship she has with her animal contributes to her own sense of person in a deep and 
enduring way.
77
 Opening one’s self to this type relationship and the understanding of its 
caring and finite qualities opens the self to wounding and damage; realising this suffering 
and the capacity for suffering defines this negative aspect of vulnerability
78
 and is key to 
understanding the emotional harm element central to a veterinary negligence claim. Within 
the constitutive relationship there is, for example, an understanding of the finite quality of 
the relationship and the possibility that the animal’s life may come to a premature end due to 
illness or injury-causing harm, yet the desire to form loving companion bonds with animals 
can constitute a deeply meaningful part of our own existence. If the relationship is severed 
prematurely because of veterinary negligence, there will almost certainly exist a personal 
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sense of being wronged. This, arguably, also helps explain the motivation behind veterinary 
negligence claims.   
 
From the perspective of the animal, its vulnerability should be quite clear. In addition to the 
constitutive connection as between animal and owner, there is also the clear dependency 
created when the animal becomes dependent on the owner for necessities such as food and 
medical care. This latter aspect of vulnerability and the reliance placed on receiving care is 
clearly articulated by Beauchamp when he states that:  
 Domesticated animals stand in a directly analogous situation 
 [between parent and child]. When we deliberately create both 
 dependency and vulnerability in these animals, and take caretaking 
 and supervisory charge over them, we acquire moral obligations of 
 care.
79
 
 
With this in mind, it is submitted that courts should be more responsive to the various 
relationships of vulnerability in play. Importantly, courts ought to acknowledge these 
relationships, what they represent, and openly engage with the relational inequalities and 
harm that is suffered when, as the result of the defendant’s negligence, the relationship 
between owner and animal is severed. The debate, essentially, is one of determining whose 
interests in law matter.  
 
Although animals are restricted from acting as legal persons, courts can make positive 
headway utilising vulnerability discourse to acknowledge their best interests. As negligence 
                                                 
79
 Beauchamp, ‘Rights Theory and Animal Rights’ (n45) 215. See also: Daniel Engster, ‘Care Ethics and 
Animal Welfare,’ (2006) 37(4) Journal of Social Philosophy 521, 527. 
2. The Nature and Purpose of Negligence Law 
83 
 
exists in a constant state of evolution representing both past and present realities, courts 
should take an active role in shaping these realities. Thus, courts should be more open and 
willing to engage in discussion which considers the argument adopted in this chapter, 
namely that a primary function of negligence is to protect the vulnerable. As the final section 
will demonstrate, the duty of care stage is arguably the area most amenable to this type of 
debate as it provides the opportunity to discuss the existence and nature of specific interests 
held by the claimant, which the law finds the defendant ought to have been mindful of. For 
now, it is important to consider the doctrinal applications of vulnerability-based discourse 
within negligence jurisprudence.  
2.4 Applications of Vulnerability in Negligence 
 Negligence Explored: Doctrinal Examples of Vulnerability    a)
Over sixty years ago Glanville Williams wrote on the aims of tort law.
80
 In his introduction, 
Williams stated that ‘an intelligent approach to the study of law must take account of its 
purpose, and must be prepared to test the law critically in light of its purpose.’81 It is 
submitted that one of negligence’s primary purposes is to protect the interests of the 
vulnerable. The remainder of this section will be devoted to exploring to what extent this is 
already being done in negligence jurisprudence and then to what extent this information can 
be transferred to veterinary negligence. Before doing this, however, the question still 
remains: what can be pragmatically achieved by taking an instrumental approach?  
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In his book on Rediscovering the Law of Negligence,
82
 Beever devotes a limited amount of 
space to discussion on vulnerability and negligence. In response to Stapleton’s argument 
discussed in the previous section, it is made clear that vulnerability does not explain the law 
relating negligence, nor should vulnerability be used as a new approach threw which 
negligence could be seen to operate. One of Beever’s primary complaints with the use of 
vulnerability is that it only appears in cases involving pure economic loss. He asks, for 
example, ‘if vulnerable claimants can recover economic loss, then why cannot they recover 
for personal injuries or property damage?’83 This section will demonstrate that contrary to 
Beever’s analysis, courts have and continue to adopt vulnerability discourse as a means of 
extending liability in a range of situations within negligence where the application of 
orthodox rules and theories would have prevented recovery.  
 
It is the case that vulnerability has played an important role in pure economic loss cases. The 
House of Lords decision in Smith v. Eric S. Bush (A Firm),
84
 for example, adopts 
vulnerability-based reasoning. It will be recalled that in this case two separate purchasers of 
modest houses relied on valuers’ reports to secure their mortgage. As it turned out, the 
valuations had been negligently prepared and both claimants suffered economic loss. The 
tenor of the judgment is one which very much adopts a vulnerability perspective. Lord 
Templeman in his judgment explicitly characterised the position of the purchasers as one in 
which both parties were vulnerable.
85
 Further, the relationship between the valuer and the 
purchaser is characterised by the court as one in which the purchaser is seen as dependent. 
For example, Lord Templeman noted that there is a ‘great pressure on a purchaser to rely on 
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the mortgage valuation. Many purchasers cannot afford a second valuation...and the sale may 
go off.’86 The valuer is in a position of trust, consistent with his or her professional status 
and ‘the public are exhorted to purchase their homes...at high rates of interest repayable over 
a quarter of a century.’87 Lord Griffiths similarly described the position of the purchasers as 
‘people buying at the bottom end of the market, many of whom will be first-time buyers, 
[and] are likely to be under considerable financial pressure...’88 
 
Continuing with the economic loss cases, the decision in Spring v. Guardian Assurance Plc. 
and Others
89
 tacitly acknowledges the position of the claimant as one of being vulnerable. 
The claimant in this action was dismissed by from his employment held with the defendants. 
After his dismissal, the claimant was interviewed by several prospective employers, 
however, a negative letter of reference was provided detailing the claimant’s unscrupulous 
business practices and untrustworthy character. Not surprisingly, the claimant was unable to 
secure employment and suffered economic loss. It was later determined that the comments 
made in the letter had not been checked for their own accuracy and it was held by the 
majority that the defendants had not exercised the requisite level of care in completing the 
letter. Describing the position of the claimant, Lord Goff stated that ‘nowadays it must often 
be very difficult for an employee to obtain fresh employment without the benefit of a 
reference from his present or a previous employer.’90 Further, by Lord Lowry: 
 On the one hand looms the probability, often amounting to a 
 certainty, of damage to the individual, which in some cases will be 
 serious and may indeed be irreparable. The entire future 
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 prosperity and happiness of someone who is the subject of a 
 damaging reference which is given carelessly but in perfectly good 
 faith may be irretrievably blighted.
91
            
 
Implicit within the court’s reasoning was that the claimant was unable to protect himself 
from the effects of his former employer’s negligently-prepared letter; quite clearly this was a 
relationship in which the defendants held considerably more power. In terms of damage, the 
courts looked to the exception created by the Hedley Byrne line of jurisprudence for pure 
economic loss following an assumption of responsibility for the claimant’s financial interest 
and reasonable reliance on the part of the claimant. Importantly, the majority thought it fair 
to extend liability in this area to the employee-employer relationship. Also evident 
throughout the judgments in Spring and other cases including Smith, in which the 
exceptional rule in the Hedley Byrne line of reasoning was applied, is the overlap with 
contractual principles. This was discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis,
92
 however, 
as regards the development of vulnerability discourse, it may also be the case that in 
applying Hedley Byrne the courts were also alive to various principles which find place of 
prominence within contract jurisprudence, such as unconscionability and undue influence, 
which also look to the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and the degree to 
which the claimant was a vulnerable party in the course of dealings. If this is the case, then it 
represents the courts actively and purposively transferring principles from another branch of 
the common law in order to arrive at a decision in which the claimant’s interests are 
protected. Indeed, it is this same creativity and compassion that is needed in developing 
veterinary negligence.    
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Outside of the pure economic loss cases, vulnerability-based reasoning was applied in the 
doctor-patient context in Rogers v. Whitaker.
93
 Again, although the court was not explicit in 
its use of vulnerability, the tenor of the judgment emphasises the dependence of the claimant 
on the defendant in line with Stapleton’s use of “exclusive dependence”94 and in line with 
the traditional doctor-patient relationship. In this instance, the claimant sought the advice of 
an ophthalmic surgeon some forty years after a childhood injury to her eye left her vision 
impaired. The surgeon recommended an operation to correct her vision, but failed to disclose 
the risk of sympathetic ophthalmia.
95
 The condition transpired and the claimant was left 
completely blind in her left eye and only partially sighted in her right. In determining 
whether the doctor had breached his duty to disclose, the court looked to the magnitude of 
risk
96
 faced by the claimant in this instance and reasoned that it was the doctor’s duty to 
disclose beyond what he or she feels the reasonable patient would want to know, to what the 
particular patient would want to know in the circumstances.
97
 According to Stapleton, this is 
an example where vulnerability was utilised ‘to extend tort protection convincingly but 
carefully...’.98 
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Taking this further, in the recent Supreme Court decision of Woodland v. Essex County 
Council,
99
 Lord Sumption, reasoned that a non-delegable duty was owed by the County 
Council to a child receiving swimming lessons from an independent contractor, and that the 
duty was owed because of the child’s position of vulnerability within the relationship. In this 
regard his Lordship considered that a non-delegable duty existed where the claimant is a 
‘patient or a child, or for some other reason is especially vulnerable or dependent on the 
protection of the defendant against risk of injury.’100 Non-delegable duties, it will be 
recalled, operate in a somewhat exceptional way by displacing the general rule that liability 
in negligence is fault-based and personal to the extent that it is the defendant’s act or 
omission which counts, not the person or organisation to whom the duty was initially 
delegated. In cases involving non-delegable duties the duty of care remains personal to the 
defendant, but the defendant has given the job of ensuring X does not happen to third 
party.
101
 According to Lord Sumption, the presence of liability in this area is rooted in the 
defendant’s assumption of responsibility (a positive duty) for the claimant’s physical 
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wellbeing,
102
 not financial, as in Hedley Byrne- type cases. Thus, the essential ingredients to 
determining whether a non-delegable duty existed were summarised by his Lordship in this 
way:  
 Both principle and authority suggest that the relevant factors are 
 the vulnerability of the claimant, the existence of a relationship 
 between the claimant and the defendant by virtue of which the 
 latter has a degree of protective custody over him, and the 
 delegation of that custody to another person.
103
  
 
Present in this description are the hallmarks of the type of relationship discussed in the 
previous section. Quite clear is the claimant's vulnerability, however, crucial to this 
characterisation is the position of the defendant being one of control or power, and the nature 
of their relationship being one which suggests a degree of control consistent with a special 
relationship.
104
  
 
Interestingly, although distinct from non-delegable duties, Giliker has argued that similar 
principles relating to vulnerability govern the extension of vicarious liability. In asking why 
vicarious liability should have be extended to cover intentional torts committed by 
employees, Giliker reasoned that consistent throughout the court’s reasoning in these cases 
was that the employees were specifically engaged by the defendant employers to ‘protect 
vulnerable individuals. [Further,] the employee abused their discretionary powers and 
                                                 
102
 Woodland v. Essex County Council [2014] AC 537, 575. 
103
 ibid at 576. Later in the judgment, Lord Sumption expanded this construction to what has now been 
identified as the five indicia by Black LJ in NA v Nottinghamshire County Council [2016] QB 739, 750.  For 
the existence of a non-delegable duty of care, it must also be the case that the claimant had no control over how 
the defendant chose to perform their obligations and that the third party had been negligent in the performance 
of the very function assumed by the by the defendant and delegated to him. For the full five indicia, see: 
Woodland v. Essex County Council [2014] AC 537, 583.    
104
 This latter point regarding an antecedent, special relationship is confirmed on page 583. 
2. The Nature and Purpose of Negligence Law 
90 
 
harmed the very persons they were entrusted to protect.’105 In the cases analysed the 
employees were either teachers or wardens in care homes and the claimants all children. 
According to Giliker, extending the law in the area was logical based on the premise that the 
‘perpetrator had been entrusted to protect and care for the individuals for whom the 
defendant institution had assumed responsibility.’106 Moreover, had liability not been so 
extended, the claimants, all of whom had suffered abuse and emotional trauma, would have 
been left without redress.    
 
Similarly, in a claim concerning the potential vicarious liability of an educational 
psychologist who failed to diagnose the claimant pupil with dyslexia, Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead stated: 
 The [defendant] authority was to act on [the advice of the 
 education psychologist] in deciding what course to adopt in the 
 best interests of the pupil with a learning disability. Throughout, 
 the child was very dependent upon the expert’s assessment. The 
 child was in a singularly vulnerable position.
107
    
     
The application, then, of a vulnerability-based analysis has been extended to areas where the 
third party had not intentionally committed a tort against the claimant, but was nonetheless 
negligent in performing the very task the employee had been hired to complete; here, the 
proper diagnosis of at risk children with learning disabilities. Phelps is also interesting 
because of the harm aspect argued, which was characterised as the:  
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Failure to ameliorate the effects of a condition affecting a claimant, 
whether such condition be physical, psychiatric or (as here) 
neurological, [which] places the "patient" in a worse condition than 
he or she would be in if appropriately treated.
108
  
 
Although it could be argued that the damage was the pure economic loss suffered by the 
claimant in failing to secure employment, I prefer the analysis applied in Adams v. Bracknell 
Forest Borough Council.
109
 Here, Lord Hoffmann reasoned that the damage suffered in 
educational negligence claims was best characterised as personal injury, plus consequential 
economic loss.
110
 Importantly, the reasoning applied in Phelps is valuable as it demonstrates 
the court utilising language consistent with efforts to protect the interests of vulnerable 
individuals where the damage concerned does not represent a straightforward application of 
orthodox categories. As the next chapter in thesis will demonstrate, complex or hybrid forms 
of damage present the courts with a range of difficult issues, but also demonstrate an 
openness and willingness on the part of the judiciary to be creative in ensuring that 
claimants receive a fair outcome.  
 
With the above discussion in mind, it is apparent that Beever’s criticism of vulnerability is 
largely unfounded. Further, although the present discussion did include examples of damage 
concerning pure economic loss, it has also been demonstrated that courts apply 
vulnerability-based reasoning in instances where the damage claimed is not straightforward. 
As a consequence, it is submitted that the use of vulnerability as a mechanism to protect the 
interests of the claimant could be extended to damage rooted in property, in particular the 
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constitutive property framework adopted in this thesis and discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter. What is important is that vulnerability has been utilised by the courts in 
situations involving more than one type of damage, in particular situations where the 
damage is more complex, and spans different types of legal relationship. The focus of the 
next section is to analyse the nature of these relationships and how a protection of the 
vulnerable model can be extended to include novel forms of property damage. 
 Legal Relationships and the Vulnerability Model: Common Characteristics and b)
Future Application in Veterinary Negligence 
From the available case law, the term vulnerability has primarily been applied as a 
descriptor for the legal relationship shared between claimant and defendant. For example, 
Rogers involved a doctor-patient relationship, Phelps concerned child and educational 
professional, and at the centre of Smith was a professional and lay person relationship. Thus, 
the duty relationship could be characterised as “special” in the sense that the defendant could 
be described as having assumed responsibility for the claimant in some way, however, 
importantly, it need not always be the case that the claimant correspondingly relied on the 
defendant. In many cases reliance appears to be inferred by the court, arguably as a result of 
the claimant’s clear position of vulnerability— a point which will be discussed in greater 
depth below and in Chapter Four.
111
 In addition to the legal relationship shared between 
claimant and defendant, the characteristics of the individual claimant match factual 
characteristics consistent with recognised vulnerable groups.
112
 For example, the claimants 
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in Phelps, Woodland, and the vicarious liability cases discussed by Giliker all involved 
children who had not yet reached capacity. In all instances, the claimants were unable to 
protect themselves or fully comprehend that nature of the harm suffered. Smith as well 
would seem to meet this definition being described as young, financially-stretched, and first-
time buyers.  
 
In this way, then, I would argue that vulnerability has also be utilised by the courts as a 
mechanism to displace the premise that tort concerns parties operating at arm’s length with 
one another, and who are therefore able to protect their own interests.
113
 This ideal of two 
individuals, possessing both autonomy and rationality, is central in the Western political and 
philosophical tradition of social contract theory where true legal persons or subjects of the 
law enter into a legal relationship fully capable of enforcing their rights against the other 
party.
114
 This perspective grounds the philosophical theories of tort discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, and further helps explain why these models do not fit the 
veterinary relationship argued here. Importantly, what the Western ideal does not capture is 
that it is frequently the case that parties come together on unequal footing and various 
asymmetries in terms of knowledge, power, and emotional commitment therefore exist. If it 
is accepted, as I think it should, that social and legal relationships
115
 give rise to certain 
social identities,
116
 then it must also be the case that courts respond to this and the argument 
                                                                                                                                                      
vulnerability is less likely to run into indeterminacy issues when applied in the doctrinal context. This is due 
largely to the special nature of the relationships considered.  
113
 In differentiating tort and contract from fiduciary law, Grubb assumes the point that parties come to tort and 
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Andrew Grubb, ‘The Doctor as Fiduciary,’ (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems 311, 313. 
114
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that the ideal of the true legal subject can prevent those who do not fit that mould from 
receiving an acknowledgment that they have been wronged by the defendant. What the cases 
discussed above illustrate is that courts have started to recognise this imbalance and utilised 
vulnerability discourse as mechanism to bring to the fore those relational asymmetries and 
resolve them in favour of the claimant. To develop this further, courts should be more 
explicit in their use of vulnerability reasoning and their role in redressing certain relational 
imbalances by adopting a more instrumental approach.          
 
Similarly, vulnerability has been utilised as a mechanism to overcome policy-based 
immunities. The relationships in this category are characterised by their high levels of trust 
and dependency
117
 and, in some instances, tread very close to being fiduciary in nature.
118
 
Yet, for various policy reasons,
119
 courts have been reluctant to find a duty of care. 
Vulnerability has therefore been utilised as a prioritising mechanism to overcome these 
immunities. In Rogers, for example, the Bolam
120
 test was rejected as the standard to 
determine breach in instances involving the duty to disclose within the doctor patient 
relationship— an area of the law where the courts have historically been highly deferential 
to doctors.
121
 In Rogers, the court stated that:  
 Because the choice to be made calls for a decision by the patient on 
 information known to the medical practitioner but not to the 
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 patient, it would be illogical to hold that the amount of 
 information to be provided by the medical practitioner can be 
 determined from the perspective of the practitioner alone or, for 
 that matter, of the medical profession.
122
                   
  
Similarly, in Phelps, vulnerability was used to overcome the policy argument that 
educational psychologists should not owe a duty of care to the child because this would 
conflict with the duty owed to the education authority. Thus, vulnerability has been used to 
widen access to justice and correct existing imbalances within certain types of legal 
relationship.  
 
This analysis finds parallels in the veterinary context. As between owner and veterinarian, 
for example, it will frequently be the case that the owner is in a vulnerable position due to 
the knowledge imbalance that exists between the two parties.
123
 This is consistent with all of 
the cases discussed thus far and is consistent across professional negligence relationships 
more broadly. Importantly, the owner’s position of vulnerability is made more profound as a 
result of the constitutive relationship the owner shares with the animal. Combined, these two 
factors place the owner, as regards her relationship with the veterinarian, in a situation where 
she is dependent on the veterinarian to take care. Where a pre-tort relationship exists and the 
veterinarian has knowledge of the constitutive relationship, the owner’s position of 
                                                 
122
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123
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vulnerability would justify an extension of the veterinarian’s liability to cover the emotional 
harm suffered by the claimant.  
 
With regards to the animal, there is little question that the animal is in a position of exclusive 
dependence, following Stapleton’s use. The animal is unable to communicate, provide 
consent, or comprehend issues relating to its care and in many ways resembles the position 
of a child who lacks capacity.
124
 The animal’s position is made more precarious, however, 
by the fact that, unlike children, animals are not legal subjects and do not possess legal 
standing in order to ensure their best interests are protected. As Naffine illustrates, as 
between humans and animals, ‘only humans are legal subjects; animals are only and always 
objects.’125 If additional rationale is needed to justify an extended model of veterinary 
liability, courts should engage with this type of open discussion and acknowledge the 
vulnerability of animals. Instead of downplaying or ignoring animal interests, engage with 
vulnerability discourse as a means of ensuring greater protection for their best interests as 
beings with more than mere object value. 
 
Structurally, it is also important to highlight that but for Rogers, all of the cases discussed 
above included diverse multi-party relationships. It is, therefore, submitted that viewing 
negligence as a mechanism for the protection of the vulnerable is strongest in these types of 
case. Thus, in Woodland, the issue was one of non-delegable duties, Phelps it will be 
recalled involved multiple duties owed to the education authority and the child patient, and 
Smith included potential duties owed to the mortgagees and to the purchasers. The veterinary 
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relationship is similarly complex as the veterinarian owes a multitude of legal and 
professional duties to both the owner and the animal. Viewing negligence as a mechanism to 
protect the vulnerable serves to re-focus the inquiry on the relationship between the parties 
and can provide a foundation for the argument that in some instances the veterinarian should 
act in the best interests of the animal. The argument that this thesis adopts is that these 
important relational issues all occur at the duty of care stage in the negligence inquiry and it 
is for this reason that duty holds a central position within negligence. The next section of this 
chapter will expand on this point and examine how the position that negligence should 
protect the interests of the vulnerable can be best accommodated within the duty assessment. 
2.5 Vulnerability and the Duty of Care 
 Duty as a Central Component within Negligence  a)
The duty of care assessment is given greater attention in this chapter for two interconnected 
reasons. First, this thesis adopts the view that the duty of care is relational and specific in 
nature,
126
 thus, there is greater scope to put into practice the vulnerability arguments made 
thus far in an effort to create positive change for all parties. Secondly, because as I argue 
here, in the previous chapter,
127
 and Chapter Four
128
 that a robust duty construct is central to 
the negligence inquiry, it must also be the case that the approach to vulnerability that I adopt 
can be seen in harmony with this type of duty assessment.  
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To this end, I adopt the argument made by Oliphant that courts should approach the duty 
question based on the ‘identification of relevant factors and their flexible assessment on the 
facts of individual cases.’129 Adopting this approach would arguably allow courts to engage 
more deeply with underlying moral and normatively-relevant considerations which underpin 
the law.
130
 Further, a more flexible perspective would arguably allow more room to openly 
and holistically engage with relational qualities which arguably reveal more about human 
notions of responsibility and relationships.
131
 In this way, the use of vulnerability to achieve 
greater protection for claimants would serve to refocus judges’ minds to aspects of the legal 
relationship which bear directly on the questions of what was actually owed in the instant 
case, why, and to whom.
132
 Arguably, this is how the courts in the cases discussed in the 
previous section addressed the duty question. In these instances the courts identified the 
broad category of case before them, whether it was, for example, public authority or doctor-
patient, but at the same time utilised vulnerability to highlight disparities and inequalities 
within the law, such as policy-based immunities within the legal relationship, and address 
broader inadequacies or gaps within the law.  
  Duty of Care and Vulnerability: The Special Role of Proximity           b)
Having established the initial link between vulnerability discourse and the duty of care, it is 
important to determine where, within the duty assessment, courts can include vulnerability 
analysis. It is submitted that vulnerability has the largest role to play at the proximity stage if 
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39. 
132
 This would arguably attribute less weight to certain external policy considerations, which currently play a 
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the Caparo
133
 test is used, or more appropriately, in determining whether it can be said the 
veterinarian assumed responsibility for the owner’s wellbeing, if assumption of 
responsibility is used.
134
 Both assessments look specifically at the closeness, or proximity, of 
the parties in terms of their relational attributes to determine whether the link is strong 
enough to say that the defendant ought to have had the claimant’s interests in mind.   
 
In describing the role of proximity within the duty assessment, Manderson notes that ‘in 
each case of proximity, plaintiffs find themselves vulnerable to the defendant in a manner 
that is outside their control and to a degree that sets them apart from the world at large’135 
and, continuing, ‘a distinct capacity to control particularises the defendant, while a distinct 
vulnerability to harm particularises the plaintiff.’136 The importance of particularisation and 
setting the claimant apart from the world at large supports the position I take regarding the 
relational and relationship-specific nature of duties of care. These interweaving threads of 
reasoning provide courts with the opportunity to engage with vulnerability discourse 
alongside existing negligence principles and examine the unique elements of the constitutive 
relationship between owner and animal which may give rise to novel duties owed by 
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veterinarians. In this way, ‘proximity…binds together the why, who and how of the duty of 
care: it points to a normative foundation [and] a language of analysis.’137  
 
Having said this, the above analysis only focuses on the relationship between owner and 
veterinarian; the animal continues to play a peripheral role. The primary criticism of the tort 
theories discussed in the previous section was that, structurally, they were unable to fully 
accommodate the triangular nature of the veterinary relationship. Thus, a critical question is 
to what extent vulnerability can be extended to include the interests of the animal. In 
discussing the role that proximity played in Australian negligence jurisprudence, Vines 
argued that proximity ‘operated not only inside a category of negligence, but also outside 
whichever category of negligence was being considered.’138 This latter assessment was, 
according to Vines, aimed at drawing out general social understandings of responsibility or 
fault.
139
  I therefore submit that vulnerability can operate on both a macro level across the 
negligence inquiry, but also on a micro level, inside the specific assessment under the 
proximity requirement. Vulnerability discourse can, therefore, play a role within a specific 
duty assessment between two legal persons, but also as a construct capable of transcending 
the assessment between claimant and defendant, animating the whole negligence inquiry. In 
both circumstances, it is submitted that the courts are acting purposively to protect the 
interests of the vulnerable party, however, when applied on a macro level, I would argue the 
position of the animal can be more fully considered, and in some cases may provide a 
rationale for placing the best interests of the animal above those of the claimant-owner.        
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 Vulnerability and the Best Interests Assessment  c)
A primary argument made throughout this thesis is that veterinarians should view their 
duties of care through a best interests lens, similar to that of a paediatrician. For present 
purposes, it is important to address the link between viewing negligence within an 
instrumental framework in which its purpose is to protect the vulnerable, and taking the 
position that veterinarians should act in the best interests of the animal. In theory, the two 
areas are mutually supportive, with the best interests assessment having at its core the goal of 
protecting the vulnerable. Thus, it is because animals are in a vulnerable position, both as 
regards their relationship with the owner and also the veterinarian, but also as a result of 
their status under the law, that their best interests ought to be protected. However, a theme 
throughout this chapter is that what works in theory does not always work in practice. 
Although it is submitted that the flexibility of the best interests test can be an advantage, it is 
only beneficial when courts direct their mind to the substantive issues before them and 
openly engage with the normatively-relevant questions raised by the claim.   
i. The Importance of Particularising the Animal in the Best Interests Assessment  
One of the challenges facing courts that have to grapple with complex issues surrounding 
vulnerability and best interests is that amidst the decision-making process and the 
complexities that come with weighing various (sometimes competing interests), the child (or 
the animal) is seen as nothing more than dependent, vulnerable, and in need of protection.
140
 
As the animal in this scenario is in a position of exclusive dependence, it is certainly 
conceivable that this view may be extended to the veterinary negligence context. Further, 
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when the legal position of the animal as property and situational position of the animal 
within the veterinary relationship is put alongside that of the owner— the owner being a 
legal subject capable of rational agency— objectifying the animal becomes an increasingly 
legitimate concern. Similar issues arise in the human medical context when dealing with the 
best interests of a child;
141
 however, the process leading to objectification is arguably easier 
done with animals. Whilst with children, regardless of their capacity to engage with 
decisions affecting their treatment, children are sacred subjects
142
 under the law. Animals, on 
the other hand, always run risk of being objectified⎯ indeed, this is their starting position 
under the law— and so the goal is to move them out of legal “objecthood” and into a 
category which recognises their individuality and sentience. Importantly, then, it must be the 
case that although the interests between owner and animal are primarily connected through 
their constitutive relationship, they must also be separate.
143
 The animal should, therefore, be 
viewed as a sentient being capable of experiencing a wide range of emotions, which should 
be independently considered.
144
 This is crucial to understanding the interlinking of best 
interests with vulnerability, but also to advancing the second aim of this thesis, namely to 
advance the best interests of the animal within the veterinary relationship. 
 
In responding to this, then, courts should be alive to the position that although it is the case 
that owners will have a specialised knowledge as regards their animal and that their wishes 
and desires are important, they are not final. This is also the case for the veterinarian; 
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although they have specialised knowledge in the medical complexities affecting the animal, 
their viewpoint also cannot be solely determinative.
145
 Crucial in the court’s understanding 
should be the particular animal’s vulnerability within the veterinary relationship which in 
itself gives rise to the need for a best interests assessment in the first instance. It must also be 
the case that the animal’s unique needs and personal attributes are given place of 
prominence. Undertaking the best interests assessment in ways which acknowledge an 
animal’s emotions and personality would represent a decisive step forward in advancing 
animal interests under the law. When the court is able to view the animal not as an object but 
as an entity with subjective preferences, we move closer to recognising that animals are 
more than simply things.     
ii. Relational Imbalances Giving Rise to Difficulties  
There remain two points stemming from the power imbalances within the veterinary 
relationship which require further discussion. First is a point made by Montgomery in the 
human medical context, namely that when faced with a novel, difficult case judges have 
been reluctant to set down or codify relevant principles or rules, preferring instead to use the 
flexibility of the best interests rationale to relieve health professionals from detailed 
scrutiny
146
 and defer to their judgment. In one limited respect, this could be seen as an 
advantage as part of my argument is that veterinarians should be able to positively act in 
ways which protect the best interests of the animal and that courts should be receptive to 
exploring these possibilities. However, although veterinarians should be given greater scope 
to act in the animal’s best interests, the relational imbalance between owner and veterinarian 
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should not be expanded to the point of giving veterinarians deferential treatment. 
Veterinarians should be prepared to have their best interest assessments scrutinised and 
importantly courts should likewise reason in such a way that their decisions are able to 
withstand careful scrutiny.
147
 Further, in an area where there exists no prior discussion or 
guidance as to how best interests ought to be applied in the veterinary context, careful 
application by the court is needed to ensure the legitimacy of the test itself. Therefore, 
although much of the attraction of the best interests assessment lies in its flexibility, in an 
area such as veterinary negligence where there exists almost no case law, this flexibility 
should be directed to achieving and setting out well-reasoned and clearly-articulated 
principles, which can then be applied across differing situations.  
 
The second point relates to the holistic nature of the best interests assessment. A best 
interests assessment is considered holistic in that it not only considers the patient’s medical 
best interests in terms of potential treatment(s), but also because the assessment includes 
elements of the patient’s lifestyle, their personality, and also the positions of those around 
the patient who care for or are some way involved in the patient’s care. It is this tension 
between the particularised aspects of the best interests assessment and the broader interests 
of those involved in the patient’s care which can give rise to complications. In the veterinary 
relationship this tension arises when considering the owner’s vulnerability stemming from 
the professional relationship with the veterinarian, and the animal’s exclusive dependence as 
between the owner and veterinarian. When these tensions come into contact with one 
another, it may be the case that the interests of the animal become conflated, for example, 
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with those of the owner to detriment of the animal, or worse, that the interests of the owner 
supersede those of the animal completely. 
 
Fox and McHale
148
 warn of this issue arising in the context of medical treatment involving 
children. In these instances, because the best interests assessment is a holistic assessment 
involving considerations of both the patient and the parent(s),
149
 there is the risk that in 
determining the best interests of the child, parental interests may supersede both medical 
opinion and the interests of the child. In their piece Fox and McHale discuss the case of Re 
T
150
 in which a young boy was diagnosed with a fatal liver condition. Although arguably a 
rather exceptional case, it illustrates what can happen when courts misconstrue the purpose 
of the best interests test. Medical opinion in Re T was clear that the boy should receive a 
transplant operation. The procedure itself provided an eighty to ninety percent success rate, 
however, the mother did not support the suggested treatment. It was acknowledged that if the 
boy did not receive treatment, he would die from his condition. Finding for the mother, the 
Court of Appeal reasoned that although the welfare of the child was the paramount 
consideration, as the welfare of the child was dependent on his mother, it would have been 
very difficult to proceed with the surgery without her full support.
151
 Thus, conflating the 
interests of the child with those of the mother:  
...permitted the Court of Appeal to minimise the potential conflict 
between the interests of the woman and child. It effectively 
allowed the Court to encompass within the best interests test the 
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interests of the mother as carer as well as the interests of the 
child.
152
  
     
In the veterinary context, although both owner and animal are in their own way vulnerable, 
the best interests assessment should ultimately be introduced into the court’s decision-
making to protect the interests of the more vulnerable party: the animal. As Elliston notes in 
the human medical context, ‘the test under the inherent jurisdiction of the courts is that the 
child’s best interests are the prime and paramount concern.’153 So, although the test does 
include considerations affecting both the parent and the child, there must remain a 
prioritising element within the assessment which places the child’s interests at the centre. 
From the court’s perspective what should be done is to consider as best they can what is in 
the best interests of the child ‘in order to retain proper focus, which rests in protecting the 
vulnerable.’154 I submit the same needs to occur in veterinary negligence cases.  
 
Importantly, where there is a conflict of interests there should be no effort by the court to 
disguise or downplay the conflict by simply applying the language paying lip service to 
precedent without truly engaging with the issue; this not only compromises the integrity of 
best interests test, but also stalls any effort to develop the law as it relates to veterinary 
negligence. Human interests are already privileged when put alongside animal interests. This 
point is made stronger when it is considered that the relationship of vulnerability most 
familiar to the courts in a doctrinal sense would be the knowledge and power imbalance 
between veterinarian and owner. Thus, a best interests assessment, prioritising the animal’s 
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interests, is needed to redress the multiple power imbalances in play. To do this, courts 
should faithfully apply the best interests assessment and be prepared to utilise negligence as 
an instrument to achieve protection for the animal and ultimately the veterinarian when they 
have acted to protect the animal’s best interests.155 
2.6 Conclusion    
Adopting an instrumental approach in which protection of the vulnerable is central opens the 
doors for courts to engage with normatively and legally relevant principles whilst also 
abiding by established convention, which holds that in resolving disputes, courts must give 
priority to values that have found expression in legal documentary form.
156
 Because of their 
obedience to strict bilateral structures and requirements of agency and personality, purely 
philosophical accounts of negligence do not allow for this type of analysis and potentially 
stall attempts to craft and advance the law in new ways. Importantly for veterinary 
negligence, the instrumental approach advocated for in this chapter allows the relationship 
between owner and veterinarian to be more thoughtfully scrutinised within existing 
professional negligence jurisprudence. Additionally, by way of a best interests assessment 
linked to the animal’s exclusive dependence, this approach can more fully account for the 
animal’s central position within the relationship, both as a patient and as a sentient being. 
Judges deciding recent negligence case law have already shown indications that they are 
willing to accept and develop their reasoning as it relates to its assessment of vulnerable 
parties when making decisions as to the nature of the duty of care owed. It is submitted that 
this should be extended to cover the veterinary negligence context.  
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Whilst Baroness Hale in Woodland highlighted that caution is needed in developing 
extended ideas relating to the duty of care, she also highlighted that the common law is a 
dynamic instrument;
157
 ‘it develops and adapts to meet new situations as they arise’158 and 
‘therein lies its strength.’159 Extending the court’s use of vulnerability to the veterinary 
relationship does not represent unprincipled growth, but rather the evolutionary re-working 
of an idea which finds parallels in other corners of the law. The next chapter of this thesis 
will develop this evolutionary perspective and, in the course of discussion, challenge the 
current actionable damage construction, which views the animal as merely an object of 
property.         
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‘...[I] might have a singing song bird, though it be not pecuniarily profitable, yet it refreshes 
my spirits and gives me good health, which is a greater treasure than great riches. So if 
anyone takes it from me he does me much damage for which I shall have action.’1 
3. Harm to Sentient Constitutive Property: Developing Nascent Innovations in 
Actionable Damage   
3.1 Introduction 
Though damage is considered the ‘last element of a negligence case temporally speaking, it 
really is the tail that wags the dog.’2 Remembering that one of the primary aims of this thesis 
is to establish guiding principles and illuminate for veterinarians what their legal duties and 
liabilities are in negligence, it is first necessary to establish what type of actionable damage 
they could be sued for. The first chapter of this thesis made clear that as it currently stands 
the courts utilise a market value assessment, which assesses the animal’s value as an item of 
property on the open market. It was argued that conceiving the damage in purely proprietary 
terms fails for two primary reasons. First, with regards to the position of the veterinarian, it 
results in a legal duty which is far too narrow and basic, and which fails to capture the 
intricacies of the relationship between owner, animal and veterinarian. Further, viewing the 
animal merely as fungible property does nothing to assist in advancing the argument that 
animals should have their best interests protected within the veterinary relationship. 
 
                                                 
1
 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1926) (quoting from Y.B. 12 Hen. 8 at 4 (1521) per 
Justice Brooks) 489. 
2
 John Oberdiek, ‘Philosophical Issues in Tort Law,’ (2008) 3(4) Philosophy Compass 734, 735. 
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Contrary to the above, this chapter will argue that in seeking to achieve the two primary aims 
of this thesis, the strongest way forward, in terms of framing the actionable damage portion 
of a negligence claim, is to view the harm as constituting damage to sentient constitutive 
property (“SCP”). Further, as between veterinarian and owner, the damage sustained should 
be represented as a special form of property damage with consequential emotional harm. At 
the outset, the idea of SCP raises an important limitation on how the actionable damage 
portion of a veterinary negligence claim can be framed. Though this thesis advocates that the 
best interests of the animal should be central within the veterinary relationship, because of 
their current legal status, it will not be possible to directly reflect their interests at the 
actionable damage stage. Thus, under the SCP framework, only the owner would be able to 
bring a claim against the veterinarian. However, as the details of the SCP model are 
expanded upon, it will further be argued that under this framework, the interests of the 
animal patient can be forwarded at the duty of care stage discussed in the forthcoming 
chapter.
3
  
 
Reflecting on current debates within animal law and the argument made by many that 
animals must possess rights to be afforded legal protections, Posner argues that judicial 
innovation must proceed incrementally and that arguments made with the aim of prescribing 
animals rights would be a step too far.
4
 Posner’s position is reflective of the broader concern 
within negligence jurisprudence that allowing wholly new forms of damage could lead to a 
flood of claims, which would overwhelm an already over-burdened court system. Though 
                                                 
3
 In time, though outside the scope of this thesis, it is hoped that as the law begins to acknowledge the 
relationship owners and animals are capable of forming, the more likely it will be that the inherent qualities and 
virtues animals possess will be recognised, which could then lead to increased protection of animals’ interests. 
See further on this point: Joan E. Schaffner, An Introduction to Animals and the Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011) 167. 
4
 Richard A. Posner, ‘Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives’ in Cass R. Sunstein 
and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (OUP 2004). 
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incremental development does some work to abate floodgates concerns, this chapter will 
argue that, in the context of veterinary negligence, classifying animals as sentient 
constitutive property does not require radical judicial innovation, but rather the careful 
development of existing damage constructions. I therefore agree with the argument made by 
Liebman that ‘we should not expect judges to adopt far-reaching...arguments that 
fundamentally challenge anthropocentrism;’5 but that as regards the damage suffered in 
veterinary negligence claims, progress can be made in the direction of life and welfare-
affirming ideals by adopting the SCP model.
6
 Indeed, it is submitted that rather than creating 
new law, the idea of sentient constitutive property is rather about developing nascent 
innovations in the realm of negligence law, in particular property damage. In a sense, then, 
the SCP model does represent an incremental development within the law and thus worries 
regarding a flood of SCP-related claims should not hinder its natural development, yet, 
incremental development is also by no means the definitive route to doctrinal development. 
Indeed, it will be advocated throughout this thesis that judges should feel empowered to 
innovate and challenge previously-accepted methods and ideals.      
  
In this chapter, I will argue that it would be within the court’s power to allow damage framed 
in terms of SCP and that doing so would more accurately reflect the relationship capable of 
existing between owner and animal. To support this argument, this chapter will incorporate 
ideas relating to feminist tort theory and the concept of hybrid damage. The first section of 
this chapter will introduce the essence of the SCP theory followed by an analysis of doctrinal 
                                                 
5
 Matthew Liebman, ‘Who the Judge Ate for Breakfast: On the Limits of Creativity in Animals Law and the 
Redeeming Power of Powerlessness,’ (2011) 18 Animal Law 133, 150. 
6
 ibid. See also Robin West, Caring for Justice (NYU Press 1997) 49. Here West argues that: 
The work of doing legal justice...must be in the service of values which are life-
affirming, if the result is to be justice, and a just society worthy of the name. 
Justice ought to be an interactive human value, and an ideal of human 
communities. 
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developments within UK negligence jurisprudence, which indicate a judicial environment 
open to novel forms of actionable damage, particularly in the area of property damage. From 
here, a discussion detailing other sentient property paradigms which have been argued in the 
past will be undertaken. It is initially submitted that though helpful in advancing the general 
argument that animals should be afforded greater protection under the law, the theories 
proposed have been too narrowly conceived as regards the types of animals considered. 
Further, the theories themselves do not fit well within the specific requirements of a 
negligence inquiry. A more in depth assessment of SCP will conclude this chapter and 
illustrate that, within the confines of negligence, this model offers the strongest way forward. 
Important in this is development is the idea that rather than the property relationship being 
constructed in terms of property-holder and property, subject and object, the more accurate 
characterisation is to see the property, and hence the damage, as being bound up with the 
owner.  
3.2 Constructing the Actionable Damage: Introducing the Sentient Constitutive 
Property Model 
 The Current Model: Market Value Approach  a)
In the first chapter, it will be recalled that the current approach to assessing veterinary 
negligence claims is the market value approach. The damage sustained is to fungible 
property and, as such, the measure of damages accords with what the animal would fetch on 
the open market, to a willing purchaser. Consequently, veterinary negligence suffers from 
two problems which severely hamper its development within the law. First, animals are 
property and as such the market value approach coincides with how damages have 
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traditionally been evaluated in this context. In many cases, then, it is not economically viable 
to bring a claim in veterinary negligence. Second, and more importantly for the purposes of 
this chapter, is the extent to which, as West
7
 has argued, the law-and-economics movement 
has affected the analysis of harm more broadly.
8
 West’s argument, with which I agree, is that 
the law’s movement in this direction has had the corollary effect of extinguishing from 
analysis and study harms relating to “pains” and “pleasures,” for example, those experiences 
which in varying degrees and measures contribute to our pursuit of a “good” or 
“meaningful” life.9 Indeed, this occurrence can be seen in the veterinary negligence case law 
analysed in the first chapter. Though it will not be argued that the legal status of animals as 
property should change, harm in the veterinary negligence context is inherently relationship-
centred, as between owner and animal. Thus, any damage model put forward regarding 
veterinary negligence should foreground this aspect. This presents a high, but arguably not 
insurmountable hurdle, given that, as Conaghan has noted, relational losses have been 
largely overlooked in tort scholarship.
10
  
 
Departing from the market value approach in the veterinary negligence context also requires 
from the judiciary that, in seeking to achieve a justice between the parties, it be informed by 
ideals of compassion and fairness, not seek to root them out. Following West, attempts to 
hold on too tightly to the rigidity of precedential logic and abandon the inquest into the 
particular circumstances of the claimant and the context under which the alleged negligent 
incident occurred, leads not to a greater, more accurate sense of justice, but rather ‘to a 
cramped, time-frozen, and at times absurd jurisprudence, unbendable and unbending to the 
                                                 
7
 Robin West, Caring for Justice (n6).  
8
 ibid 166-167. 
9
 ibid 167 and 170. 
10
 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Tort Law and Feminist Critique,’ (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 175, 192. 
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changing demands of a changing and complex society.’11 Oliphant too argues that the pursuit 
of legal certainty tends to produce rigidity and resistance to change, with the consequence 
that the law loses touch with prevailing social standards.
12
 Instead, Oliphant states:  
To be preferred is an approach based on the identification of 
relevant factors and their flexible assessment on the facts of 
individual cases. The exercise of judgment by the court—  and  
the uncertainty that is necessarily entails—  should be recognised 
as inherent in the judicial role, and as desirable rather than 
something to be distrusted and constrained.
13
  
 
This issue will be dealt with in greater depth below, however, it bears mentioning at the 
outset that though SCP will challenge traditional perceptions of damage, it is challenges to 
time-frozen notions of damage which prompt the judiciary to re-evaluate perceived realities 
and begin a reworking of precedential rules to better reflect actual societal realities. It is 
submitted that adopting the SCP model allows for this type of development to occur and that 
such development ought to be viewed as positive. This section will therefore provide an 
introduction to the concept of sentient constitutive property in advance of a more detailed 
discussion later in this chapter as to its scope and applicability.    
                                                 
11
 Robin West, Caring for Justice (n6) 61. 
12
 Ken Oliphant, ‘Against Certainty in Tort Law’ in Stephen GA Pitel, Jason W. Neyers and Erika Chamberlain 
(eds.), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Hart 2013) 3-4. 
13
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 Core Features: The Essence of the Sentient Constitutive Property Paradigm and the b)
Limits of Actionable Damage  
Priaulx argues that ‘attention to what kinds of harms negligence embraces tells us much 
about the general operation of law, and in particular, to whom negligence speaks and whose 
interests it protects.’14 Asking these questions of the SCP model is particularly important as 
it contemplates constructions of emotional harm and relationality, but also considers interests 
to which the law already speaks at the damage stage. It is submitted that though the SCP 
model is ultimately not without its limitations, it represents the best way forward in cases 
involving veterinary negligence. In particular, it maintains animals’ status as property (as 
opposed to arguing that they should be endowed with rights akin to humans), but recognises 
the strong relational element between all parties, in particular owner and animal. Building 
from this, the SCP model maintains that it is the owner, not the animal, who would bring a 
claim in veterinary negligence, though the animal assumes a special form of elevated 
property. Further, the sentient animal is an active participant in a reciprocal relationship, not 
simply an inanimate object or a being capable of suffering and experiencing pain.
15
 To this 
extent, the SCP model allows animal interests to be considered, but not actually feature as a 
protected interest at the actionable damage stage.
16
 Instead, it is submitted that the interests 
                                                 
14
 Nicky Priaulx, ‘Humanising Negligence: Damaged Bodies, Biographical Lives and the Limits of Law,’ 
(2012) 33 Adel. L. Rev. 177, 178. 
15
 The famous statement made by Jeremy Bentham that ‘the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they 
talk? but, Can they suffer?’ (see: Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(Dover, 2007) Chap 17) has been widely influential in arguments made to accord animals with moral 
consideration and advocate for the maximisation of greater welfare standards. See also: R.G. Frey, 
‘Utilitarianism and Animals’ in Tom L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey’s (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal 
Ethics (OUP 2011) 174-176.This thesis will contemplate a more detailed application of the sentience 
requirement. The full details of what sentience includes will be detailed later in this chapter, however, for 
present purposes, sentience is meant to encompass the ability to enter and participate actively in a reciprocal 
relationship and from this relationship derive a sense of pleasure.   
16
 See: Andrew Tettenborn, ‘What is a Loss?’ in J. Neyers (ed.), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart 2009) 441. 
Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider in full Tettenborn’s argument on a protected legal 
interest (as opposed to an observable, objective loss), I would submit that this analysis accords more with my 
argument regarding how the loss is framed in cases involving veterinary negligence. Briefly, Tettenborn 
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of the animal, namely the animal’s best interests, can be most fully represented at the duty of 
care stage, which will be addressed in the next chapter.
17
 An important point which the SCP 
model highlights, then, is the holistic nature of the negligence inquiry and the point that each 
stage develops and depends on the last for meaning and context.  
 
Bearing in mind the function that the sentient constitutive property paradigm is to serve, 
consideration must be given to how the owner’s legal interest and the animal’s interest in 
being treated as a sentient being interact. It is submitted that the best way to protect interests 
of both parties lies in arguing that the relationship created is constitutive of the owner’s 
personhood. Crucially, it will be argued below that a primary reason behind attributing an 
elevated property status to animals is that the relationship they form with their owners is 
capable of contributing in a robust and meaningful way to the owner’s sense of person; in 
essence, the relationship with the animal constructs part of the owner’s personhood. The 
relationship, then, not only transcends the subject-object divide, as between property- holder 
and property, but is one which is reciprocal and forms an integral element of the owner’s life 
story⎯ it enhances the owner’s (and the animal’s) flourishing.18 As Radin explains:  
                                                                                                                                                      
describes the infringed protected interest which must be valued by the courts includes ‘not only [the claimant’s] 
interest in not suffering the wrong, but also [the claimant’s] interest in not being consequentially harmed by it’ 
(at p. 458). “Interest” is never explicitly defined, but it is submitted that such legally protected interests would 
include examples such as an interest in one’s bodily integrity, proprietary interests, but also possibly, interests 
in certain types of relationship. I would argue that this conception of damage fits more accurately with the 
“damage hybrid” claims discussed in this chapter, including the sentient constitutive property model advocated. 
17
 It will be recalled in Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1 at 48 that the ‘question is always 
whether the defendant was under a duty to avoid or prevent that damage, but the actual nature of the damage 
suffered is relevant to the existence and extent of any duty to avoid or prevent it.’ 
18
 Radin’s later work looks at conditions for human flourishing and develops upon Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach. Very basically, the theory works from the premise that people have certain capabilities 
(ie. relatedness, cognitive capacity, etc.) for development which make it possible for them to grow into fully 
developed human beings. Nussbaum later expands her theory to also cover animal capabilities (ie. emotion, 
social cognition, etc.) and entitlements. I would argue that those in a constitutive relationship (ie. owner and 
animal) both develop some of those capabilities, which contributes in a meaningful way to their individual 
flourishing. See on these points: Margaret Jane Radin, ‘The Colin Ruagh Thomas O’Fallon Memorial Lecture 
on Reconsidering Personhood,’ (1995) 74 Oregon Law Review 423, 432 and Martha Nussbaum, ‘The 
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 If an object you now control is bound up in your future plans or in 
 your anticipation of your future self, and it is partly these plans for 
 your own continuity that make you a person, then your 
 personhood [for example, a view of personhood as a continuing 
 character structure encompassing future projects and plans, as well 
 as past events and feelings] depends on the realisation of these 
 expectations.
19
 
 
The constitutive element, therefore, serves to highlight the strong relational element present 
in the damage construction and provides a normative framework from which to develop the 
SCP model as a whole.  
 
Following from this, it is submitted that the way in which sentience has traditionally been 
constructed (ie. the ability or capacity to feel pain and suffer) does not fully capture the 
animal’s place within the constitutive relationship. A full discussion of this issue will be 
addressed later in this chapter, however, it is important to highlight at the outset that 
sentience is here being recognised as encompassing the animal’s ability to enter into a 
relationship in which both parties actively participate and, from this, derive a sense a 
meaning. This view of sentience will, therefore, have a bearing not only on how the 
relationship itself is constructed, but also in later advancing the argument that the animal’s 
best interests should be protected at the duty and breach stages. Thus, when veterinary 
negligence occurs it is not only damage to property which occurs— indeed, this would 
constitute only a threshold requirement allowing the claim to accord with already existing, 
                                                                                                                                                      
Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements’ in Tom L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Animal Ethics (OUP, 2011) 228.     
19
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orthodox notions of actionable damage— but crucially, the severed relationship between 
owner and animal.  
 
Traditionally, negligence jurisprudence has been fairly strict in the types of harm deemed 
actionable. Established examples include personal injury, property damage, economic loss 
and certain, restricted forms of psychiatric harm; emotional harm, on its own, is unlikely to 
succeed.
20
 Further, relational losses or harms, as Conaghan argues, have been largely 
overlooked and dismissed in tort scholarship.
21
 This is particularly the case with animal-
related claims as though some pressure has been exerted by private individuals, and as 
Deckha makes clear, it is humans that are placing ‘pressure on the law to catch up 
to...cultural affections,’22 the law has primarily disavowed these relational arguments and 
maintained strict adherence to a commodity-based valuation, as opposed to a relational 
one.
23
 It will be argued below that the criticisms made by Conaghan are justified and that the 
SCP model is an example of where the law could be developed to accommodate relational 
damage currently lacking in tort jurisprudence. Building on this, given the strong psycho-
social element present in the constitutive aspect and the orthodox aspect contained in the 
property element, it will also be argued that the SCP model resembles what Priaulx has 
termed “damage hybrid”24 claims, or those claims which sit somewhere in between two 
recognised forms of damage. Admittedly, there are differences in the SCP model as 
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 Rachael Mulheron, ‘Rewriting the Requirement for a ‘Recognised Psychiatric Injury’ in Negligence Claims,’ 
(2012) 32(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 77, 77-78. See also: Rothwell v. Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd. 
[2008] AC 281. 
21
 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Tort Law and Feminist Critique’ (n10) 192. 
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 Maneesha Deckha, ‘Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law and Animal 
Vulnerability Under a Property Paradigm,’ (2013) 50 Alberta Law Review 783, 785. 
23
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 Nicky Priaulx, ‘Humanising Negligence: Damaged Bodies, Biographical Lives and the Limits of Law’ (n14) 
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compared to damage hybrid claims,
25
 however, it is submitted that, in theory, the two can be 
seen as analogous. Importantly, it is the damage hybrid claims which Prialux argues presents 
‘the most serious challenge to established boundaries of the damage concept. Such cases 
make even more transparent the serious shortcomings of the operation of the damage 
concept...’26     
 
It is these types of damage claims which, according to Priaulx, represent the next  assault 
(after pure psychiatric harm) on the damage concept and by challenging orthodox constructs, 
hybrid damage claims look to broaden the concept of harm to accommodate critical aspects 
of our humanity.
27
 This latter point lies at the heart of what SCP hopes to achieve. Without 
question, SCP challenges the orthodox notions of damage listed above, however, as our 
understanding of what constitutes damage expands with time and greater attribution given to 
the role psycho-social elements present in our lives, challenges to the status quo inevitably 
follow. As tort is generally conceived of as a body of law whose role it is to both set 
standards which govern relations between people and encourage positive social relations,
28
 it 
is to be expected that what constitutes those standards are challenged and amended.  
3.3 Current Challenges to Orthodox Notions of Actionable Damage 
Thus far, it is has been argued that a relational approach to the damage requirement be 
adopted as between owner and animal, as opposed to the more rigid boundary currently in 
                                                 
25
 Importantly, the “damage hybrid” claims contemplated by Priaulx appear to consider harms which are 
experienced through the female person, for example, whether pregnancy should be classed as personal injury, 
loss of personal autonomy or harm occasioned to bodily integrity. So, it is the female body in relation to 
society, the self, the foetus, etc. The argument will be made below in section 3.3(b) that damage hybrid 
principles can be extended to cover instances where property forms the orthodox basis of the actionable 
damage claimed and so constitute two separate, living entities.  
26
 Priaulx, ‘Humanising Negligence: Damaged Bodies, Biographical Lives and the Limits of Law’ (n14) 184. 
27
 ibid 184 and 186. 
28
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place between subject and object, property-holder and property. It was, however, highlighted 
that thus far tort has largely dismissed damage framed in relational terms. With this in mind, 
the purpose of this section is twofold. First, it will be argued that, though the SCP model 
does stretch the boundaries of orthodox notions of actionable damage, there is increasing 
evidence which indicates courts in the UK have been more willing to accept novel forms of 
damage and have acted creatively in resolving the issues before them. Thus, there is scope to 
argue that the SCP model, rather than proposing a radical change in the law, represents an 
evolutionary step in a developing area within the law. Second, it will be argued that in terms 
of property damage, examples exist where courts have taken a more compassionate and 
pragmatic approach to the matter before them. Combined, these examples are best seen as 
judicial recognition for the point that ‘certain items of property [do] form part of the way we 
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities.’29 As Powell has observed, while 
property law is often slow to change, it does change over time as the moral and ethical 
perspectives of society change’30 and that these changes ‘represent efforts to workout 
adaptations to the new problems presented by new ingredients in the political, economic, and 
philosophical atmosphere of the moment.’31 This section will begin by looking at the current 
state of the actionable damage inquiry and argue that new advances in our society are 
challenging orthodox views of actionable damage. Proceeding on from this, it will be argued 
that three existing property cases illustrate a trend which indicates a judicial willingness to 
put aside strict rules of certainty and precedent, and instead adopt a more flexible approach.   
                                                 
29
 Radin, ‘Property and Personhood,’ (n19) 959. 
30
 Michael Allan Wolf (ed.), Powell on Real Property (Matthew Bender & Co. 2009) s. 2.06. 
31
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 Damage Challenging Orthodoxy a)
Until recently, inquiry into the nature of actionable damage has been widely ignored.
32
 New 
challenges to the black and white notions of, in particular, physical damage have altered this 
conception. Importantly, what the discussion below will highlight is that these successful 
challenges, specifically in the area of negligence, indicate a judicial climate which would be 
amenable to the novel SCP model introduced above. While discussion in this area has tended 
to focus on issues surrounding the limits of personal injury, it is submitted that it is the 
strong psycho-social elements in each of the examples mentioned that makes these cases 
unique, not the fact that they appear under the umbrella of physical injury. Thus, the fact that 
SCP concerns issues relating to property should not diminish the wider impact of these 
cases. As Witting has noted, for example:  
developments [in the actionable damage context] appear to have 
shifted attention away from the examination of actual changes in 
physical structures or states of persons or property and towards a 
more context-specific inquiry into social perceptions of damage.
33
 
 
Areas which have received recent academic and judicial challenge can be seen in wrongful 
conception and educational negligence. It will be recalled from the previous chapter on 
vulnerability that courts have accepted educational negligence claims despite the 
complexities surrounding the physical aetiology of conditions such as dyslexia.
34
 Discussion 
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 Donal Nolan, ‘New Forms of Damage in Negligence,’ (2007) 70(1) Modern Law Review 59, 59 and Witting, 
‘Physical Damage in Negligence’ (2002) 61 Cambridge Law Journal 189, 190. 
33
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will therefore transfer to wrongful conception.
35
 This section will not address whether the 
ultimate decisions reached were correct. What is important for the purposes of this section, 
however, is how these cases have been subsequently interpreted by various tort scholars and 
the parallels that can be drawn with the SCP model. After some debate, it has been accepted 
that wrongful conception can constitute a form of personal injury, however, as Conaghan 
and Priaulx highlight, there is a strong relational
36
 and psycho-social element
37
 to these 
claims, which cannot be denied, but for which negligence jurisprudence lacks an appropriate 
language.
38
 Hence, as Priaulx has argued, wrongful conception cases offer one of the 
strongest examples of the damage hybrid category and one that is now deeply challenging 
our orthodox notions of damage.
39
  
 
Nolan too has recognised the inherently difficult nature of these claims as centring around 
the subjective nature of viewing pregnancy as a form of damage.
40
 What matters, he argues, 
is not what some (or even most) women think, as the question is not whether pregnancy is 
damage in general, but whether it is damage to the particular claimant.
41
 This subjective 
element is also important in the veterinary negligence context. It will be recalled that it will 
inevitably be the owner’s subjective interest in the relationship with her animal which will 
form the principal aspect of the claim. It will not be the case that every owner will view their 
animal as being constitutive to their own self-being, however, where this is the case, tort 
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ought to protect this interest. Again, what is important here is that in accepting wrongful 
conception as a form of actionable damage, the courts have shown themselves willing to 
accept claims which possess an inherently relational element to them. And though it may be 
overly zealous at this point to agree with Nolan that expansion of these categories into the 
realm of actionable damage ‘should be welcomed as evidence that courts are not privileging 
interests’ which are easily discerned in pecuniary terms over those which are not, what it 
does indicate is ‘quite a significant shift away from a strict conception of damage...towards a 
broader conception of harm that is more capable of accommodating critical aspects of our 
humanity.’42   
 Property Damage: Entering New Grounds b)
Though it appears that innovation regarding what constitutes actionable damage is occurring, 
it is acknowledged that these changes have largely occurred in the personal injury context; 
issues surrounding property damage remain largely under-analysed. The purpose of this 
section is to highlight two examples— Attia v British Gas43 and Yearworth and others v 
North Bristol NHS Trust
44
 — which stretch the boundaries of damage in the context of 
property. In both of these cases, similar to the SCP model advanced in this chapter, the 
claimant’s claim was rooted in property, but the psycho-social element was really the 
essence of the damage suffered. In this way, then, these claims mirror the hybrid damage 
claims discussed by Priaulx, however, the orthodox grounding of the claim lies in property 
damage, as opposed to personal injury. It is argued that these cases reflect a more flexible 
approach to the damage inquiry as it relates to property damage and represents a ‘sensitive, 
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evolutionary reworking of precedential rules and decisions so as to better account for current 
realities,’45 which is necessary if the SCP model is to be accepted in its current formulation.  
 
Having said that, what does become apparent in these decisions is the comment made 
previously by Conaghan that tort lacks a language suitable to deal with harms which possess 
an inherently relational element. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the recent decision of 
Holdich v. Lothian Health Board,
46
 also discussed below. It is submitted that all three cases 
considered represent damage of a very intimate and personal nature, which, in the cases of 
Attia and Yeaworth, is then not fully addressed because the focus is instead placed either on 
orthodox notions of property and property damage, as opposed to the relational element of 
property. So, though I would argue the psycho-social element played an important role in 
these decisions, this was done largely on a tacit basis. In the case of Holdich, an 
“uneasiness”47 about the doctrinal uncertainty of developing the concept of property to 
describe the relational interest held by the pursuer resulted in a decision which could have 
advanced the concept of property damage in this area, but for now, seems to have maintained 
the status quo, which supports the point that sperm can constitute property damage, but 
without going further.  
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i. Attia v British Gas48  
In this instance, the claimant had employed the defendant company to install central heating 
in her home. At some point during the installation, the defendants negligently caused a fire 
to start, which then destroyed a substantial portion of the claimant’s home and personal 
effects. The claimant witnessed the fire as it engulfed her home for some four hours before 
fire crews were able to extinguish it. As a result, the claimant claimed to have suffered 
psychiatric illness. The Court of Appeal in this case refused to strike out the claim.  
 
What is important for these purposes is the judgment offered by Bingham LJ. In asking 
himself whether to dismiss the claimant’s claim or proceed with the knowledge that this area 
would be breaking new ground, Bingham LJ sided with evolution.
49
 To his mind, erecting a 
boundary line which forbade recovery for psychiatric harm following property damage 
would, in principle, be arbitrary and, ultimately, unsupportable.
50
 Imagining further instances 
where foreseeable psychiatric harm could follow property damage, Bingham LJ cited the 
scholar who, before his eyes, witnesses the destruction of his life’s work at the hands of the 
careless defendant, or the householder who returns home to find her cherished possessions 
destroyed by the carelessness of an intruder.
51
 It is submitted that these are all instances 
where it could be argued that the property is in some way constitutive or bound up with the 
claimant’s self-hood, so that when the property is damaged or destroyed, the owner suffers 
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damage which, unlike the property itself, cannot be easily translated into monetary terms.
52
 
Indeed, as it has been argued above, the same would ring true in instances involving 
veterinary negligence where the relationship between owner and animal has been negligently 
severed and the relationship could be characterised as constitutive. Arguably, the 
relationship between owner and animal is no different than the examples discussed here; if 
anything, the relationship would be considerably stronger as SCP is also able to reciprocate 
feelings and actively participate in the relationship.  
 
From a doctrinal position, Attia is admittedly a somewhat difficult case. Again, it is argued 
that this is the case not because of the decision that was ultimately rendered, but because it 
shows the inadequacy of the judicial language to articulate the harm where the damage 
sustained is a mixture between orthodox notions of damage (here, property) and psychiatric 
harm, and then how that damage affects the duty analysis. With that in mind, Witting has 
interpreted the decision to mean essentially that in Attia the ‘damage to her home ostensibly 
made her a ‘primary’ rather than a ‘secondary’ victim.’53 This point is highlighted by the 
court when it indicated that the claimant was said to have been 'closely and directly affected' 
by their [the defendants’] actions.’54 Nolan,55 however, takes issue with this decision in the 
sense that it was delivered prior to the seminal decision in Alcock,
56
 which outlined a strict 
distinction between primary and secondary victims for the purposes of the duty of care 
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analysis.
57
 Debating the issues between the adequacy of the primary and secondary victim 
distinction has been extensively covered by other academic commentary. What is important 
for present purposes is that perhaps some mileage can be made in better understanding the 
nature of “damage hybrid” claims. Attia is important for present purposes as it does stand for 
the premise that psychiatric harm can follow the destruction of property, however, had it 
been argued in a way similar to the SCP model (ie that emotional harm is consequential to 
the property damage), the thorny debate surrounding the applicability of Alcock to the 
precedential value of this case could have been avoided.     
ii. Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust58 
Yearworth, like Attia, is a rather complex case and though it has generated a large amount of 
academic debate,
59
 its precedential value is somewhat uncertain. Thus, for present purposes, 
the decision will be utilised for one very specific purpose: to show the courts acting 
creatively in defining property. Of course, it should also be noted that the case was 
ultimately decided on principles of bailment,
60
 as opposed to negligence; however, I would 
argue, following Hawes,
61
 that the decision could have been reasoned on negligence 
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principles. It also should be stated that, although I would argue the court was not wrong to 
conclude proprietary rights could be held in this instance, much more needed to be done to 
explain the nature of those rights and the scope of the interest created.  
 
The claim itself involved several men who, as part of their cancer treatment, undertook 
chemotherapy. They were advised by medical staff that their treatment may render them 
infertile and were informed of the opportunity to store samples of their sperm. The Trust 
negligently maintained the freezing unit used to store the sperm and the samples were 
destroyed. The men brought claims in negligence, claiming personal injury or property 
damage. Also brought were claims for the emotional/psychiatric harm sustained over the loss 
of their sperm and the fear that they may be unable to conceive. For present purposes, what 
is important is that the court declared that the sperm was capable of being property and 
second, the facts quite obviously reveal a secondary harm which is of a very intimate and 
personal nature.
62
  
 
To again cite Priaulx, she views the decision in Yearworth as an example of ‘legal 
inventiveness where the factual variants had failed to squarely fit ‘orthodox conceptions’ 
of...damage’63— in essence, a damage hybrid claim. However, it is submitted that though the 
court was willing to extend itself in a limited way to hold that sperm could be considered 
property, it lacked a willingness to tackle the whole problem and fully address the issues 
surrounding the nexus between property damage and psychiatric harm. What is left, then, is 
a complex, unresolved question as to the meaning and extent of property in modern 
negligence. So, though there does seem to be recognition for the point that the idea of 
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property is something which is continuously changing and evolving to match society’s 
needs,
64
 which mirrors Powell’s argument at the beginning of this section, and can give a 
sense of ‘coherence and cohesion to our relationship between each other and between us and 
things,’65 our current legal language is unable to fully accommodate and develop these 
realisations. Therefore, though the decision in Yearworth was inventive and shows a judicial 
creatively which helps give force to the argument that the SCP model could be successfully 
argued, ultimately, the larger argument that advances in our language as it relates to property 
conceptions and paradigms needs to be addressed in a more holistic manner, remains.  
iii. Holdich v. Lothian Health Board66 
The argument that more needs to be done to develop the language of relational harms, in 
particular those relating to property, can be clearly seen in the case of Holdich. The facts and 
claims brought by the pursuer in this case bear a close similarity to that of Yearworth Here, 
the pursuer was diagnosed with testicular cancer at the young age of twenty-two. Prior to 
undergoing treatment he was advised to, and later did, deposit three samples of his sperm 
with the defenders ‘to preserve his chances of becoming a father.’67 When the pursuer later 
married and wanted to start a family, he was informed that there had been a malfunction in 
the cooling system used to freeze his sperm. As a result, there was a risk the samples had 
become damaged. This meant there was an increased risk of chromosomal abnormalities, 
birth defects, and miscarriages. The pursuer brought several claims all on the Scottish 
equivalent to those argued in Yearworth. The focus of this discussion will therefore 
concentrate on the claim brought in delict.  
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Following the direction of Yearworth, one of the pursuer’s claims in delict was framed in 
terms of property damage, plus consequential emotional harm. In this regard, Lord Stewart 
came to the conclusion that settled law now indicated that damages for mental injury could 
be claimed in three potential situations. For present purposes, the third option is salient. 
Here, the pursuer could claim ‘in a range of situations involving mental injury consequent on 
wrongful harm to the claimant other than bodily injury, the underlying principle being pre-
existing legal proximity.’68 However, according to Lord Stewart, although the pursuer’s 
claim in this regard was framed in terms of property, no value was attributed to the sperm 
and the sperm itself was not actually destroyed so, arguably, no property damage was 
sustained in the first place.
69
 Instead, it was reasoned that the wrongful harm suffered was to 
the pursuer’s ‘procreative autonomy.’70  
 
In terms of what this contributes to the discussion on damage to sentient constitutive 
property, it is unfortunate that a value was not attributed to the sperm in argument before the 
court. In a separate part of the judgment, Lord Stewart states that ‘I do not say that biomatter 
cannot be property...I can see no private law objection to treating stored sperm as 
property,’71 so the willingness to innovate is arguably present. Further, there is nothing to 
say that wrongful harm in Lord Stewart’s third categorisation could not be property damage. 
Had the sperm been attributed a market value,
72
 it seemed that the court would have been 
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prepared to find the damage sustained to the sperm was capable of constituting property 
damage. This reasoning, however, was then qualified where it was stated that ‘the broader 
question remains whether it is doctrinally correct, or indeed a useful exercise, to classify 
stored sperm as “property” even in the minimalist, Yearworth sense.’73 In response to this, it 
is submitted that developing notions of property whether in sperm or, for the purposes of this 
thesis, animal ownership, is a doctrinally important exercise. The common law is not static 
and unchanging, but rather evolutionary. In this instance, insights into evolving perceptions 
of property damage could have made a significant contribution to developing a discourse 
around relational elements of property. On this last point, it is also helpful to recall Nolan’s 
argument, above, recognising the subjective element of damage.
74
 Arguably, then, it is a 
useful exercise to challenge the doctrinal barriers where the claimant argues she has been 
damaged. In any case, the finding that all claims could be put to proof means that the door is 
still open to innovate further in this area.
75
          
 Actionable Damage: Reflections on Current Trends and Looking Toward the Sentient c)
Constitutive Property Model  
Based on the above discussion although at one stage in negligence scholarship the concept of 
actionable damage had been largely forgotten or ignored,
76
 it would seem that more recently 
this has started to change. Strong challenges to orthodox principles have caused courts and 
scholars to reflect on the changing character of the actionable damage inquiry. Though the 
road to discovery has been and continues to be a difficult one, what should certainly be 
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praised are judicial attempts to tackle these novel problems presented. With regards to the 
SCP model discussed throughout this chapter, the challenges made in the actionable damage 
segment of the negligence inquiry signal a legal climate which would be amenable to the 
legal and normative arguments made.  
 
As a concluding thought, it is submitted that what unifies these theories, concepts, and cases 
is that the damage is “bound up”77 with the claimant. Arguably, this is similar to the 
argument made regarding constitutiveness and the psycho-social element discussed by 
Priaulx. The constitutive element was introduced into the SCP model to describe the 
intimacy and importance of the relationship shared between owner and animal and how, 
even though the animal is still viewed as property, the distinction between owner and animal, 
subject and object is blurred, if not totally obscured. This idea of the damage being “bound 
up” could also be made for the wrongful conception claims, and I would argue too for Attia, 
Yearworth, and Holdich. As society starts re-defining the concept of property and the effects 
it can have in our lives, a more expansive definition and language, including a representation 
of the emotional attachments we form with some of our property ought to be recognised.      
   
Ultimately, though, it must be remembered the limits of what actionable damage can achieve 
in the context of veterinary negligence claims. With regards to SCP, much depends on the 
construction and particularisation of the duty of care to both ensure the integrity of SCP 
model is maintained and also to provide adequate protections for both human and animal 
interests. As the next section will highlight, SCP is not the first model to contemplate an 
elevated property status for animals. It will be argued, however, that for various reasons 
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discussed below, the authors of these property paradigms fail to consider or clearly delineate 
the aims of their respective models. Further, the conditions they impose at what would be the 
damage stage arbitrarily restrict the class of potential claimants. This leads to a level of 
incoherence which ultimately prevents their full application in negligence, and also perhaps 
more broadly across other fields of law. Recalling the aims of this thesis, namely to provide 
veterinarians with guidance as to their liabilities and obligations arising in negligence and 
advocating the best interests of the animal patient within this relationship, it will be argued 
that the SCP model, unlike other models discussed below, represents the best way forward.  
3.4 Other Paradigmatic Property Models   
Within the last ten years, a number of models have been put forward arguing that companion 
animals should not be given full personhood status, but rather an intermediate or elevated 
property status.
78
 This section will address two models which represent detailed arguments 
on the subject, however, it will be argued that even these theories lack sufficient doctrinal 
content. The first model considered advocates for the idea of sentient property, which can be 
applied in a range of legal areas.
79
 The second advances an argument centred on a 
companion-based property model and is particularly important as the author specifically 
contemplates application within the tort context and argues that companion animals fitting 
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within her paradigm are best conceived of as belonging to a separate legal category.
80
 The 
models chosen represent the prevailing sentiment in animal law discourse which considers 
the concept of elevated property, however, it will be argued that for various reasons, some of 
which are directly related to the intricacies of a negligence claim and others related to the 
obvious privileging of companion animals, these models are deficient.  
 Sentient Property a)
i. The Sentient Property Framework  
In her book, which focuses on companion animals, Matlack advocates for a model that 
centres on a two-part test.
81
 The first part, a threshold test, seeks to establish the strength of 
the bond between owner and animal. The test itself looks at questions relating to the duration 
and continuity of the relationship, special needs of the owner, regular veterinary visits, 
medical evidence that the owner suffered emotional distress as a result of an act(s) of cruelty 
or inhumane treatment toward the animal, and others.
82
 Looking at some of the questions 
that the court can consider in making its initial decision, there are quite obviously some 
questions which possess a strong relational quality. For example, a record of regular 
veterinary visits indicates an owner who is attentive and cares for the health and welfare 
interests of her animal. The fact that Matlack does include elements highlighting the 
relational aspect between the owner and animal is a point deserving of praise and one which 
will be developed in the sentient constitutive property model discussed below. Importantly, 
the threshold test also appears to contain elements which consider the emotional welfare of 
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the animal beyond the necessities of life (for example, food and water) and take into account 
the animal’s individual feelings. In particular, one of the questions that Matlack puts forward 
for the court to consider are any ‘unique behavioural characteristics or special needs of the 
animal.’83 
 
Once the court determines that the bond between animal and owner is sufficiently strong and 
meets the threshold requirements, the animal is deemed sentient property and the second 
stage of the test, namely a substituted judgment assessment, can occur. It is further stated by 
Matlack that the sentient property model could be applied in instances where: the owner 
needs to redress a harm that has caused pain and suffering or emotional distress to the 
animal, or where the same has happened to the owner as a result of loss or harm sustained by 
the animal.
84
 
ii. Potential Problems with the Sentient Property Model 
Matlack’s model does advance several important arguments such as aspects of relationality 
and the concept of elevated property, however, problems arise when the model is analysed 
more closely. The first issue turns on her use of the word ‘sentient’ to describe those animals 
capable of being considered sentient property. Matlack does not explicitly define the word 
“sentient,” yet, she only contemplates those animals that are warm-blooded, domesticated, 
non-human, dependent on one or more humans for necessities of life, and kept in or near the 
household.
85
 She also explicitly excludes animals kept for farming or those regulated by the 
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US federal Animal Welfare Act;
86
 hence, it is likely only those animals which have 
traditionally been conceptualised as companions, such as dogs and cats that will qualify.
87
 
From this, it can be concluded that Matlack does not base her concept of sentience on 
scientific understandings. If she had, then she would necessarily have to include animals 
used for agricultural purposes and those animals which straddle the divide between 
traditionally conceived ideas of agricultural and companion animals (ie. horses). The 
problem with this definition, I argue, is simply that there are quite obviously animals that 
have been deemed to be sentient, which are not accounted for in her model. In sum, 
Matlack’s model as it is conceived is far too limiting. This goes deeper than a semantic 
debate over the meaning of the word sentience. Though Matlack does include relational 
elements in her construction, which is to be commended, excluding certain animals from the 
debate for unjustifiable reasons leads to favouritism of certain animals over others and, 
ultimately, incoherence.
88
 I argue that if Matlack wishes to limit her model to those animals 
which would by definition be considered “companion animals,” then her model should more 
clearly reflect this distinction and its implications. The fact, for example, that current 
veterinary negligence case law only considers horses, it is particularly important that 
boundaries which divide claimable and un-claimable harm are explicitly considered and 
justified. 
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On a more theoretical level, it is difficult to determine under what circumstances Matlack 
believes her model can be applied. In her monograph, she uses the example of a custody case 
involving the placement of a family dog. Whether, then, her model could be applied for the 
purposes of a veterinary negligence claim is somewhat uncertain. Above, it is noted that 
Matlack envisions the application of her model in situations where, for example, the owner 
has sustained a harm (ie. emotional distress) as a result of harm occasioned to the animal. 
This would seem to encompass instances of veterinary negligence. However, the 
combination of ex ante and ex post considerations when considering the harm suffered by the 
claimant, the particular use of the threshold test to objectively determine the strength of the 
relationship, and, later, the use of the substituted judgment standard do not fit easily into 
notions of actionable damage or a negligence claim as a whole.  
 
One of the primary issues that arises in this model is the use of the substituted judgment 
standard. It is submitted that for the purposes of a veterinary negligence claim, the two do 
not work harmoniously with one another. Briefly, according to Beauchamp and Childress, 
substituted judgment has traditionally been used in medical contexts and revolves around:  
 …the premise that decisions about treatment properly belong to the 
 incompetent or nonautonomous patient, by virtue of his or her 
 rights of autonomy and privacy...[the standard] requires the 
 surrogate decision maker...to make the decision the incompetent 
 person would have made if competent.
89
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In the animal context, however, McMullen accurately states that as regards the substituted 
judgment standard, ‘it would be hard to imagine what an animal would choose if it were 
autonomous.’90 The act, of trying to put ourselves in the shoes of our animal and make for 
them the choice they would make if autonomous, I argue, would be exceedingly difficult 
given that animals are exclusively dependent on their owner from the very beginning of the 
relationship. Further, unlike the best interests model discussed later, the substitutive 
judgment standard provides a greater opportunity to allow personal judgments and desires to 
be imprinted on the animal and to cloud the decision-making process, which should remain 
focused on the animal. Further, substituted judgment is best characterised as a decision taken 
to prevent a harm (ie. ‘what would the patient want in this circumstance?’91), whilst a claim 
in negligence is one which necessarily looks to redress a past harm; thus, the focus of the 
question does not lend itself the temporal qualities of a negligence claim. Putting the pieces 
together, the question for the court becomes: ‘would the animal have chosen ‘x’ treatment in 
‘y’ circumstance(s)?’ It is submitted that, ultimately, this would prove too conceptually 
difficult a task for the courts to undertake and one which would raise the wrong issues in the 
negligence context. It would appear, then, that the only situation under which such a model 
could perhaps be successfully applied is a claim in the specific area her monograph 
contemplates, namely custody disputes where one party is attempting to gain custody of the 
animal in question; however, even this is contentious. Importantly, Matlack, does not appear 
to limit her model to these confines and does envision a broader scope for its application, 
though how far beyond the sphere of custody matters is never fully addressed.   
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iii. Concluding Thoughts on Sentient Property Paradigm 
Matlack’s model, though interesting in premise and strongly relational, does not fit well into 
the requirements and inner workings of a negligence claim. Despite the author’s claims that 
her model could be applied in a range of legal circumstances, it was arguably not intended to 
be applied in negligence. The primary problem with Matlack’s model is its ambiguity. It is 
uncertain, for example, under what circumstances her model is to apply; its scope appears 
quite far-reaching, but in reality may only work in a very restricted context. Moreover, her 
attempt to limit the class of animals to only those that would be considered companion 
animals that live geographically close to the home not only serves to draw incoherent lines 
between companion animals that live far or close to the home, but also between animals that 
meet scientific definitions of sentience (ie. cows, sheep, etc.), but fail to qualify under 
Matlack’s definition. 
 Companion Animal Property b)
i. Framework and Application     
Consideration of Hankin’s companion animal property model is enticing as she considers 
both the tort context and the effects that her changes could have on the veterinary profession. 
In essence, Hankin’s model is quite basic. She advocates for an elevated property status for 
some companion animals, in particular dogs and cats.
92
 It is argued by Hankin that evidence 
separating dogs and cats from other animals can be found in the great amount of money and 
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concern we show toward these types of animal.
93
 In this way, then, Hankin attempts to 
separate herself from others who argue an elevated property paradigm for animals by openly 
and severely curtailing the animals that could benefit from this model. In the tort context, 
Hankin envisions that damage awards would be increased in recognition of the bond shared 
between owner and animal. To implement these changes, it is argued that legislation, as 
opposed to the common law, which is advocated in this thesis and Matlack’s model, ought to 
be implemented.
94
 In this regard, a worthwhile observation is made, namely that judges may 
feel confined by precedent to deny changing the legal status of animals. As this thesis 
argues, however, one of the common law’s greatest strengths is its ability to evolve and 
reflect changing social sentiment. Further, whilst it should not be expected that the judiciary 
accept arguments that fundamentally challenge anthropocentrism, positive change for 
animals can occur without adopting a change in their legal status; indeed, this is what SCP 
sets out to achieve, but on a much broader scale than Hankin envisions.  
ii. Potential Problems with the Companion Animal Property Model 
Throughout Hankin’s piece she states that the overarching drive behind the creation of this 
new model is to enhance coherence
95
 and consistency
96
 in the law as it relates to the human-
animal bond. The question, however, remains as to whether the companion property model 
fulfils its mandate. It is submitted that Hankin’s model ultimately falls foul of the coherent 
model she endeavoured to create. 
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First, similar to Matlack’s model discussed previously, Hankin restricts her elevated property 
model to a very specific type of companion animal, namely dogs and cats. Though 
adequately delineating the confines of any novel legal idea, especially those in the 
negligence context is important for fear that a floodgates or compensation culture argument 
could be used to destroy its development, such confines ought to meet with standards of 
reasonableness and logic. Hankin’s model, however, requires an arbitrary line to be drawn, 
relegating those animals (ie. horses, rabbits, sheep, arguably any domesticated animal) which 
are not dogs or cats to the status of fungible property.
97
 This privileging of certain animals 
over others is to some extent recognised by the author when she states that such a theory 
‘could admittedly create additional distinctions both between and within animal species;’98 
however, her reason that essentially things are what they are, is overly complacent.
99
 There 
is arguably no reason to limit her model to a narrowly-defined concept of animal companion. 
The sentient constitutive property paradigm discussed below will similarly possess 
limitations, however, I argue that a concept which appears to promote a form of favouritism 
(similar to Matlack’s discussed above), lacks a deeper understanding of the roles 
domesticated animals can play in the lives of humans.
100
 This also appears to go against 
Hankin’s model itself, which locates the bond between owner and animal in the animal’s 
dependence on its human owners and its ability to suffer.
101
 Quite simply, many animals 
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which are not cats and dogs meet this description, however, Hankin does not account in a 
reasoned way for why they ought to be excluded.    
 
Following from this, Hankin also appears to make the assumption that all owners of 
companion animals exhibit the qualities which she argues should translate to greater 
protection under the law. The reality of the matter is that the human-companion bond is not 
always like the idealised family unit Hankin envisions.
102
 Indeed, Corr notes that ‘people’s 
relationships with their pets differ.’103 Some are treated as family members, whilst others are 
used to portray a certain image and some are kept merely as possessions, which can be 
disposed of when the novelty has dissipated or they have become too expensive to keep.
104
 
Hankin, and those who contemplate an elevated property status for companion animals, 
routinely fail to take this issue into account. Indeed, this point underscores the ambiguity 
with which Hankin distinguishes between those relationships deserving of elevated 
protection under the law and those that do not. Though an owner may have a long-standing, 
exceedingly close relationship with her horse, under Hankin’s model, this relationship would 
not be protected, whilst someone who does not share that animal-human bond, but who does 
own a dog, would be entitled to elevated damages based solely on the fact that the animal is 
one characterised as “companion.” Thus, Hankin’s model is apt to produce arbitrary results, 
whilst at the same time restricting the court’s ability to expand and develop the law beyond 
the words of the legislation. Importantly, the relational element is not explored in sufficient 
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depth, with the result that her framework lacks a developed core. In the end, approving the 
companion animal property model in the context of a veterinary negligence context runs the 
risk of bringing the common law in this area into ambiguity.  
 
Lastly, because Hankin explicitly states that her model could be applied in the tort context 
and that the purpose of her article is to explore the implications of changing companion 
animals’ status on the veterinary profession,105 it is important to analyse the feasibility of this 
submission. Unfortunately, as the following analysis will show, some important 
considerations have been left out by Hankin. First, the holistic nature of the negligence 
inquiry makes it difficult to analyse any one aspect in isolation. Put a different way, one 
cannot view the aspect of damage in a vacuum. I would argue this is even more important as 
the author cites veterinarians as one group which would be most affected if the status of 
companion animals were to change. From a corrective justice standpoint it is essential that 
the claimant’s interest— here, her proprietary and emotional interest in her companion 
animal— forms the object of the defendant’s duty.106 In this way, then, the positions of 
defendant and claimant are strongly relational.
107
 There is little doubt that where the damage 
claimed is a relational one, there will be some level of purposiveness and interpretation 
needed at the duty stage; indeed, the sentient constitutive property model adopted in this 
chapter will necessarily require a somewhat more purposive interpretation of the duty of 
care. However, deeper consideration of the damage-duty relationship as it relates to Hankin’s 
model of companion animal property is quite difficult as her model does not: a) define or 
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characterise the bond envisioned; and b) fails to take into account the very disparate quality 
of the relationships people share with the companion animals, as highlighted by Corr and by 
a government research paper which disclosed that dogs and cats were the two highest 
categories of animal to suffer abuse.
108
     
 Concluding Thoughts in Sentient Property and Companion Animal Property Models c)
In both cases, despite the emphasis placed on the human-animal bond, the focus of the 
discussion is very firmly owner-centred (ie. animals are our children; we spend considerable 
sums of money on our animals, etc.).
109
 Unfortunately, this represents only one piece to the 
puzzle. Additional consideration needed to be paid to the animal’s interests within the 
relationship and how the respective models interact with current legal practices and 
relationships. This latter point is especially true of Hankin’s model, as it specifically 
contemplates application in tort and potential changes in the construction of the veterinary 
profession. If it is only the owner that can bring a claim, the authors in the above pieces and 
those that are closely related needed to address this dichotomy and consider larger order 
questions which would look to the impact of arguments made on the animal. Also absent is 
the legal role and obligations of the defendant. In some instances the authors mention 
veterinarians, yet their work contemplates many potential types of defendant (ie. defendants 
on the other side of a custody dispute or an equity dispute involving a trust, etc.), without 
addressing the fact that depending on the legal relationship between owner and defendant, 
different legal principles will apply and different considerations highlighted. Instead, the 
authors focus only on the role companion animals play in our lives; companion animals are 
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consistently likened to children and their importance evidenced by large amounts money 
spent on veterinary care, day care and birthdays. Whether the models created specifically 
highlight its application in tort or not, it is submitted that an analysis which contemplates a 
legal change to the status of animals needs to consider important issues beyond an owner-
centred relationship.  
 
Though I would agree that our social climate is changing with regards to the importance of 
animal welfare, I would contend that these models do not provide a workable framework 
from which to advance those interests successfully. Not all owners of companion animals 
treat their animals as beloved family members. Further, these models fail to discuss the point 
that people can share deep connections with animals falling outside the confines of a 
traditional companion animal definition. As the next section will highlight, the SCP 
framework recognises the blurring between subject and object, but argues for a more 
expansive conception in terms of the animals it contemplates. Further, sentient constitutive 
property also takes into consideration the importance of the relationship between 
veterinarian and owner by more clearly articulating the nature of the damage suffered by the 
owner and thus more clearly outlining and setting the stage for the correlative duty that the 
veterinarian would owe.   
3.5 The Sentient Constitutive Property Model 
It will be recalled that the sentient constitutive property model advocated in this thesis is 
strongly centred in aspects of relationality, but that tort law has been slow to recognise such 
harms or special “damage hybrid” claims. This section will detail the intricacies of the SCP 
model initially introduced at the beginning of this chapter and argue that, unlike the models 
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discussed previously, the SCP model provides a strong foundation from which to develop 
veterinary negligence jurisprudence and provide a normative framework for how we 
conceive of the human-animal bond.  
 
At the outset, it is important to highlight the point that not every animal will meet the 
threshold contemplated within the SCP model. From the first chapter, it will be recalled that 
the “type” of animal is irrelevant for the purposes of the damage requirement in a veterinary 
negligence claim following the SCP model.
110
 However, it will be argued (reluctantly) that 
to operate successfully within current negligence jurisprudence, SCP will have to be 
restricted to those relationships which would be considered a constitutive relationship. This 
argument will become more apparent at the constitutive stage of the analysis, but for present 
purposes, it is important to recognise and acknowledge the limitations of the SCP itself and 
the actionable damage component more broadly. In particular, as it currently stands, 
negligence does not recognise the individual interest of a nonhuman animal; thus, it will 
necessarily be the case that, at least at the damage stage, it will be the owner’s interest that is 
protected. Further, because the model advocated here is grounded in ideas of constitutiveness 
and relationality, it will also be the case that those animals bred and raised for purely 
commercial purposes, for example, cows and pigs raised for slaughter, will be unlikely to fit 
under the SCP model.
111
 It is acknowledged that this is not perfect and that advances which 
would allow the animal’s interests to be considered at the damage stage would be greatly 
preferred. Having said this, for the limited aims of this thesis, namely to provide 
veterinarians with guidance on their obligations arising in negligence and to forward the best 
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interests of animals so far as possible within the veterinary relationship, it is argued that the 
SCP model provides the best course going forward.       
 Animals’ Status as Property: Retaining an Accepted Model a)
This thesis does not seek to change the legal status of animals. In terms of satisfying 
orthodox notions of property damage for the purposes of the actionable damage requirement, 
Witting states that courts look to deleterious changes in the nature of the property.
112
 Further, 
‘[damage to property is] ordinarily manifest in nature, easily perceptible by the human 
eye.’113 Available case law discussed in the previous section dealing with the issue of 
veterinary negligence continues to treat animals as fungible property.
114
 Though the pure 
market value approach to assessing veterinary negligence cases has been rejected, retaining 
the property status of animals does allow for two important things. First, it allows the 
application of the constitutive property framework, which will be discussed in the coming 
sections. Second, it allows the law in this area to develop in an evolutionary fashion, as 
opposed to radical. As Radford has observed: 
In Britain, even if the senior judiciary could be prevailed upon to 
accept that the capacities of a particular species were such as to 
justify a change in their legal status, it is highly improbable that 
the judges would consider it appropriate for they themselves to 
introduce such a novel principle into the law.
115
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In keeping with this, then, a model which retains the status quo in certain areas, but 
challenges it others, arguably presents a middle ground approach and the strongest way 
forward. Having said this, it is also important to emphasise that just as the forthcoming 
sections on sentience and the nature of the constitutive relationship will highlight the 
relational element, the property element, for the purposes of a veterinary negligence claim, 
also embraces a strongly relational quality. To this end, a more modern understanding of 
property which insists upon a relational dimension is advocated.
116
 Following Davies, 
‘property is not just about individuals exercising control over external things and (therefore) 
over others. Rather, property concerns individuals and communities: how they are formed, 
how they live together...’117 I would extend this argument further to reflect the unique nature 
of the relationship that can be formed with sentient constitutive property and that a more 
nuanced approach, including looking at the animal as more than a mere “thing,” must 
therefore be adopted. 
 Sentience  b)
Sentience has been broadly defined as the ability to feel pain and to suffer. These attributes 
have been behind the law’s attempt to protect animals from intentional infliction of pain and 
suffering
118
 and have provided a footing to argue that animals possess moral status.
119
 For 
the animals contemplated in this thesis, establishing sentience is unlikely to prove 
problematic. I would argue, however, that to truly embrace the idea that the harm in a 
veterinary negligence claim is centred in the relationship shared between animal and owner, 
the ability to feel pain and suffer does not capture the whole picture.  Further, articulating a 
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more detailed account of sentience as a being capable of experiencing emotions beyond pain 
and suffering will assist in laying the groundwork for the argument in the next chapter, 
focusing on duty of care, that animals should have their best interests protected at the duty of 
care stage. To this end, it will be argued that acting in an animal’s best interest goes beyond 
merely preventing or alleviating pain and suffering, but also taking positive steps to ensure 
that animal’s interests are maintained. Speaking to this issue, veterinarians could, for 
example, depart from the instructions of the owner should the animal’s welfare be brought 
into question say by providing invasive futile treatment to a terminally ill animal.
120
  
 
It will be recalled that one of the restrictions placed on the type of animal considered to be 
sentient constitutive property is that the animal and owner must be in some form of 
constitutive relationship. Though it would only be the owner’s interest in the relationship 
that could be legally represented as forming the basis for actionable damage, the animal must 
be, I argue, an active participant in that relationship. This would imply a definition of 
sentience which extends animals’ capabilities beyond pain and suffering. In this way, 
Tannenbaum’s description of the human-animal bond provides a good starting point. Here,  
 The relationship must also derive not just to a benefit, but to a 
 significant benefit, of both parties, and the relationship must 
 benefit a central aspect of the lives of each...[it must also] be 
 bidirectional, with each party to the bond offering attention to the 
 other [and] insofar as is possible, each party...must treat the other 
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 not as a means toward its own ends, but something entitled to 
 respect and benefit in its own right.
121
    
 
To this end, it is submitted that the following two theories conceived of by Broom
122
 and 
Proctor
123
 combine to form a definition of sentience that takes on board the relational 
arguments made by Conaghan
124
 and Priaulx
125
 and lends credence to the argument that the 
constitutive element should form the cornerstone of the SCP model. According to Broom, an 
animal is described as being sentient where it has some ability, ‘to evaluate the actions of 
others in relation to itself and third parties, to remember some of its own actions and their 
consequences, to assess risk, to have some feelings and to have some degree of 
awareness.’126 Further, according to Proctor, sentient animals are capable of forming lasting 
friendships and exhibiting empathy.
127
 All of this, I argue, provides an independent rationale 
for the position that the animal’s best interests should be protected, but also lays the 
groundwork for discussion of the constitutive element. In these instances, courts would be 
affirming that nonhuman animals are beings which can, in essence, do more than suffer and 
feel pain and, in fact, lead complex lives involving a wide range of different emotions and 
thought processes.
128
 Importantly, the model of sentience adopted here requires active 
participation from the animal in the sense that the animal is able to experience, but also share 
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a wide range of emotions in response to a relationship from which the animal derives 
meaning. 
 A ‘Constitutive’ Relationship: Radin’s Property and Personhood Argument  c)
i. Theory and Application of Constitutive Property   
This section will be based largely on the arguments detailed by Margaret Radin, specifically 
the theory that ‘ownership is bound up with self-constitution or personhood.’129 It is 
submitted that for the purposes of a veterinary negligence claim, viewing the animal as 
special form property which contributes and elevates the owner’s sense of self (ie. the 
owner’s personhood), captures both the legal relationship that exists as between owner and 
property, here the owner and animal, but also the deep companion relationship that can exist 
within this legal relationship, which can positively impact the life of the owner and the 
animal.
130
 In this way, Radin’s argument will be utilised to give the SCP model a normative 
grounding.   
 
In essence, Radin’s argument is simple in construction, but has yet to be fully explored in the 
context of animals and the law, and is not contemplated by Matlack or Hankin discussed 
previously.
131
 Broadly speaking, Radin’s argument works on the premise that all property 
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can be viewed on a continuum. On one end of the spectrum is fungible property, or property 
which is viewed as alienable and interchangeable with like items and money. Hence, 
property which sits on this end of spectrum can be viewed as instrumental. On the other end 
of the spectrum sits property which is inalienable and, ultimately, intrinsically valuable to 
the owner. Radin states that ‘since personal property132 is connected with the self in a 
morally justifiable and constitutive way, to disconnect it from the person harms or destroys 
the self.’133 Further, property on the constitutive end of the spectrum is not valued, or not 
only valued, in market terms of exchange; thus, they are noncommodified, or incompletely 
commodified.
134
    
 
Though Radin’s theory of constitutive property does not specifically contemplate 
applications in the realm of owner-animal relations, I would argue that her theory is quite apt 
to describe the type of relationship present between owners and animals for the purposes of 
the actionable damage portion of veterinary negligence claim. Consider the example Radin 
uses of a constitutive relationship involving the home.
135
 She describes the home as a place 
which is sacred and represents a ‘moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of 
association.’136 Further, the ‘home is a place where intimate things are kept from prying eyes 
                                                                                                                                                      
Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a 
Companion Animal (1998) 4 Animal L 33, 67-68. 
132
 Radin uses the phrase ‘personal property’ to denote those relationships which exist on the far end of the 
spectrum towards personhood. In later writings, she describes this relationship as ‘constitutive property.’ See 
on this point: Radin, Reinterpreting Property (n129) 2. 
133
 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Reconsidering Personhood’ (n18) 423, 428. 
134
 ibid 429. 
135
 Radin also uses the example of wedding ring to articulate her intuitive argument of constitutive property. A 
wedding ring will have a market value based on the market value of its metallic compounds, precious stones, 
etc. It will also have a value to the jeweller who may place very little constitutive value in it (he or she is 
merely selling the item), and it may have an intrinsic/ fully constitutive value to the person who receives the 
ring. Interestingly, Radin then notes that this relationship with the item may change if the relationship with the 
giver of the ring broke down. See: Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ (n19) 959-960.      
136
 Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ (n19) 991. 
3. Harm to Sentient Constitutive Property 
153 
 
and intimate relationships are carried on away from prying ears.’137 In essence, the home is a 
safe zone where people can keep personal possessions, enjoy their privacy, and interact with 
others. Some of these same sentiments can be seen in the decision of Bingham LJ in Attia 
discussed above.
138
 Thus, the home itself embodies for the owner something more than its 
market value. There is an intrinsic value to the owner which can be attributed to the many 
ways we are able to develop and grow as people (ie. to constitute ourselves) within the 
home. In one way, the fact that the court in Attia did not strike out the claim for psychiatric 
harm element illustrates that a similar sentiment may exist in the UK context.  
 
At this point, it is helpful to recall Tannenbaum’s articulation of the companion-owner bond 
being one that is:  
…bidirectional.... [and one] which brings a significant benefit to a 
central aspect of the lives of each...and in which each party treats 
the other not just as something entitled to respect and benefit in its 
own right but also an object of admiration, trust, devotion, or 
love.
139
  
 
Corr further highlights that the companion relationship provides many emotional benefits for 
humans including love, constancy and a lack of judgment.
140
 In essence, the bond created is 
of a deeply personal and intimate nature. From this, I would contend certain human-animal 
relationships fit the description articulated by Radin to the extent that certain animals are 
likely to be of intrinsic value to the owner and when that relationship is broken, for example 
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by negligence, the disconnection harms the self. Further, the point made above that the 
constitutive relationship would be stronger in the owner-animal context given the animal’s 
ability to actively reciprocate feelings and emotions, would arguably place this relationship 
at the far end of Radin’s spectrum. The point that constitutive property is noncommodifiable 
also explains the argument that setting damages in terms of the animal’s market value fails to 
capture the relationship which has been lost and why it is necessary to include an element 
which accounts for the emotional damage suffered by the claimant.   
 
It is further submitted that when viewing the types of relationships between owner and 
animal which would be considered constitutive, the distinction between subject and object 
becomes blurred and is better seen as a reciprocal relationship in which both mutually 
benefit and contribute positively to the development of the self in each. In describing her 
theory of constitutive property, Radin too discusses a blurring between the subject and object 
to the extent that in relationships which can be viewed as constitutive, ‘the property is not 
wholly “outside” the self, in a world separate from the person; but neither is it wholly 
“inside” the self, indistinguishable from the attributes of the person.’141 It is this balance 
between the internal and external which characterises any healthy relationship and certainly 
one which I would argue can occur between owner and animal.
142
            
 
It will also be recalled that though the type of animal (ie. companion, agricultural, or 
something in between) is irrelevant in terms of what animals humans can form constitutive 
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relationships with, it will only be those relationships which could be characterised as 
constitutive relationships that could include the additional emotional harm element within a 
veterinary negligence claim. In this regard, I agree with Sandøe who argues that ‘it is the 
nature of the relationship, not the species, which identifies an animal as a companion [here, 
constitutive] animal.’143 The continuum argument that Radin posits is fitting when 
attempting to understand this dichotomy and to address the argument that perhaps animals 
should form a separate category of property wholly unto themselves. Though reluctantly 
stated, it will likely be the case that those animals born and raised solely for the purposes of 
slaughter would tend to fit the description Radin gives for fungible property. Animals in this 
category are usually seen as instruments and are seen as commodities with a specific 
monetary value. In large factory farms, it will be increasingly difficult, though arguably not 
impossible, to form the close, constitutive relationship necessary to fit the parameters of the 
SCP model. It is submitted that this and other existing institutions of animal use severely 
handicaps any argument which seeks to achieve a wholly separate, elevated category of 
property specifically for sentient animals.
144
 Whether these practices are morally permissible 
is beyond the remit of this chapter. What is salient are the borders within which tort operates 
and how far those borders can be stretched to accommodate new forms of damage.  
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To this end, it is helpful to briefly re-examine the arguments made by West, Conaghan and 
Priaulx to the extent that, harm has a social as well as an individual dimension.
145
 Radin 
states that under her model, ‘the court will not be called to determine whether subjectively 
the owner’s property is constitutive, but rather to decide what type of property cases involve 
constitutive property.’146 However, I argue that, as regards SCP, the issues of subjectively 
establishing constitutive property and critiquing the constitutive property paradigm need not 
be divorced. The argument that within a constitutive relationship the subject-object 
relationship becomes blurred— indeed, as between animal and owner that divide may cease 
to exist entirely— means that an integral part of the veterinary negligence claim will be this 
subjective determination. Underscoring this is the argument made by West that there must be 
an element of compassion in the decision-making capacity of the judiciary if justice is to be 
accomplished and the common law to evolve alongside social realities.
147
 Thus, the position 
advocated here is that the courts have the capability to recognise the subjective element and 
that within a constitutive relationship, just as the animal property cannot be viewed as being 
totally external or internal to the self, the harm too will be suffered on a level which is 
neither totally internal (ie. psychiatric), nor totally external.
148
 Though complex, I argue this 
articulation represents a more complete and holistic picture of the actual damage suffered by 
the claimant.
149
 Further, the discussion regarding new forms of actionable damage discussed 
above indicates that an erosion of strict boundary lines is already taking place and that 
judges are willing to innovate and adopt positions which challenge the status quo. 
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ii. Potential Problems with Utilising a ‘Constitutive’ Structure for Actionable 
Damage 
One primary aspect of Radin’s theory which could negatively bear on its successful 
application in articulating the damage suffered between owner and animal is whether the 
eventual end which Radin articulates in her first article, namely that a person fully 
constituted has reached a full personhood or autonomy status
150
 is desirable when 
considering an aim of the SCP model is to take seriously relational damage models within 
the tort of negligence.  
 
In this regard, Nedelsky argues that property has traditionally been conceived as the interest 
which both figuratively and literally provides the strongest symbol of autonomy.
151
 
Similarly, Conaghan notes that tort law views the fully autonomous individual or person ‘in 
isolation from the relationships which produce, nurture, and protect him.’152 In essence, the 
person of tort is ‘not someone for whom the boundaries of self and other have ever been 
blurred, or who experiences his social world, particularly the relations of which that world is 
comprised, not as something external to self but as something from which self is derived.’153 
In essence, then, utilising Radin’s theory would be a regressive step, which rather than 
challenging the orthodox person of tort, accepts and forwards it. Though I would agree with 
the statements made by Conaghan and Nedelsky, I argue that the way in which the 
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constitutive model is being applied for the purposes of this thesis differs from the model 
originally conceived of by Radin. Whilst Radin only contemplates a constitutive relationship 
with inanimate property, I view the relationship as one between two sentient, participating 
beings, which more closely resembles a relationship between two humans as opposed to 
person and thing; subject and object. Indeed, Radin herself points out that as between subject 
and object there is a blurring of the boundary lines.
154
 It is therefore contended that rather 
than adding to orthodox notions of ownership and property in tort, SCP situates itself within 
in the relational loss category discussed at the beginning of this chapter and the negligence 
claims discussed in the previous chapter, which considered vulnerability.
155
     
iii. Concluding Thoughts on the Constitutive Property as a Basis for Actionable 
Damage 
Putting the above arguments together, it is submitted that a strong case can be made that 
from a normative perspective the constitutive relationship is one that should be protected by 
the law of negligence. Orthodox articulations of property damage found in the identification 
of deleterious change fail to explain the damage suffered. Instead, the constitutive 
relationship embraces a view of sentience which recognises an animal’s capacity to enter 
into complex, constitutive relationships with their human owners and that, from this 
relationship, owners and animals are capable of deriving intrinsically-valuable experiences. 
Importantly, it is these experiences which contribute to our own personhood and conceptions 
of a good life. Further, from the owner’s perspective, this relationship is not fully captured 
by a market value approach when valuing the animal for the purposes of a veterinary 
negligence claim. As West notes:    
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Both through the larger culture of which law is partly constitutive 
and which it in turn partly constitutes, and through a system of 
justificatory norms and ethics interrelated with the larger culture 
but also quite distinct from it, law influences our behaviour and 
thoughts by affecting the way we think about ourselves, each 
other, and the larger society of which we are a part. The overall 
efficacy of legal culture in shaping our behaviour through its 
impact on our self-concept, in fact, may well be far greater than 
that of the legal sanction itself.
156
 
 
Important in this is the argument made by Priaulx that the preference tort has shown to 
physical forms of harm over ‘harms of a psycho-social nature not only serves to draw lines 
between the between kinds of harm, but entire categories of victim whose biographies 
express harm in ways that fail to fit the dominant dialogue of negligence law.’157 Thus, there 
is legitimacy that comes from the court acknowledging that a claimant has been harmed and 
has suffered a recognised form of actionable damage— this would arguably occur both on a 
personal level from the perspective of the claimant (ie. ‘I have suffered a recognised harm’) 
and from a corrective justice standpoint in so far as it establishes the defendant and claimant 
are ‘connected as doer and sufferer of the same injustice.’158 With this in mind, it is 
submitted that SCP should constitute a recognised form of actionable damage. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to address the principal issue of actionable damage in a 
veterinary negligence claim. The problem faced by the current model is that a market value 
approach is too restrictive in the number and nature of possible claimants it embraces. The 
market value approach fails to take into account the position of the animal patient as a 
sentient being, intrinsic to the veterinary relationship and, importantly, the constitutive 
relationship between owner and animal. Further, whilst other alternative property theories 
have been put forward to address the position of the animal in care and treatment decisions, 
their inability work successfully within established negligence doctrine and method severely 
restricts their ability to provide veterinarians with worthwhile guidance on how to fulfil their 
legal obligations. Second, the authors of the models considered take an overly-restrictive 
view of the type of companion animal which can be considered. Whilst dogs and cats would 
no doubt feature strongly in any construct which attempts to understand the bond 
experienced by owner and animal, denying the possibility of other animals forming similar 
bonds with their owners leads to unfair privileging of certain companion animals over others 
and ultimately a bias restriction on who can bring a claim to court and who cannot.    
 
The sentient constitutive property model, however, corrects these misrepresentations by 
building upon doctrinal developments within property and highlighting the strongly 
relational elements more characteristic of the actual harm likely to be suffered in veterinary 
negligence claims. Importantly, it looks to the strength of the bond that exists between 
animal and owner as one which is constitutive, where both the animal and the owner are 
active participants in a reciprocal, mutually beneficial relationship. For the purposes of the 
actionable damage requirement of a negligence claim, then, the animal remains the property 
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of the owner, however, the emotional harm suffered when constitutive relationship is 
negligently severed, forms a consequential (but arguably more important) element to the 
claim. This chapter, then, takes on board Nolan’s construction where it was argued that:  
 It seems preferable to deal with the questions of whether a given 
 harm is ever actionable under the heading of actionable damage  
 and to deal with the question of whether a sometimes actionable 
 harm is actionable in this particular case under the separate 
 heading of duty of care, since doing so...makes it more likely that 
 the important issues raised...will be addressed openly and 
 comprehensively.
159
 
 
On this note, it is to the duty of care that this thesis now turns. 
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“It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every 
legal duty is founded on a moral obligation.”1 
4. Revisiting the Duty of Care: Arguing for a Best Interests Approach 
4.1 Introduction 
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the damage aspect of a veterinary negligence claim 
and argued that the constitutive relationship shared between owner and animal is central to a 
claim in veterinary negligence, the purpose of this chapter is to explore current duty of care 
structures and determine whether the sentient constitutive property model can be properly 
accounted for within these structures. Although it has been argued in the first chapter that 
veterinarians owe many legal duties of care, the exact nature and limits of those duties, 
especially in complex ethical scenarios, has yet to be explored. No modern secondary 
literature on this topic exists and the small amount of reported case law fails to provide any 
meaningful account of the duty component. The purpose of this chapter is to explore these 
boundaries utilising established negligence principles and analogous case law to come to a 
more nuanced understanding of a veterinarian’s duty of care.  
 
From the outset, it is important to distinguish between two terms which will appear 
throughout this chapter. First, the commercial model will be used to represent the current 
approach to veterinary negligence: a binary relationship (owner and veterinarian), in which 
the protected interest under consideration is the market value of the claimant’s damaged 
                                                 
1
 R v. Instan [1893] 1 QB 450, 453 per Lord Coleridge CJ.  
4. Revisiting Duty of Care 
163 
 
property (the animal). Duty under this model, it will be recalled, resembled a singular duty 
approach stemming from a Hedley Byrne- type assumption of responsibility.
2
 Conversely, 
the best interests model which will be developed throughout this chapter argues that, so far 
as possible, veterinarians ought to protect the best interests of the animal. Thus, the 
relationship is characterised as triangular and, in certain scenarios discussed later in this 
chapter, following the best interests model may justify a departure from the express desires 
of the owner. This approach is advocated not only to protect the integrity of the constitutive 
relationship, but more importantly, to acknowledge the best interests of the animal patient as 
a paramount consideration in veterinary medicine. Though, it is acknowledged that some of 
the veterinarian’s duty can be explained by the commercial relationship between owner and 
veterinarian, the duties that stem from this construct are fairly straightforward and generally 
uncontroversial.  
 
Where things become complicated, however, is determining what form the duty assumes 
once the position of the animal features more predominantly within the legal relationship. As 
arguing for the best interests of the animal patient and providing more accurate legal 
guidance for veterinarians remains the primary ambition of this thesis, addressing these 
novel points is crucial. In so doing, it is submitted that the orthodox conception of a 
veterinarian's duty of care stemming from the commercial relationship between owner and 
veterinarian masks significantly deeper issues inherent within the triangular veterinary 
relationship and more specifically within constitutive property relationships. The result is not 
only that the true nature of the veterinarian's duties in these instances is significantly 
obscured, but that what information we do have may actually serve to misinform 
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veterinarians as to their legal obligations. In addressing these deeper duty of care issues, it is 
submitted that viewing a veterinarian’s legal duties of care through a lens which prioritises 
the best interests of the animal, in a similar vein to that of a paediatrician, provides a solution 
to overcome the conflicts created by adhering too strictly to commercial interests. 
 
To illustrate this process, the first section will introduce briefly how I intend to utilise a best 
interests approach in the veterinary context. From here, the second section will address the 
veterinarian’s legal duties of care in areas which can arguably be determined utilising 
orthodox tort principles; the doctrinal distinction between positive acts of misfeasance and 
omissions is particularly relevant here. This section will explore the limits of what 
negligence is able to accomplish using the commercial relationship as its foundation. 
Although analysing the veterinarian’s duty in this context is able to provide some guidance 
for veterinarians, this is at the expense of both forwarding the animal’s interests and 
acknowledging the relationship between owner and animal as something more than simply 
subject-object; property-holder and property. This section continues by exploring the grey 
areas that emerge as a result of viewing the veterinarian’s duties in a purely commercial 
context. To demonstrate the limitations of the commercial model in accurately articulating 
the veterinarian’s duty, human medical law will be offered as a body of law from which 
analogous principles to the veterinary profession can be derived. Ultimately, however, it will 
be argued that the tension created by the legal status of the animal and the constitutive nature 
of the relationship between animal and owner gives rise to complex, unique issues which 
cannot be fully accommodated by either the medical law analogy or the existing commercial 
articulation. This will be further illustrated by the introduction of several hypothetical 
scenarios, which, although certainly conceivable in terms of the treatment dilemmas they 
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raise, cannot be reconciled using orthodox duty principles as they are currently being 
applied. Section four offers a solution to the dilemmas discussed in the previous section in 
the form of a best interests inquiry, placing the animal’s interests as the paramount 
consideration. As this section will make clear, the best interests principle is not a cure-all for 
all of the issues introduced, however, it is submitted that this inquiry provides a step in the 
right direction by providing veterinarians with a framework which can better guide their 
decision making by re-focusing the duty inquiry and taking a fuller account of which 
interests ought to be protected.    
 
The remaining section will consider issues stemming from the veterinarian’s duty to advise 
and disclose risks. This is currently an area undergoing rapid change, both in the human 
medical context and veterinary. Whereas the debate over the doctor’s duty to disclose in 
relation to the patient’s right to decide has been debated for the better part of thirty years, 
this topic is just now entering veterinary medicine. Looking at this situation in light of the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board
3
 provides a 
special opportunity to determine whether the veterinary profession should try so far as 
possible to emulate the human medical context, or whether a different framework is to be 
preferred. It is initially submitted that, at least in this regard, the veterinary profession should 
not follow suit with human medicine; this is due primarily to the antagonism and distrust that 
can be created when the relationship is viewed diametrically, stemming from the patient’s 
right as an autonomous individual and the detrimental effects that can come when viewing 
the relationship as consumer-based in nature. As an alternative, a shared decision-making 
model, which allows for a more holistic assessment taking into account the interests of the 
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owner as a participant in a constitutive relationship, and importantly, the best interests of the 
animal will be offered. 
4.2 Best Interests: A Step in the Right Direction  
Ultimately, this chapter will make the argument that applying a best interests rationale 
provides a workable framework which veterinarians can utilise to resolve various treatment 
dilemmas. How best interests ought to be applied and its limitations in the veterinary context 
will be discussed in greater depth below, however, what is important for present purposes is 
how I intend to use best interests throughout this chapter to formulate a more robust and 
representative duty of care. To begin, Corr states that ‘in reality, it is the client who 
ultimately determines what happens to their animal, and only in cases of cruelty can the vet 
disregard the owner’s wishes, and have legal protection.’4 The position that I adopt in this 
thesis is that veterinarians should try so far as possible to promote the best interests of the 
animal patient, even if this goes against the owner’s wishes. There are, of course limitations 
to this which will be discussed, however, the important point is that the owner’s wishes and 
the commercial relationship between the owner and veterinarian should not always be 
dispositive.  
 
Looking at the relationship between best interests and the duty of care in veterinary 
negligence, the point to take away is that best interests is used to determine whether it can be 
said that the veterinarian has an affirmative duty to act for the animal. Simply put, if such a 
duty does arise, the question becomes what form that duty takes— following the argument 
                                                 
4
 Sandra Corr, ‘Companion Animals’ in Christopher M. Wathes and others (eds.), Veterinary Ethics and Law in 
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that many duties of care exist—  and whether the veterinarian acted appropriately. 
Conversely, if no duty to act in the animal’s best interests arises, then the veterinarian need 
not take positive steps to ensure the animal’s best interests are protected. In the context of 
veterinary negligence, affirmative duties of care to act in the animal’s best interest may arise 
in situations broadly described as the duty to diagnose, the duty to provide options, and the 
duty to treat. In situations where, for example, the animal’s best interests are put in jeopardy 
because of a particular type of treatment chosen by the owner, my argument runs that the 
veterinarian has an affirmative duty to act in the animal’s best interests. This could occur, for 
example, where the treatment choice sought by the owner results in a poorer quality of life 
for the animal. In some cases, this occurs because the owner cannot come to terms with the 
prospect of losing the animal, or has become emotionally detached from the additional 
suffering that will be caused if such treatment is performed. In these situations, it is argued 
that the best interests of the animal must come first. In so acting, the veterinarian would not 
only be advocating for the interests of animal patient, but also acting to maintain the integrity 
of the constitutive bond shared between owner and animal.  
 
A further area which will be discussed, and where great contention lies, is in the area of 
euthanasia. Indeed, a recent British Veterinary Association Congress meeting stated that 
‘increased client expectations, developments in technology, and the drive from new 
graduates to develop their diagnostic and treatment skills were all pushing back the 
boundaries of when [euthanasia became the best treatment option]’5 — the implication being 
that the boundary between viable treatment options and those that, although technologically 
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advanced,
6
 do not necessary produce a better quality of life for the animal is becoming 
increasingly important and contentious. Whereas, for example, euthanasia remains unlawful 
in the human medical context, it is an accepted treatment option in veterinary medicine.
7
 
However, the issue of actively taking steps to bring about an animal’s death raises complex 
issues and dilemmas, especially where the owner and veterinarian disagree on its application. 
It is in these complex boundary scenarios that best interests can play an important role. 
Addressing the nature of a veterinarian’s duty of care in these situations is therefore all the 
more critical given the pace at which new treatment options are entering the veterinary scene 
in relation to the available RCVS guidance in this area, and the priority placed in this thesis 
on the interests of the animal. Before discussing this issue further, however, it is important to 
first get a sense of how the law currently interprets, or would likely interpret, the 
veterinarian’s duty utilising orthodox, commercial principles. 
4.3 Returning to First Principles: Duty of Care Applications in the Veterinary 
Context 
Corr’s statement in the previous section illustrates two important points as regards the 
current approach taken in negligence: first, it is only the relationship between owner and 
veterinarian which would be contemplated; only in extreme cases of cruelty can the 
veterinarian consider the interests of the animal. Second, as between veterinarian and owner, 
the owner determines the terms under which the veterinarian can become involved with her 
property. From this, we can see the beginnings of relationship which mirrors that found in 
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general commercial dealings.
8
 The problem with this commercial articulation of the duty of 
care is that it gives rise to a formulation that is too narrow, thus failing to assist the 
veterinarian and protect the animal. The purpose of this section is to determine how far the 
commercial articulation extends, whilst also recognising and addressing the more basic point 
that the nature of the commercial relationship between owner and veterinarian has, in itself, 
yet to be fully explored within legal scholarship.  
 
At its most broad, the duty question asks us to consider what interests of the claimant’s the 
defendant ought to have been aware. With secondary source material and the courts 
indicating that the only interests relevant to veterinary liability are those related to the 
owner’s commercial interests, veterinarians can lose sight of the importance of the animal’s 
best interests.
9
 Under the current commercial approach, then, it is only cases involving 
animals with high market values that are likely to be litigated. As the previous chapter on 
damage illustrated, however, this is an exceedingly narrow conception of the human-animal 
bond.
10
 Owners in a constitutive relationship (ie. those most likely to bring a claim in 
veterinary negligence) are not primarily motivated by the animal’s commercial worth or their 
financial investment in the animal, thus, going forward, a more holistic understanding of 
veterinary negligence liability— one which takes into account constitutive relationships and 
relationships of vulnerability— is needed. Couple this situation with Jarvis’s point that 
viable treatment boundaries are being pushed in unknown directions, it must be asked to 
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what extent the current commercial approach to duty for veterinary negligence remains 
relevant and pertinent.  
 
These two issues provide the catalyst for reconsidering what interests ought really to be 
protected at the duty of care stage. It is submitted that as soon as more weight is given to the 
position of the animal— either individually, or as an extension as the owner’s personhood— 
the commercial construction of the veterinarian’s duty becomes wholly inadequate. This is 
not to say that a commercial approach should be done away with entirely. Indeed, this model 
would arguably still apply in uncontroversial situations where the parties come to a formal 
agreement as to treatment and fees, but rather to make the point that the best interests model 
should be the dominant model, with the commercial model operating within it. In 
uncontroversial situations, for example, where the owner and veterinarian are in agreement 
as to treatment and fees, no affirmative duty to protect the best interests of the animal arises. 
Looking ahead to more controversial situations, this section will address current problems 
facing the duty of care assessment in veterinary negligence claims. As regards the distinction 
between acts and omissions, the area of contention is determining how far current negligence 
principles at the duty of care stage can be extended. To better illustrate these distinctions, 
analogies will be drawn with human medical cases where there is considerably more 
information and pertinent legal principles have received greater judicial scrutiny.
11
 
Ultimately, as the animal becomes a more central focus within the triangular relationship, the 
commercial relationship and orthodox principles that influence it start to crumble; the focus 
of this section, then, is to bring to the fore where those boundary lines exist and identify 
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ways in which they can be rebuilt to accommodate the best interests model advocated for 
later in this chapter.  
 Relational Duties of Care, or A Singular Duty of Care? a)
It will be recalled from Chapter One that one of the more problematic issues with the current 
case law on veterinary negligence lies in the fact that the duty of care aspect was largely 
ignored in favour of a more detailed breach assessment.
12
 In this regard the language utilised 
by the courts resembled a singular duty approach stemming from an assumption of 
responsibility for the claimant’s economic interest; duty, therefore, served only an 
instrumental means. This simple form of assessment is reflective of a larger trend within 
negligence scholarship to dispose of an in-depth duty analysis in favour of a more detailed 
analysis occurring at the breach stage.
13
 For reasons which I discuss below, I argue that this 
trend should be resisted and that determining what a veterinarian owes to their client and 
their patient is a legal question, which later carries obligatory force, not a factual question 
dependent of the specific facts of a particular claim.  
 
Whilst some authors have ventured so far as to argue that duty can be deconstructed and its 
component parts divided amongst other negligence requirements, such as breach and 
causation,
14
 Howarth argues for a slightly different vision for duty.
15
 Under this view, there 
is only one duty— a duty not to harm others by faulty conduct.16 According to Howarth, ‘the 
duty is always the same, to take reasonable care; what varies is whether the duty to act 
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reasonably applies in the first place and whether if it does, the defendant [has done so].’17 
Proponents of this view, according to Goldberg and Zipursky, hold that: 
 Law for the modern world... is law that recognizes that the duty of 
 care in negligence law does not attach to relationships (personal, 
 contractual, or otherwise) but to individuals and their actions. In 
 short, it is a simple, nonrelational duty—a duty to act with 
 reasonable care, full stop.
18
  
 
Described as being ex ante in nature, the singular duty model also allegedly retains an 
action-guiding quality.
19
 Unlike the unintelligible proposition that we owe many duties of 
care which are dependent on the relationship we share with a given individual, the duty to 
act reasonably in all circumstances is something everyone can comprehend.
20
 The role of the 
court, then, is to look at the facts of the given case and upon weighing the issues and 
identifying the reasons for denying a duty in past cases, determine whether the defendant, in 
essence, made the correct calculation.
21
  
 
This type of analysis is perhaps most clearly seen in the veterinary negligence case of Blass 
v. Randall,
22
 where it will be recalled that the claimant brought an action against the 
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defendant veterinarian alleging that she had been negligent in completing a pre-purchase 
examination for the purchase of a horse. In the analysis that followed, the court was 
concerned solely with determining whether the veterinarian in, for example, completing the 
physical examination, recording the history, and communicating the findings and advice, had 
acted reasonably within the commercial arrangement. Following Howarth’s construction, a 
singular duty to act reasonably arose (as it always does) and so what remained was to 
determine whether, based on the facts, the defendant had in fact acted reasonably. The tenor 
of the judgment in Blass closely follows this type of analysis. Heavy emphasis was placed 
on whether the defendant could be said to have acted as a reasonably competent 
veterinarian.
23
  
 
What is problematic in Howarth’s argument, and others that similarly agree with the singular 
duty construct,
24
 is that it only considers the issue of whether, in a given situation, the 
defendant acted reasonably; it does not address the far more revealing question of why this 
type of assessment is important in the first place. This links with the argument put forward in 
Chapter One that in its current commercial form, the assumption of responsibility test is 
utilised as a conclusory phrase, rather than an essential step to arriving at a rationale for why 
a duty ought to be imposed.
25
 In this way it becomes disingenuous to talk about the duty 
being ex ante because there is no rationale or basis provided as to why it is important to act 
reasonably in the first place. This analysis is avoided by those who adopt a singular duty 
perspective because, at some point in the reasoning process, a discussion on relationality and 
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how this shapes the obligations we owe becomes necessary. Indeed, taking this non-
relational approach to duty corresponds with the argument made by Conaghan, discussed in 
the previous chapter, namely that the ideal, fully autonomous person of tort is viewed ‘in 
isolation from the relationships which produce, nurture, and protect him,’26 and with the 
ideal commercial relationship as one in which both parties are fully autonomous, rational, 
and capable of enforcing their rights against the other.
27
 In a way, the singular duty and 
commercial model are, therefore, linked in their common rejection of a relational 
understanding to human interaction.  
 
The reality, I argue, is that we exist in world where we enter into relationships with other 
people (and animals).  Within this web of different relationships, some relationships sit 
closer to the centre and others more distant sitting along the outer perimeter. The closer to 
the centre, the closer the relationship; the more we entrust to the other, the more we divulge, 
the more heavily we rely. Thus, it is not “perverse”28 to contemplate the relationships we 
form with others, rather this approach is more in keeping with human experience and the 
experiential nature of negligence law. How we characterise the closeness or proximity of 
these relationships is governed by individual sentiment mixed with shared societal 
understandings.  
 
This relational approach is in keeping with the duty concept posed by Goldberg and 
Zipursky in Chapter One, where it was reasoned that duties of care are owed to certain 
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persons by certain other persons.
29
 Thus, duty is a relational construct and the nature of one’s 
obligations will differ depending on the nature of the relationship shared between the parties 
(termed “relationship-sensitive”30 by Goldberg and Zipursky). This explains why, for 
example, a driver owes all other road users a duty to observe the rules of the road, but also 
why when a paediatrician accepts a patient into her care she owes an affirmative and more 
onerous duty to act in the child’s best interests. The combination of the child’s position of 
vulnerability and the doctor’s position as a specialist, with specialist knowledge regarding 
the child’s, care warrants this more detailed duty, which is different in character and kind to 
that between stranger road users. Indeed, it is determining the boundaries of when a 
veterinarian can owe an animal an affirmative duty to act in its best interests that forms a 
central theme within this chapter, but in coming to these conclusions, it is the nature of the 
relationship between owner and animal being constitutive in nature, and the relationship 
between owner and veterinarian which will also define the duty.  
 
Developing these types of relational expectations are ‘built by the law itself in some 
measure,’31  however, more importantly, the law should reflect a developing understanding 
of the normative relationships at play and crystallising norms that already have currency on 
certain shared social understandings.
32
 In the second chapter, it was argued that this flexible 
approach would allow greater scope to include vulnerability-based reasoning and relational 
qualities which reveal more about human notions of responsibility.
33
 This is reflective of the 
duty concept I adopt in this chapter and why I argue that it should form a central role within 
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the negligence inquiry. It is only when this type of normatively-based, relational inquiry 
occurs that it can be said negligence is action-guiding. Only when duty is said to be 
relational can it also be said that the negligence inquiry itself is holistic and linked; that is to 
say that: 
  (1) the defendant owed [the claimant] a duty of care; (2) the 
 defendant breached that duty of care; (3) the breach of that duty of 
 care caused [the claimant] to suffer some kind of loss; and (4) the 
 loss suffered by the claimant as a result of the defendant’s breach 
 was the kind of loss which the duty of care breached by the 
 defendant was imposed on him in order to avoid.
34
  
  
Under the singular duty formulation, there is no linking between other negligence 
requirements; they are simply separate, discrete factual analyses in which ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
answers are given to questions which no longer share a common thread. Looking then to the 
remaining issues regarding duty of care discussed below, in particular the topics of 
assumption of responsibility and the distinction between acts and omissions, it should be 
from a strongly relational footing that the topics are approached.          
 Determining the Limits of the Act-Omission Distinction b)
It is trite tort law to say that when the courts are confronted with a novel duty of care 
question they will apply the three-stage test set out in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman.
35
 
As outlined by Lord Bridge: 
                                                 
34
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 What emerges is that, in addition to the foreseeability of damage, 
 necessary ingredients in any situation giving rise to a duty of care 
 are that there should exist between the party owing the duty and 
 the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by the 
 law as one of 'proximity' or 'neighbourhood' and that the situation 
 should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and 
 reasonable that the law should impose a duty...
36
   
 
Alongside Caparo, courts have recognised a series of exceptional duty of care tests which 
depend on a particular type of damage being claimed. Damage for pure economic loss, for 
example, follows with an assessment at the duty stage of the nature of defendant’s having 
assumed responsibility for the claimant’s financial interests and the claimant’s reasonable 
reliance.
37
 Indeed, it is this type of assessment which is evident in the very limited duty of 
care analyses in veterinary negligence case law discussed in Chapter One.
38
  
 
Applying Caparo in the veterinary context would generally be uncontroversial where there 
was an active infliction of harm. Foreseeability and proximity would be satisfied and though 
some argument could be made that the fair, just and reasonable requirement could cause 
issues relating to indeterminate liability, this argument has found considerably less favour in 
recent years. Where the application of Caparo becomes more complicated, however, is when 
arguments advancing the interests of the animal come into play. For the most part, Caparo 
concerns bilateral relationships and where property damage is claimed, the property fits into 
established convention, being fungible, alienable, and inanimate. In veterinary negligence, 
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the relationship is not bilateral, but triangular and the animal is not fungible property, but 
rather a special kind of constitutive property. Thus, applying Caparo would do nothing to 
advance the interests of the animal and would likely take considerable manipulation to 
harmonise the damage sustained by the owner as discussed in Chapter Three with the duty 
owed. The situation is further complicated where the damage claimed stems not from a 
positive infliction of harm, but rather an omission.   
 
Negligence (and private law more generally) draws a fundamental distinction between acts 
and omissions, imposing liability on those that commit wrongful acts, but generally not in 
instances of an omission, however wrongful or immoral.
39
 In describing the distinction 
between acts and “mere omissions” in the human medical context, Jones states the well-
accepted rule that:  
One who chooses to act must do so carefully so as to avoid 
inflicting harm on others; but, as a general rule, the tort of 
negligence does not compel a person to take positive steps to 
confer a benefit on others.
40
  
 
Thus, it is generally uncontroversial that where a veterinarian actively inflicts harm upon the 
owner’s property, a duty of care will be recognised.41 In veterinary practice, then, a 
veterinarian would come under this straightforward duty where, for example, she has been 
called to shoe a horse and negligently drives in a nail laming the animal. If the animal then 
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has to be euthanised as a result, following the damage element argued in the previous 
chapter, the owner would be able to claim not only for the property value of the horse, but 
also the constitutive value of the animal to the owner. Having said that, controversial 
misfeasance scenarios exist. For example, the scenario discussed below exploring the duty 
of care owed by a veterinarian who has deliberately acted against the wishes of the owner 
and euthanised the animal would constitute an act of misfeasance, however, the duty 
question is not easily answered.   
 
Additional complications arise, as Jones’s statement makes clear, when omissions come into 
play. There has been much academic debate on the nature of omissions versus positive acts 
with some arguing, for example, that the difference lies in the conferral of benefits whilst 
others argue it is conscious bodily movements which mark the difference.
42
 This latter 
explanation, however, is far too simplistic. It is submitted that the best way forward in this 
regard is to distinguish between the active infliction of harm versus simply failing to make 
things better.
43
 Thus, failing to confer a benefit on another is not on par with positive acts 
which cause harm or give rise to the risk of such harm occurring. This rule also provides the 
basis for the general principle that there is no duty to rescue. In this regard Stuart-Smith LJ, 
giving judgment for the court in Capital & Counties Plc. v Hampshire County Council,
44
 
stated that “a doctor who happened to witness a road accident “is not under any legal 
obligation to [assist], save in certain limited circumstances which are not relevant, and the 
relationship of doctor and patient does not arise.”45  
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Putting this into the veterinary context, once the veterinarian accepts a case, there is said to 
exist a special relationship between owner and veterinarian. However, as Soave notes ‘there 
is no obligation on the part of the veterinarian to accept a case. Even in an emergency he is 
not bound to care for or treat a sick or injured animal.’46 This statement is again a 
straightforward application of orthodox tort principle. It makes clear that unless the 
veterinarian has previously accepted the animal as a patient within the triangular relationship 
no duty will arise, and further that unless the case is accepted (discussed in greater depth 
below), a veterinarian will not come under a positive duty to act. Following human medical 
law, veterinarians in this instance will also generally be protected from harms suffered by 
the claimant as a result of an omission.
47
 To use the paradigm example, it would likely be 
the case that a veterinarian would not owe to the animal or to the owner a duty to rescue.
48
 
Even if there is sufficient physical proximity, a duty of care will not arise ‘simply because 
one party is a doctor and the other has a medical problem which may be of interest to 
both.’49 It is arguably in this context that the analogy drawn with human medicine separates 
from the veterinary.  
 
Once the human medical patient is accepted as a patient, the doctor comes under a positive 
duty of care resulting from the existence of a special relationship. However, this duty is 
made possible because of the NHS system which currently operates. In the veterinary 
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context, this system does not exist. Thus, even in circumstances where the animal has been 
accepted as a patient, the existing fee-for-service structure in veterinary medicine makes 
compelling a veterinarian to treat extremely difficult. It may be the veterinarian comes under 
a more limited duty (say to offer advice or a telephone number for an alternative service 
provider), however, it is very unlikely that a more comprehensive duty, which would include 
a duty to administer treatment, would be found to exist.  
 
In reality, then, under current negligence principles, it is highly unlikely that veterinarians 
owe a duty of care in straight omissions liability situations. Moreover, it is unlikely, given 
the highly entrenched nature of the rule against liability for omissions in England, that this 
would change via the common law. As Mulheron has noted, ‘English law is chary of 
imposing positive duties upon individuals.’50 Reform in this area would likely have to 
happen either via statutory amendment, perhaps under the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966.
51
 
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule against liability for omissions found 
within the common law. Termed “distinct duties”52 by Honoré, when violated, omissions are 
placed on par with positive acts, or very nearly so.
53
 For present purposes, the relevant duty 
would come into being where it could be said that the defendant undertook, or assumed 
responsibility for the claimant’s well-being. 
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 Assumption of Responsibility for the Claimant’s Well-being, Not Economic Interest c)
As Soave noted above, there is no obligation for a veterinarian to accept a case; this is so 
whether the situation presents as an emergency or otherwise. Soave’s statement, however, 
continues with the point that ‘once the animal is accepted for treatment the veterinarian 
cannot leave or abandon the case without being liable...for negligence.’54  Although this 
statement will need deeper analysis, it does seem to follow doctrine in the human medical 
context and professional negligence more generally insofar as it is the language of 
“undertaking” and “assumption of responsibility” that the courts use when imposing positive 
duties of care in providing advice, and diagnosis and treatment.
55
 A similar sentiment is 
made by Yeates that ‘[veterinarians] voluntarily accept a greater responsibility by taking an 
animal under their care as a patient. This goes beyond not causing harm into mandating 
positive actions to care for the animal.’56 Again, although helpful in terms of framing the 
obligations held by veterinarians as stemming from an assumption of responsibility based on 
the commercial relationship, there is little content to the statements made by Yeates and 
Soave, or indeed, elsewhere in the available literature.
57
 Veterinarians need more 
information regarding the nature of what it means to assume responsibility, the extent of the 
duties they undertake, and why they arise in the first place.    
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As to the why the duty arises, broadly speaking, it can be said that positive duties are 
justified: 
 Where A places himself in a relationship to B in which B's physical 
 safety becomes dependent upon the acts or omissions of A, A's 
 conduct can suffice to impose on A a duty to exercise reasonable 
 care for B's safety. In such circumstances A's conduct can 
 accurately be described as the assumption of responsibility for B, 
 whether "responsibility" is given its lay or legal meaning.
58
  
  
In the professional negligence context, which views the relationship between client and 
professional as one characterised by the client’s trust and relative dependence on the 
professional,
59
 Lord Phillips’s conclusion above remains completely consistent. However, 
the content of the duty described by Lord Phillips is different in nature to that of the 
assumption of responsibility in the best interests veterinary model. In this regard, I would 
argue that it need not be the case that the claimant relied (to her detriment, or otherwise) on 
the veterinarian to exercise reasonable care.
60
 This is important as it differentiates the 
assumption of responsibility argued here from the assumption of responsibility argued in 
existing veterinary negligence case law, which follows a commercial approach to the duty of 
care grounded in damage stemming from pure economic loss.  
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In the veterinary negligence cases, reliance was an essential ingredient in determining 
whether it could be said a duty of care existed. In Glyn v. McGarel-Groves,
61
 for example, 
Rix LJ stated that: 
 ...Mrs McGarel-Groves wanted Mr Glyn to be present at High 
 Meadows when Anna was examined and treated by Msr Grandiere, 
 because he was Anna's vet and Mrs McGarel-Groves relied on him 
 to protect her own interests...
62
  
  
Soave also speaks of an assumption of responsibility by the veterinarian and reliance by the 
owner resulting in pure economic loss.
63
 However, the damage model adopted in this thesis, 
namely that the claimant has suffered damage to the constitutive relationship with the 
animal, does not correspond with harm stemming from pure economic loss. Thus, the duty 
should not be framed in line with a Hedley Byrne
64
- type of assumption of responsibility, but 
rather one which more closely resembles the human medical context. It is submitted that in a 
veterinary negligence context, when a veterinarian assumes responsibility for the animal’s 
care, this is not to protect the owner’s financial interest, for indeed, the vast majority of 
companion animals have very little financial value. Rather the duty is assumed to maintain 
the constitutive relationship that exists between animal and owner and, in exceptional cases 
the animal itself.  
 
It will be recalled from Chapter Two that it was in the assumption of responsibility 
requirement that a deeper analysis of the proximity between owner and animal and owner 
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and veterinarian could be considered. Further, reliance did not feature as a requirement 
where the claimant was, for example, a vulnerable child.
65
 Therefore, saying that the 
defendant had assumed responsibility would no longer be a conclusory phrase, but rather one 
in which a much more nuanced, relational assessment of the parties’ proximity to one 
another, guided by normatively-relevant principles, is undertaken. In some instances it may 
be that the owner is only concerned about the economic loss suffered, however, this is likely 
to be the minority situation and can be accounted for under the current commercial model. 
Thus, in the majority of cases, at the very least, it can be said that commercial duty model 
does not account for the full range of harms suffered, nor the specific duty requirements 
necessary to protect that interest.  
 
To sum up, then, when a veterinarian assumes responsibility for the owner’s well-being by 
accepting the animal into his or her care, liability for an omission could exist— that is to say 
positive duties of care are owed— and it would be no excuse for a veterinarian to say that 
there existed no evidence of reliance on the part of the claimant owner. Now that the basic 
nature of positive and negative duties of care have been touched upon, the extent of these 
duties must be explored. 
 The Extent of a Veterinarian’s Duty of Care: Testing the Limits of First Principles  d)
At its most general, the duty of care asks ‘whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff 
to use a particular level of care to avoid the sort of injury the plaintiff suffered.’66 As already 
discussed, it is the commercial model which currently animates the veterinary relationship; 
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this is consistent both with how courts have interpreted the duty element and how secondary 
source material, typically written by practitioners, have interpreted the duty. Following from 
this, the extent of the veterinarian’s duty of care depends on whether the owner has been 
accepted as a client and the animal as a patient, and what the parties agreed on in terms of 
treatment and fees. To support the argument that the commercial model cannot account for 
all the intricacies of the veterinary relationship, I will explore the analogy to be drawn with 
human medicine.     
 
Broadly speaking, the duties of a medical practitioner fall into three main areas: diagnosis, 
treatment, and providing advice.
67
 Dealing first with diagnosis and treatment, duties to 
diagnose concern the professional’s ability to diagnose the patient under their care given the 
symptoms presented and techniques available,
68
 which means investigating, testing, 
exploring, checking and verifying
69
 the patient’s condition. Duties to treat, on the other hand, 
stem from the defendant’s professional knowledge and the professional’s skill in executing a 
particular procedure.
70
 The clearest expression of the duty comes from Lord Denning’s 
decision in Cassidy v. Ministry of Health
71
 where, in discussing the duty of doctors and 
hospitals to treat, he stated that:  
  There is no doubt that once the relationship of doctor and patient 
 or hospital authority and admitted patient exists, the doctor or the 
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McGarel-Groves [2006] EWCA Civ 998. 
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 hospital owe a duty to take reasonable care to effect a cure, not 
 merely to prevent further harm.
72
 
 
This was later upheld by Stuart-Smith LJ in Capital and Counties Plc. v. Hampshire County 
Council
73
 stating, obiter, that doctors owe positive duties of care to make the situation better, 
not simply to prevent it from getting worse. The undertaking, then, is to use the special skills 
which the doctor and hospital authorities have to treat the patient and as far as possible effect 
a cure.
74
 
 
In the veterinary context, although these duty constructions should guide a veterinarian’s 
conduct, as long as negligence still views the legal relationship as predicated on the 
existence or non-existence of a commercial relationship based on the payment of fees for 
services, the analogy drawn with the human medical profession on these points will always 
be limited; indeed, it is submitted that the issue of fees presents one of the largest obstacles 
to extending a veterinarian’s duty beyond the confines of the commercial context. Thus, 
although a veterinarian may have assumed responsibility for the care and treatment of the 
animal this would arguably extend only insofar as the commercial agreement reached 
between the parties and not necessarily to use the most effective diagnostic tools or, once 
diagnosed, to take reasonable care to effect a cure. As mentioned in the previous section, 
there is no equivalent NHS system to ensure that every animal receives care and even if fees 
are not an issue, the message being sent to the veterinary profession is that ‘fees pay for 
veterinary services, not for animal health.’75 Therefore, under orthodox negligence 
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principles as currently conceived, this is as far as the veterinarian’s duty can extend. 
Moreover, unlike the human medical context, treatment may vary depending on the use of 
the animal, for example, food-producing or companion and also the “value” of the animal in 
determining whether the ‘treatment is worth the expense or whether the treatment will 
interfere with the intended use of the animal.’76 Importantly, then, as long as the courts 
continue to view the legal relationship in commercial terms, as demonstrated, for example, 
by the payment of fees, drawing an analogy with the human medical profession will be 
imperfect, and negligence itself remains similarly limited as a means of redress. 
 
At the beginning of this section, it was argued that once the best interests of the animal 
started to play a more important and central role, the commercial underpinnings of the 
veterinary relationship would be rendered inadequate. Ultimately, it is submitted that 
although the veterinarian is hired by the owner-client, the veterinarian’s primary 
responsibility should be to the animal patient and the integrity of the constitutive 
relationship, which necessarily depends on the well-being of the animal. To further illustrate 
this point the next section of this chapter will introduce various hypothetical scenarios 
involving situational dilemmas which, although currently unaccounted for in the case law or 
secondary literature, could certainly arise in everyday modern veterinary practice. In line 
with the secondary objectives of this thesis, it will be argued that the best interest of the 
animal should be central within the duty assessment. As the below scenarios will highlight, 
as long as the commercial relationship dictates the extent of the duty owed, however, this 
aim cannot be fulfilled and a new framework will be needed. Specific examples of the 
limitations of the commercial model will be discussed in the next section. In response, a best 
                                                 
76
 Soave (n46) 15. 
4. Revisiting Duty of Care 
189 
 
interests rationale will be explored as a means of resolving the problems encountered in the 
hypothetical scenarios discussed. 
4.4 Limitations of the Commercial Model: Difficult Practice Scenarios Introduced 
Scenario 1: Owners disagree with veterinarian, hence, no consensus as to treatment 
path. Can the veterinarian take positive steps to remedy the situation? 
The animal is senior in years and has recently been diagnosed with leukaemia and is in 
considerable pain. The owners do not want the animal euthanised. Emotionally distraught, 
the owners have placed the animal in the care of the veterinary hospital. After conducting a 
best interests assessment, the veterinarian has determined that in this situation, euthanasia is 
the best option for the animal. Chemotherapy would only prolong the animal’s suffering and 
constitute futile treatment,
77
 and surgery is not an option. In these circumstances the 
question is whether the veterinarian, acting in what she professionally feels is the best 
interests of the animal, can euthanise the animal. In this scenario, the act of euthanising the 
animal would constitute an act of misfeasance against the owners’ property. Further, 
although the veterinarian has undertaken a duty to act in the best interests of the animal, in 
so doing, she will have acted in contradiction to the owners’ express instruction. Thus, if the 
owners brought a claim against the veterinarian because they desired that their animal live 
out its natural lifespan, what interest ought the veterinarian to have protected?  
   
In this instance, as the veterinarian has accepted the case she owes a positive duty of care, 
but does this extend to euthanising the animal even though euthanasia is regarded as a valid 
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treatment method?
78
 Similar situations arise in the human context with children where the 
parents disagree with the treatment recommended by the doctor. In these circumstances, 
doctors are able to apply to the court for guidance,
79
 however, this is not the case with 
veterinarians. Under current legal constructs, the commercial relationship between the 
owners and veterinarian dictates that the owners’ instruction is decisive; the interests of the 
animal and the interests of the constitutive relationship therefore fall to the wayside. Thus, if 
the clients indicate that they do not want the animal euthanised, under the commercial 
model, the veterinarian cannot euthanise. This situation, however, is clearly not in the best 
interests of the animal or the constitutive relationship, so the veterinarian is caught in a 
dilemma.  
Scenario 2: Owner seeking treatment that does not properly consider animal’s 
quality of life (ie. overtreatment) 
In this scenario, the owner presents to the veterinarian with her nine-year-old dog and it is 
determined that the animal is suffering from a severe form of epilepsy; there is no drug 
which can cure the condition and with each seizure the animal’s cognitive and bodily 
functions worsen. The veterinarian has recommended that euthanasia would be appropriate 
in this situation, but has also noted the availability of drugs which can keep the animal alive. 
These drugs, however, place the animal in a permanent semi-comatose state and severely 
impair its quality of life. After doing some reading on the Internet, the owner has decided 
that drugs be administered and demanded that the animal be put through a battery of MRI 
and neurological testing. These additional tests, however, would likely cause the animal 
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stress and anxiety and offer no additional medical benefit.
80
 The veterinarian refuses the 
owner’s direction and one week later the animal dies after suffering an epileptic seizure. The 
owner brings a claim in negligence against the veterinarian.  
 
Following the commercial model, ‘clients have the right to decide what shall be done to their 
animal, based on the doctor’s assessment of the case and the information presented to 
them.’81 It is uncertain under the commercial model how far a veterinarian could be 
compelled to act in these circumstances or whether it could be said the veterinarian was 
under a duty to administer the desired treatment. What is important, however, is that if the 
animal’s interests are not considered, as is consistent with the current commercial model, 
there is little scope for the veterinarian to make the argument that refusing to treat the animal 
in line with the owner’s wishes was a justified course of action. In this scenario, if the 
animal’s interests are considered, the veterinarian could argue that she came under an 
affirmative duty to act in the best interests of the animal and refuse the desired treatment, at 
which time the question shifts to consideration of the type of duty owed.  
Scenario 3: Veterinarian volunteers to provide best treatment option, but owners 
refuse  
In this scenario, the animal presents at the veterinary hospital with a broken leg and the 
veterinarian volunteers to provide surgery to reset the leg, which she has reasoned is in the 
animal’s best interests. The owners opt for placing the animal’s leg in a splint, which would 
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permanently and severely limit the animal’s mobility. Future surgery may also be needed to 
amputate the leg. After starting the treatment process, the veterinarian ultimately decides to 
operate without obtaining the client’s agreement believing she is compelled to act in the 
animal’s best interests, but in the process, the animal cannot be brought out from 
anaesthesia. Again, and quite clearly, orthodoxy would suggest that the wishes of the owner 
remain dispositive within the commercial relationship. Under the commercial model, the 
veterinarian would come under a duty of care to act in accordance with the client’s wishes. 
As between the owners and veterinarian, a treatment plan was decided and fees agreed to. 
This would be classified as an active infliction of harm (ie. the death of the animal). The 
question remains, however, whether the veterinarian who is acting in the best interests of the 
animal, can argue that she had a positive duty to do so and, as a result, should not be found 
liable. Under the commercial model, this would not be the case.  
 
The above scenarios are just a sampling of some of the complex legal and ethical dilemmas 
that veterinarians can and do face. Although it is submitted that a best interests approach can 
do some of the work in providing veterinarians with guidance as to where their duties of care 
ought to lie, as will be detailed in the next section, this is also not a perfect solution and one 
that cannot be employed in every circumstance. Some solutions will have to be sought 
outside of the tort system. Having said this, there is much value in determining how far the 
present tort system can be extended.  
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4.5 Best Interests: Parameters and Practical Applications 
  Best Interests: Providing a Structure for the Veterinarian’s Duty of Care a)
Before discussing to what extent best interests can assist veterinarians in assessing the nature 
and extent of their duties of care, it is first important to set out how I intend to utilise best 
interests. In the veterinary context, the commercial relationship and, in some cases, the 
professional views of veterinarians themselves,
82
 have hindered the development of a best 
interests approach. In other areas, such as the law relating to the paediatric relationship, best 
interests is a well-known construct. In the first chapter of this thesis, it will be recalled that 
an argument was made that veterinarians should view their duties in line with that of a 
paediatrician and not those of a garage mechanic. In support of this view, Main states that: 
Veterinary surgeons should offer to their clients and, if necessary, 
advocate to them, the ‘best’ veterinary care. Using appropriate 
prevention and treatment methods, this best veterinary care  should 
aim to maximise the best interests of the animal in terms of  both 
quality and quantity of life...and should be based on clinical 
experience, scientific knowledge and, most importantly, the needs 
of the individual animal.
83
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Though I agree with Main’s account, it requires further clarification. As a framework, 
Main’s statement provides a solid foundation from which to work, however, it must be 
highlighted that this is an ethical statement and will require further development if it is to act 
as an articulation of a veterinarian’s legal duty. To be defensible in a way that would 
displace the legal duty owed to the client-owner, a veterinarian’s reasoning needs to be more 
firmly grounded in legal principle. It is submitted that some headway can be made by 
analysing the practices adopted in the human medical context regarding best interests, in 
particular those practices adopted for deciding treatment issues relating to children. 
 
Some of the most detailed judicial discussions of best interests occur in cases where 
paediatric doctors wish to withhold treatment regarding the child patient and the parents 
disagree. There are some similarities here with the triangular veterinary relationship, yet, 
there is the obvious hurdle that the child patient has legal status and the animal does not. The 
question for this section, then, is to determine whether the sentient constitutive property 
model argued in the previous chapter and the best interests approach argued here can do 
some work to improve the interests of the animal patient, which is currently neglected under 
the commercial approach.  
 
When making a decision regarding best interests, Elliston notes that determining whether to 
withhold treatment in situations involving children requires a weighing up of relative 
burdens and benefits.
84
 This typically involves an assessment of the utility (or futility) of 
treatment and the child’s prognosis with or without treatment, often termed a quality of life 
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judgment,
85
 but also emotional and other welfare issues.
86
 This mirrors the statement made 
by Main, but makes explicit the need for a weighing up or balancing of the various interests, 
including emotional considerations.
87
 If veterinarians are to feel empowered to act in ways 
which protect the best interests of the animal then they need to feel confident that the 
conclusion arrived at is defensible, both on a personal level and a professional. This is not to 
say that a strict test should be developed and indeed, I would argue much of what is good 
about the best interests evaluation is its flexibility and ability to take into consideration 
particular qualities of the patient, however, I would also argue that the assessment is best 
undertaken within a framework of principles applicable to a particular context. In this way, 
then, I support the argument made by Coggon that best interests should be viewed as a set of 
action-guiding principles, not a specific test and not a singular concept.
88
 In particular, 
viewing best interests as sets of action-guiding principles ties in with the argument adopted 
in Chapter One, which argued that the duty of care should carry obligatory normative force 
in how people interact with one another, and that that obligatory force stems from a deep 
concern for the well-being of others.
89
 This accords with more general notions that 
negligence aims to uphold, namely protection of the vulnerable, regulating conduct, and 
encouraging good behaviour. 
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Putting this into practice, it is important to note from the outset that some of the principles 
which complicate best interests determinations, for example, sanctity of life
90
 and 
autonomy
91
 are not applicable in the veterinary context and thus, again, the analogy with 
human medicine is not a perfect one. However, this is actually an advantage for veterinarians 
who find themselves in a dilemma similar to the scenarios listed above.
92
 Euthanasia is an 
accepted form of treatment and, although I argue that animals within a constitutive 
relationship possess an intrinsic value, this does not preclude a determination that acting in 
the best interests of the animal in a given situation means the animal should be euthanised. 
Further, although the discussion below focuses on how the veterinarian could approach a 
best interests assessment, the process itself should be one which is made in conjunction with 
the owners and should take into account their abilities and desires. As Eillston accurately 
highlights: 
[Doctors] will also be, in the first instance at least, the ones who 
are expected to question decisions made by parents...where they 
feel these raise issues of concern. Doctors are of course expected to 
promote and protect health and to offer the care they believe most 
appropriate.
93
  
 
Elliston’s statement raises two important points going forward. First, the proceeding 
discussion addresses the question of best interests primarily from the perspective of the 
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veterinarian. Although a best interests assessment will involve the perspective of the parents 
(here the owner), it is ultimately the practitioner who assumes the middle position and who, 
in relation to their own best interests assessment, must scrutinise and balance the wishes of 
the owner(s) as against those of the patient, execute the decision, and defend it upon legal 
challenge. Second, Elliston notes that doctors are expected to promote and protect the health 
of their patient; this is presumed in the human medical context given the legal status of the 
patient and various ethical principles associated with human life. In the veterinary context, 
where the commercial model continues to operate, this position is not so presumed. I 
therefore argue that this same expectation directed to the animal’s best interests should be 
developed in the veterinary context and that, in so doing, veterinarians will have a clearer 
picture of their legal obligations.   
 
Taking this forward, principles which could be applied in the veterinary context include, for 
example: the best interests of the animal patient must be the veterinarian’s primary concern, 
the animal patient must be treated as a sentient entity with interests which extend beyond the 
alleviation of pain and suffering
94
 and, in determining best interests, veterinarians must have 
regard for the animal’s quality of life. In assessing the best interests of the animal patient the 
veterinarian could consider the following in determining quality of life issues: the ability of 
the animal to express its natural functioning as a member of a specific species (ie. the 
animal’s telos95 or the unique and special features and behaviours that make a dog a dog or a 
horse a horse), the animal’s ability to actively participate within the constitutive relationship 
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between owner and animal (both cognitively and physically),
96
 and the veterinarian’s 
knowledge of the individual animal and its lifestyle. Importantly, I would also agree with the 
statement that ‘quality of life considerations can permit...life-prolonging treatment to be 
withheld, even if the treatment would not itself be unduly burdensome’97 where the patient is 
no longer deriving a benefit.  
 
It is also widely acknowledged that a best interests assessment is holistic one and ought to 
take into account the views and abilities of involved third parties, such as family members. 
Importantly, assessing best interests must take into account the web or nexus of relationships 
in which the patient exists.
98
 Given the exclusive dependence of the animal, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, attempting to separate the interests of the patient from those relationships 
would be highly artificial.
99
 Recalling the nature of the constitutive relationship advocated in 
the previous chapter, taking on board the views and wishes of the owner would be wholly 
consistent with this approach. Additionally, the owner’s ability to comfortably pay for the 
treatment and after-care could be a relevant consideration.  
 
A related point is the extent to which putting forward the argument that veterinarians should 
have the option to vary or refuse to give a specific treatment on the basis that it goes against 
the best interests of the animal conflicts with the fact that animals are ultimately the property 
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of their owners. First, it must be remembered that the duty contemplated here would only 
arise when dealing with sentient constitutive property. In this regard, it will be remembered 
that animals falling under this category assume a special property status, one in which the 
relationship is mutually constitutive and reciprocal. It is therefore submitted that acting 
positively in the best interests of the animal, the veterinarian is also acting to maintain the 
integrity of the constitutive relationship. Thus, acting for the animal, by placing central 
importance on the animal as a sentient being capable of experiencing a wide range of 
feelings and emotions, is also acting to maintain the integrity of the bi-directional, 
constitutive relationship. Importantly, the constitutive relationship works from the premise 
that both parties derive a mutual benefit; this is eroded or destroyed when one party is 
suffering because of the other, or when party is exercising power over or coercing the other.  
 
When making a best interests assessment, then, the relative weight and the specification the 
veterinarian gives to each consideration will necessarily vary, however, it will be recalled 
that flexibility in this assessment is an advantage. Having said this, I would also argue that 
although flexibility in decision-making is a good, the veterinarian must also be prepared to 
defend their rationale and not allow the decision to be based wholly on intuition; this is both 
for their own personal and professional growth, but is also important should the veterinarian 
face legal scrutiny. This point raises a further issue for discussion and though full 
consideration cannot be given here, the issue of external scrutiny seems particularly 
pertinent. It has already been mentioned that in the human context, where parents (or legal 
guardians) disagree with the medical team in charge of the child’s care, applications can be 
made to the High Court, likely under s.8 of the Children Act 1989, for determination. There 
is no such avenue available for veterinarians. As treatment options and thus best interest 
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determinations become more complex, there is scope to argue that the Royal College of 
Veterinary Surgeons (“RCVS”) as official regulator should introduce a mechanism allowing 
veterinarians to pre-emptively bring complex treatment issues to an impartial third party and 
request formal guidance. Indeed, this argument is made stronger when one considers the 
amount of source material indicating that veterinarians face increasing personal and 
professional pressure in making complex treatment decisions.
100
     
 Can Best Interests Resolve all of the Problems Created by the Commercial b)
Approach?  
The short answer to this question is ‘no’. Best interests is not a cure-all to the issue that more 
weight should be given the welfare interests of the animal patient. This will become clear 
presently when we return to the scenarios introduced above. What best interests can do, 
however, is provide a step in the right direction by focusing and, in some cases, empowering 
veterinarians to act, or at the very least consider, the best interests of their patient. At this 
stage it is helpful to return to the scenarios discussed previously and see how far best 
interests can be utilised to give substance and effect to the veterinarian’s duty of care.   
 
In scenarios 1 (disagreement between veterinarian and clients) and 3 (veterinarian provides 
“better” treatment owners do not want), it is submitted that a best interests argument could 
be utilised to effect a positive development in the law by better protecting animal interests 
and providing more accurate guidance for veterinarians. In essence, the question for the 
court in applying a best interests argument would be whether the veterinarian has fulfilled 
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her duty in the circumstances. Although the veterinarian does owe a duty of care to the 
owners stemming from their commercial relationship, the question here is whether an 
argument can be made that in scenarios where the animal’s best interests are being 
compromised, a duty to the animal can work to protect that particular interest. In both 
scenarios, the veterinarian has acted with care and concern toward the animal in question. 
They have put their minds to the well-being of the patient and exercised professional 
judgment in weighing and balancing the relative risks and benefits in coming to their 
conclusions. Arguably, their positions would be defensible.  
 
In scenario 1, the animal is in severe pain and though its quantity of life is unknown, the 
animal’s quality of life is arguably non-existent. The animal would be unable to exhibit, for 
example, its telos
101
 or the lifestyle it had prior to illness. There is also concern that the 
owners are having a difficult time coming to terms with their animal’s condition and are 
perhaps, unwittingly, utilising their position of power as owners, detrimentally affecting the 
animal. The animal itself would also be unable to actively participate and derive benefit from 
the constitutive relationship shared with its owners. By euthanising the animal, then, the 
veterinarian performed what was in her opinion the best treatment option for the animal. It 
should be recalled that in a conflict situation (ie. where the desires of the owner conflict with 
the welfare interests of the animal), the best interests model asserts that the veterinarian 
would come under a specific positive duty to act in the interests of the animal. Assuming the 
veterinarian did not then go on to breach that duty regarding performance, there would be no 
liability. It has been maintained throughout this thesis that although animals remain property, 
some exist as a special form of property in which their own sentience is both developed and 
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intrinsically-valuable. If the status of the animal is to be elevated in this way, there needs to 
be a mechanism in place to see that their interests are protected. One of the ways of doing 
this is to argue the owner’s proprietary interest within the triangular relationship is not 
absolute; in some cases, the interests of the animal must take precedence. Scenario 1, I 
would argue, provides a strong example of where the owner’s interest is secondary to the 
animal’s interest in maintaining a high quality of life, free from suffering. 
 
Scenario 3, which deals with the veterinarian volunteering to perform the best treatment 
option against the owner’s wishes, is somewhat more complex. The animal is initially in 
pain, having suffered a broken leg, however, the treatment desired by the owners does not 
place the animal in continuous pain, but would severely limit the animal’s mobility for the 
rest of its life. Thus, the animal’s quality of life is compromised, but not necessarily its 
quantity of life. There is an indication that the additional risk of complication is heightened 
by the owner’s choice, but at what level that risk operates is not fully known. The 
veterinarian acted in a way which she believed represented the best interests of the animal by 
attempting to provide what she professionally felt was its best treatment option. It is argued 
that because the surgical option provided the best opportunity in terms of affecting a positive 
quality of life for the animal, the veterinarian came under a positive duty which compelled 
her to provide that treatment and protect the animal’s best interests. As the veterinarian 
completed a balanced and reasoned assessment of the animal’s best interests, it is submitted 
that the veterinarian has fulfilled her duty to the animal and absent any negligence on her 
part for the actual execution of the surgery, should escape liability. It is appreciated that 
these arguments carry important ramifications. However, for the best interests argument to 
have bite, it must be that in certain circumstances the animal’s interests take precedence over 
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the commercial interests between owner and veterinarian. If this position is not adopted, then 
it will always be the case that the commercial relationship is superior. In acting for the best 
interests of the animal, the veterinarian is not only acting to protect the animal, but as a 
corollary, the interests the owner and animal share being in a constitutive relationship.    
 
It is also important here to consider that permitting a veterinarian’s behaviour in these 
situations, although done with the animal’s interests in mind, would allow the profession a 
large amount of power.  Where, for example, in the human context, parents’ wishes conflict 
or a decision by all involved parties cannot be reached, doctors must continue to act in the 
best interests of their patient and can thus petition the court for guidance on these matters.
102
 
This currently does not exist in the veterinary context and re-emphasises the point made 
earlier that an alternative option where a legal body attached to or within the RCVS could act 
as an independent arbiter in conflict situations. Importantly, however, whilst this presents as 
an interesting way in which to develop the veterinary profession, it has never been 
considered by the RCVS and would represent a significant change in its regulatory structure. 
The best interests option discussed here provides an option which can, at the moment, 
achieve a measured result for both veterinarians and animals by opening the decision-making 
process to external legal scrutiny.  
    
The remaining scenario (scenario 2- possible overtreatment of animal suffering from 
epilepsy), is the most complex. Here, the veterinarian has essentially conscientiously refused 
to administer treatment which according to the veterinarian is not in the animal’s best 
interests, but is desired by the owner. In Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt,
103
 Hedley J noted 
                                                 
102
 See for example: Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2005] 1 WLR 3995. 
103
 [2004] EWHC 2247.  
4. Revisiting Duty of Care 
204 
 
four “stages” or ways in which a clinician can be in disagreement with the parent(s) of the 
child patient. The last stage is where ‘to do what the parents want is not possible in good 
conscience.’104 This is the situation the veterinarian finds herself. The question, then, is what 
type of duty arises? This section argues that veterinarians only owe the animal a duty to act 
positively if it is in their best interests, otherwise the basic rule against liability for omissions 
applies. The veterinarian in this scenario has determined that it would not be in the best 
interests of the animal to undergo the treatment sought by the owner. In these circumstances, 
then, there is arguably no positive duty to provide that treatment as this would conflict with 
the veterinarian’s duty to act in the animal’s best interest. 
 
In some ways, this situation mirrors that of Charlotte Wyatt’s case.105 Charlotte was born 
prematurely and faced numerous life-threatening ailments. At one stage Charlotte’s 
respiratory condition worsened significantly. A judicial order was sought to determine 
whether Charlotte should receive artificial ventilation in the event that her respiratory system 
failed. It was the opinion of the medical team that it was not in Charlotte’s best interests to 
receive artificial ventilation,
106
 whilst her parents believed it was their duty to maintain 
Charlotte’s life as they did not believe she was ready to die.107 In determining whether 
treatment should be withheld, Hedley J had regard to the Court of Appeal decision in Re: J 
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)
108
 where Taylor LJ stated:  
 Clearly, to justify withholding treatment, the circumstances would 
 have to be extreme…I consider the correct approach is for the court 
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 to judge the quality of life the child would have to endure if given 
 the treatment and decide whether in all the circumstances such a 
 life would be so afflicted as to be intolerable to that child. I say "to 
 that child" because the test should not be whether the life would be 
 tolerable to the decider.
109
    
 
Although the analogy here is not perfect— the doctor’s legal duty being to act in the best 
interests of the child as a subject under the law— in the present context it is submitted that 
this is something which should be aimed for, both by veterinarians and the courts. In cases 
where the question to be decided is one of withholding treatment (ie. because administering 
such treatment would amount to overtreatment, or futile treatment
110
), focus must be on the 
welfare of the patient. Thus, if the approach adopted by Taylor LJ is applied, the veterinarian 
has, arguably, fulfilled her duty. The veterinarian has conducted a best interests assessment 
and determined that the treatment sought by the owner would provide no benefit to the 
animal and would actually cause it increased suffering. Thus, if the owner in this scenario 
had brought a claim against the veterinarian, utilising the best interests approach would find 
that the veterinarian would not owe a duty to provide treatment in this case and a claim 
against the veterinarian under these circumstances would not, arguably, proceed past 
preliminary stages. It is submitted that this is a particularly strong example of where best 
interests can make a positive change to the law regarding veterinary negligence 
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Recalling the statement that more advanced diagnostic and treatment options are pushing 
back the boundary of when euthanasia becomes the best treatment (the implication being that 
diagnostic testing and treatment options are greatly, and perhaps haphazardly expanding), 
the argument in favour of a best interests approach serves to re-focus veterinarians’ decision-
making. For the courts, this approach would allow for a more nuanced and balanced 
assessment of all interests involved, not simply deferring to the rights of the owner as 
property-holder. In order to facilitate this development, it may be that changes to the RCVS 
may need to occur, however, this is something which would arguably be welcomed by 
veterinarians. This will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter.             
4.6 The Duty to Disclose Risks: Decision-Making in Veterinary Medicine 
From the outset, it is important to note that the issues relating to the duty to disclose risks are 
different in nature from the duties discussed thus far in this chapter. Whilst in the human 
medical context disclosure of risks is important to promote patient autonomy and self-
determination, these principles do not apply to animals. In the veterinary context, risk 
disclosure is important to facilitate the owner’s ability to make a treatment decision for the 
animal, but also, in a way, to protect the integrity of the constitutive relationship she shares 
with her animal.
111
 This section will ultimately argue that the human medical model be 
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 The client has undertaken the care of the animal, he has made the personal   
 and financial sacrifices, he has arranged his life and that of his family around 
 the life of his animal. Having made these commitments, and decisions...he is 
 entitled to decide...how his life and that of his animal will proceed in the future. 
 
See: Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition and Collegiality (n7) 
182-183. A similar argument is made by Tony Milligan who argues that owners can be in privileged position 
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rejected and a shared decision-making model which is compatible with the best interests 
model discussed throughout this chapter be adopted.   
 
Recent debate in the human medical negligence context over the importance of issues 
pertaining to client autonomy, medical deference, and ethical principles relating to bodily 
integrity and embodiment, has led to increased discussion regarding obtaining informed 
consent. Indeed, Jones notes, ‘lack of communication is often said to be at the heart of many 
medical negligence actions.’112 In the veterinary context, lack of communication or problems 
in communication featured in two out of the three reported cases.
113
  As Jackson
114
 
highlights, however, legally, informed consent is used as a shorthand for two distinct duties: 
the duty to obtain the patient’s consent before treatment and the duty to ensure that the 
patient has be properly informed about its risks and benefits’.115 This blending of legal and 
ethical principles provides a rich area for discussion, however, it should also be appreciated 
that establishing concrete conclusions relating to the nature of the duties discussed cannot 
take place given the rapidly changing and controversial nature of the law at present.  
 
Central to this debate is a point made by Jones that: 
 Part of the imbalance between doctor and patient is due to the 
 patient's lack of information, and, on one view, it is the function of 
                                                                                                                                                      
when it comes to end-of-life decisions based on their ‘narrative appreciation’ of the animal’s life. See: Tony 
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 the law to redress the imbalance by providing patients with the 
 ‘right ‘ to be given that information, or perhaps more accurately 
 imposing a duty on doctors to provide it.
116
 
 
This imbalance of power and knowledge is shared in the veterinary context and indeed 
across professional negligence jurisprudence more widely.
117
 It will be recalled that 
knowledge and power imbalances featured in Chapter Two, where it was argued that one of 
negligence’s functions was to redress the imbalance between claimant and defendant and 
protect the vulnerable party. Regardless of whether the commercial or best interests model is 
adopted, the knowledge imbalance is highly likely to exist; it is this imbalance which the 
doctrine of informed consent seeks to mitigate. Importantly, this section will address whether 
a rights-centred, autonomy-based approach is something which ought to be emulated in 
guiding veterinary-owner relationships.
118
 Ultimately, though it will be emphasised that 
similar duties of care exist for veterinarians, development following an autonomy-based 
approach in line with current debates within the human medical context is unhelpful. Rather, 
it is submitted that although the duties will remain similar in terms of content, the ultimate 
rationale for this is to achieve a shared decision-making model and that it is this model 
which better provides for the various interests within the triadic relationship shared between 
owner, animal, and veterinarian and better reflects the position that the best interests of the 
animal should be promoted within these relationships. 
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 The Duty to Disclose in the Veterinary Context a)
Dealing specifically with veterinarians, the tension between client autonomy and veterinary 
care has become increasingly important. As May states, it is the balancing of patient needs 
with the ethical principle of client autonomy that is at the heart of veterinary ethical 
dilemmas.
119
 In the veterinary context, much of the tension arguably stems from the position 
of animals as property, even if it is the special constitutive property discussed in this thesis. 
The position of the animal as property, at first glance appears to make things easier for 
veterinarians: the owner is a paying customer for services concerning a piece of property, 
however, I agree with Tannenbaum that ‘veterinary clients are not just consumers but are 
animal owners who entrust a particular kind of property to the care of their veterinarian.’120 
Further, because some owners place strong emotional and sometimes economic value on 
their animal, the nature and weight of the client’s interests can be profoundly affected.121 
Importantly, focusing only on the client’s autonomy interest prevents an assessment of the 
animal’s best interests; indeed, the animal’s interest full stop. Once again, it is finding some 
balance between the interests of both the animal and client which creates uncertainty for 
veterinarians.  
 
Arguably the most detailed account of a veterinarian’s duty to disclose is articulated by 
Soave where it is stated that: 
It is a legal duty of the veterinarian to give sufficient information to 
the client to allow them to make a rational decision on whether to 
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proceed with the care of an animal. Informed consent means that 
the owner understands what the animal’s problem is, what can be 
done to remedy it, the risks and dangers of the treatment and how 
much the fee will be. Failure to adequately inform the client of all 
of the medical aspects of a case may constitute negligence...
122
  
 
There are, however, two potential problems with this statement. First, this was written from 
an American perspective and does not necessarily represent the current state of affairs in the 
UK. Second, it must be asked whether this statement solves the balancing dilemma stated by 
May at the beginning of this section, and relatedly, whether the statement does enough to 
fully inform the veterinarian of the legal duty of care owed. It is argued that although 
Soave’s statement is quite detailed and can get us some of the way, failing to address the 
animal’s interest as a specific consideration maintains the orthodox perception of the 
veterinary relationship as being purely commercial in nature, and the only interest which 
ought to be protected is that of the owner.  
 
Turning to the current situation in the UK, the matter is complicated by the fact that there is 
no reported case law detailing the duty to disclose risks and obtain consent in the veterinary 
context. It may seem a fortunate surprise then to find that the RCVS has recently published 
guidance on the importance of obtaining consent. Section 11.1 of the RCVS Code of 
Professional Conduct
123
 provides that, ‘informed consent, which is an essential part of any 
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contract,
124
 can only be given by a client who has had the opportunity to consider a range of 
reasonable treatment options, with associated fee estimates, and had the significance and 
main risks explained to them.’125 This statement appears to match that articulated by Yeates 
who, in the context of determining what should be disclosed to clients states that ‘veterinary 
professionals should offer only reasonable options.’126 Both the RCVS guidance and the 
quote by Yeates highlight that only reasonable treatment options should be disclosed, 
however, no further guidance is given as to what a ‘reasonable’ option would be and whose 
perspective that assessment is determined. In some ways this perspective resembles the now-
rejected Bolam approach to disclosure. Here, the doctor’s duty to disclose extends only to 
what she feels is necessary for the patient to make a decision as to treatment and, following 
Bolam, the profession later determines whether the disclosure itself was sufficient.
127
 If it is 
only those which the veterinarian believes the client can afford or wants to hear, then this 
conflicts with the argument made previously that veterinarians should advocate the best 
interests of the animal. The question thus remains: what is the veterinarian’s duty of care in 
these circumstances?  
 The Human Medical Context: Providing Clarity or Complicating the Picture? b)
Throughout this chapter human medicine has provided a foundation from which to frame 
veterinary duties of care. Sometimes those foundations were unstable whilst in others the 
human medical context provides meaningful goals to be worked toward. The current 
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situation as regards disclosure of risk, however, is still quite uncertain, even in light of the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board.
128
 This is not to 
say that human medicine is unhelpful, indeed, it is quite the opposite. Valuable lessons can 
be learned from tracing the path human medical law has taken. To illustrate the current 
position in human medical negligence, four primary cases will be briefly discussed: Sidaway 
v. Bethlem Royal Hospital,
129
 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,
130
 and Chester 
v. Afshar
131
 and Montgomery. The first three cases, though frequently discussed in terms of 
their novel breach of duty and causation issues, are also important for how (if at all) they 
alter the doctor’s duty of care from one based on paternalistic grounds to a duty which 
prioritises the patient’s right to decide what is best for him or herself.  
 
Prior to this line of cases, it was generally accepted that a doctor’s duty in terms of 
disclosure of risk and obtaining consent fell largely to what he or she felt was best for the 
patient in line with a course of treatment envisaged by the doctor. Consent was still obtained 
(failing to obtain consent could result in charges of battery alongside negligence
132
), 
however, it was the doctor that determined what risks should be discussed and the profession 
itself which determined whether the discussion was sufficient.
133
 Indeed, this seems to 
represent the current picture with veterinarians. Generally speaking, as long as risks were 
discussed in broad terms, the consent received was valid.
134
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More recent case law, however, has sought to move toward a patient-centred, autonomy-
based model. Thus in Sidaway, it was not with whether the broad risks had been disclosed, 
but whether a small 1-2 per cent risk of spinal cord and nerve damage should have been 
disclosed so as to allow the claimant to make a fully informed decision as to treatment. 
Although the majority found for the doctor and held that the doctor’s duty to disclose rested 
on what he believed the patient ought to know, in a landmark judgment, Lord Scarman’s 
dissenting decision recognised a more patient-centred approach. In Lord Scarman’s words, 
‘the doctor’s duty should be to disclose that which a reasonable, prudent person in this 
patient’s position would want to know.’135  
 
The patient-centred approach was affirmed by Lord Woolf where, in Pearce, it was held that 
a doctor’s duty was to disclose to her patient that risk information which a reasonable patient 
would consider significant in deciding on a course of treatment and not whether other 
reasonable doctors might conclude the patient should be informed.
136
 And finally in Chester, 
on facts very similar to Sidaway, the House of Lords held that the risk of paralysis should 
have been disclosed. In his decision, Lord Steyn stated that ‘the right to autonomy and 
dignity can and ought to be vindicated’137 and Lord Bingham firmly stated that the doctor’s 
duty to advise existed in order ‘to enable adult patients of sound mind to make for 
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themselves decisions immediately affecting their own lives and bodies.’138 Although the 
tenor of the decision in Chester is one in which patient autonomy is quite strong, Meyers 
states that there remains an inherent tension between the doctor’s legal duties of care and the 
patient’s right to exercise fully informed consent.139  
 
The challenge for Montgomery, in essence, was to resolve this line of jurisprudence. 
Montgomery is an important decision, however space precludes a full consideration of its 
potential effects. The pursuer’s argument was that she ought to have been advised of a 
specific mechanical risk
140
 during the delivery of her child and that a cesarian section should 
have been offered, as opposed to vaginal delivery. The Supreme Court found for the pursuer. 
Two points are important for the purposes of this chapter. First is how the court constructed 
the doctor’s duty. Lords Kerr and Reed JJSC, with whom all agreed, stated:  
 The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to 
 ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in 
 any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or 
 variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the 
 circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the 
 patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, 
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 or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
 patient would be likely to attach significance to it.
141
  
 
As regards the veterinary context, the subjective element introduced at the duty of care stage 
imposes an additional burden on the practitioner to guard against those risks or harms 
stemming from disclosure, which she should reasonably be aware the client would find 
significant. In some ways this subjective determination requirement mirrors the statement 
made by Tannenbaum that ‘veterinary clients are not just consumers but are animal owners 
who entrust a particular kind of property to the care of their veterinarian,’142 and the broader 
point in this thesis that veterinarians need to achieve a more holistic understanding of the 
various relationships in play and the harms that can be suffered. Thus, in one way, adding a 
subjective element is not in itself something to be discouraged, however, the reasoning 
behind this requirement in Montgomery (ie. to promote a very strong patient autonomy 
model), is ultimately not helpful. In the context of shared decision-making discussed below, 
the subjective element has a positive role to play in determining what the best interests of the 
animal would be in a given situation.    
 
The second point can again be taken from Tannenbaum’s statement; in this instance 
describing the owner as a ‘consumer.’ Montgomery too found a similar relationship existing 
between doctor and patient where it was stated that ‘[patients] are also widely treated as 
consumers exercising choices.’143 Of course, much of this thesis has sought to move away 
from this commercial understanding as it tends to commodify the relationship and fails to 
take into account the emotional realities of both the triangular relationship and constitutive 
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relationship. Importantly, this model also fails to allow any scope to consider the animal’s 
best interests. In the human medical context, Teff stated thirty years ago that viewing the 
doctor-patient relationship from a consumerist perspective is consistent with a society 
distrustful of the medical profession and focused on a right-based, patient-centred 
approach.
144
 Again, although great detail cannot be fully devoted to this point, I argue the 
statement in Montgomery is a regressive step and serves to further polarise the relationship 
between doctor and patient. The relationship between doctor and patient as rights holder and 
doctor, consumer and provider fails to provide the foundation needed for shared decision-
making based on mutual trust. In the veterinary context, this articulation paints the picture 
that veterinarians are acting in line with other analogous professions, when in reality, the 
veterinary dynamic requires something altogether different if the goals of this thesis are to 
be met.     
 A Better Way Forward: Framing the Veterinarian’s Duty of Disclosure Around a c)
Shared Decision-Making Model  
From the outset, Beauchamp and Childress appear sceptical that truly informed consent and 
shared decision-making can work harmoniously. They state:  
 If shared decision making is presented as a plea merely for patients   
 to be allowed to participate in decision making about diagnostic   
 and treatment procedures, it continues the legacy of medical   
 paternalism by ignoring patients’ rights to consent or refuse those   
 procedures.
145
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The type of shared decision-making advocated here is not one which simply pays lip service 
to the patient’s interest in determining treatment options, rather the role of the patient (in the 
veterinary context, the client) is central to the decision-making process and ultimately the 
nature of the doctor’s duty of care. Taking the above into consideration, I adopt the 
definition of shared decision-making utilised by Moulton and King, which describes 
disclosure as process whereby the doctor and the patient:  
 …use unbiased and complete information on the risks and benefits 
 associated with all viable treatment alternatives and information 
 from the patient on personal factors that might make one 
 treatment alternative more preferable than the others to come to a 
 treatment decision.
146
  
  
Thus, properly understood, disclosure of risk and ‘informed consent entails genuine 
dialogue, focusing not on technical medical detail but on facilitating a broad appreciation by 
the patient of the seriousness of his illness.’147 Importantly, this includes a holistic 
assessment of the patient’s condition and plays a crucial role in developing mutual trust. For 
the purposes of disclosure of risk in the veterinary context, it is submitted that the same 
position applies.   
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Further, it has been argued above that veterinarians should try so far as possible to forward 
the best interests of the animal. It is submitted that framing the duty to disclose around 
shared decision-making is necessary not only to ensure that full and open discussion takes 
place between owner and veterinarian, but also because it allows greater scope for the 
veterinarian to advocate for the animal with regards to what she feels represents the best 
option. This is not the same thing as saying that veterinarians should in any way coerce the 
client, this is simply to say that a veterinary relationship created under a shared decision-
making model arguably provides greater scope to allow for all interests to be more fully 
represented. Thus, the role of shared decision-making should not, at least in the triadic 
relationship envisioned here, be thought of as incongruous to the veterinarian’s duty to 
disclose risks and ultimately obtain informed consent. Rather, it ought to be viewed as a 
mechanism to ensure that so far as possible qualities intrinsic to the constitutive relationship 
such as the constitutive relationship itself and the animal’s best interests are preserved.  
 
In terms of what this means for the veterinarian’s duty of care, Maclean’s statement that the 
law has focused more on the outcome of the process rather than the process itself
148
 and that 
the court ‘is more concerned with whether or not a particular risk has been disclosed rather 
than with whether the healthcare professional engaged the patient in a partnership 
approach,’149 is analogous to the argument that focus needs to shift from breach to duty: was 
the standard met versus ought the practitioner have disclosed X and why. In this regard, I 
argue that courts should engage more fully with the duty question and not place sole 
emphasis on the outcome of process. Instead, when dealing with disclosure of risk, courts 
should take on board the arguments made at the beginning of this chapter, and in Chapters 
                                                 
148
 Maclean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and Beyond’ (n136) 127. 
149
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One and Two, which highlight the central importance of the duty analysis in formulating 
principles of right conduct and how those decisions should be arrived at. It is this 
information which veterinarians, professionals, and the general population can take forward 
and apply in their everyday interactions with others, but it must start with the courts and 
their willingness to more fully engage with these issues.  
4.7 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to advocate for a more robust duty of care assessment in 
which the animal’s best interests could be more fully represented. As it currently stands, 
almost no attention is given to the duty of care within the veterinary context. Where duty is 
discussed, the focus placed on the veterinarian’s assumption of responsibility for the 
claimant’s financial wellbeing prevents a more revealing normative assessment of the 
relational elements within the veterinary relationship from taking place. Importantly, this 
type of analysis also prevents consideration of the animal’s best interests. To rectify this 
situation, re-visiting the duty of care is necessary. 
 
Within the context of treatment and diagnosis, a more detailed analysis of the assumption of 
responsibility component is necessary. In situations where the issue concerns harm to the 
constitutive relationship, focus should be placed on assessing the proximity between the 
parties and the nature of what was undertaken by the veterinarian. Where, however, the 
focus changes to the best interests of the animal, the crucial point to decide is whether it 
could be argued that the veterinarian came under an affirmative duty to protect the interests 
of the animal. Depending on the nature of the wrong alleged, it may be that the veterinarian 
could argue the owner’s wishes were not determinative in articulating the nature of her duty. 
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When dealing with disclosure of risk, it is submitted that a shared decision-making model, as 
opposed to an autonomy-based, consumerist model, would allow greater scope for the 
animal’s best interests to be forwarded and a relationship of trust between owner and 
veterinarian fostered.  
 
With all of these considerations in mind, the singular duty of care model adopted in current 
veterinary negligence case law and increasingly throughout negligence law more generally, 
is wholly inadequate and fails to provide assistance to veterinarians caught in complex 
dilemmas. With this more robust duty analysis in place, however, focus can be properly 
ascribed at the duty stage to investigating whose interests the defendant ought to have had in 
mind and why, and then turning to breach to determine whether, based  on the facts, that 
standard was met.     
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5. Assessing Breach of Duty: Remedying Practical Difficulties with the Sentient 
Constitutive Model Framework for Veterinary Negligence   
 
This final substantive chapter is concerned with addressing the practical obstacles and 
challenges involved in implementing the new veterinary negligence model presented in this 
thesis. To date, legal actions for veterinary negligence have only appeared within a very 
narrow commercial context, which has arguably stifled consideration of obligations 
stemming from the relationship between owner and animal and the animal’s best interests. 
Whilst the previous three chapters argued that negligence can, theoretically and doctrinally, 
accommodate a more holistic interpretation of the veterinary relationship, no forward 
movement can realistically occur without a similar discourse happening at the professional  
and judicial levels when issues of breach are considered.  
 
The breach assessment is highly fact-sensitive and relies heavily on the determination of 
professional standards of care elicited through expert witness opinion and increasingly on 
guidance issued by professional regulatory bodies. In the veterinary negligence context this 
equation is particularly problematic given the current commercial model in place, which 
views the animal as a fungible commodity and the veterinarian’s duty centred on the owner’s 
financial interest(s); indeed, this approach is the antithesis of that advocated in this thesis. 
Further problems can arise on a doctrinal level in that decisions centred on the breach 
assessment possess a one-off quality consistent with an analysis which focuses on the facts 
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of a particular case. For this reason, decisions based on breach fail to create precedents,
1
 or 
cases from which meaningful guidance as to proper conduct can be derived. Chapters One, 
Three, and Four have already argued that providing veterinarians with greater guidance as to 
their legal obligations and shifting their perspective to focus on the best interests of the 
animal can be best achieved by adopting a more robust duty of care analysis, however, the 
success of this change is also largely dependent on their being in place a professional 
mindset (both at the regulatory and individual level) on expected standards of care which 
support these changes, and a judiciary willing to scrutinise expert testimony. It is on these 
latter points that this chapter will focus.  
 
The point that veterinarians approach their practice in sometimes very divergent
2
 ways 
makes the current breach assessment problematic. It will be argued that to meet the 
objectives of this thesis, it first needs to be the case that veterinarians support a professional 
change which would place the constitutive relationship and best interests of the animal at the 
centre of the veterinary relationship. It is only when this approach receives institutional 
support that courts can take the next step and work to refine the professional standard of care 
to reflect the kind of legal expectations being advocated in this thesis. The purpose of this 
chapter, then, is to address these two issues and devise a solution to what is arguably the 
more problematic of the two: changing the professional mindset to accommodate the sentient 
constitutive model. For although there is evidence to the effect that an increasing number of 
veterinarians see their role evolving to consider more the welfare position of the animal 
                                                 
1
 Donal Nolan, ‘Varying the Standard of Care,’ (2013) 72(3) Cambridge Law Journal 651, 680. 
2
 See on this point: Bernard E. Rollin, An Introduction to Veterinary Medical Ethics: Theory and Cases (2nd 
ed., Blackwell 2006) and Carol Anne Morgan, ‘Stepping up to the Plate: Animal Welfare, Veterinarians, and 
Ethical Conflicts’ (DPhil thesis, University of British Columbia 2009). 
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patient,
3
 this is not universal. Further, how to meet evolving expectations is becoming 
increasingly problematic for veterinarians. First, it is submitted that the most effective way 
to instigate this change would be to take on board frameworks utilised by analogous 
professions and revise existing professional guidance to provide the veterinary profession 
with authoritative and objective information. Building upon this, it will be argued that the 
Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (“RCVS”), as governing body, should become a more 
representative body and, to this end, focus increasingly on academic and lay involvement to 
gain a more accurate and nuanced picture of the interests involved within the veterinary 
relationship.  
 
The second point detailing the role of the courts is, as a result of doctrinal developments in 
breach discussed in the final section of this chapter, somewhat more straightforward, but still 
of great importance. As Campbell and Cranley Glass point out, a decision by the courts to 
include professional guidance in its reasoning can elevate the status of that guidance to that 
of a legally-binding expectation, however, this is likely to occur only when the guidance is 
first supported by expert testimony.
4
 Thus, as ‘final arbiters of the standard of care’5 
expected by veterinarians, the judiciary play a crucial role in advancing the profession to 
meet a society with evolving expectations.        
                                                 
3
 See: Vet Futures Project, Taking Charge of our Future: A vision for the Veterinary Profession for 2030 
(London, November 2015) 19-20 <http://vetfutures.org.uk/launch-of-the-vet-futures-report/> accessed 24 
November 2015. 
4
 Angela Campbell and Kathleen Cranley Glass, ‘The Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes, and 
Guidelines in Medical Practice and Research,’ (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 473, 488 [emphasis added]. 
5
 ibid 480. 
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5.1 Assessing Breach of Duty: The Reasonable Professional and The Bolam Test 
 Establishing the Standard of Care in Professional Negligence Claims  a)
It is trite tort law that breach is determined by applying the test of the reasonable person. 
Quite simply the question to be answered is: did the defendant meet the standard of the 
reasonably competent person in the situation? Baring very few exceptions, the test is an 
objective one.
6
 When dealing with professionals, however, the standard changes to meet the 
higher expectations of those working within a given profession. Again, this is well-
established negligence doctrine, which stems from the fact that professionals hold 
themselves out to the public as possessing a specialised skill. The test is of the reasonably 
competent professional working in that specialism.
7
 Determining the required standard of 
care was given further specification in the case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee.
8
 Here, Lord McNair directed that a professional person is: 
 …not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
 practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men 
 skilled in that particular art...Putting it the other way round, a man 
 is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, 
 merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a 
 contrary view.
9
  
              
                                                 
6
 See for example: Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Ex 781 and Glasgow Corporation v. Muir 
[1943] AC 448. 
7
 John L. Powell and Roger Stewart, Jackson and Powell on Professional Liability (6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
2007) 72-73. 
8
 [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
9
 ibid 587. 
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Although the claim speaks specifically to the medical profession, it is accepted that Bolam 
can apply across all professional negligence jurisprudence.
10
 The applicability and validity of 
the Bolam test was later challenged in the case of Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health 
Authority,
11
 where it was held that evidence given to the court must be both logical and 
reasonable.
12
 As Jackson and Powell make clear, courts will interrogate standards in line 
with the specific profession being considered to ensure their continued integrity and 
evolution.
13
 For the veterinary profession, as there is very little information to draw from, an 
important opportunity exists for the court to be involved in positively shaping the profession. 
Before the full extent of the court’s involvement can occur, however, two interconnected 
issues must be addressed: the role of expert witnesses and the role that regulation plays in 
shaping professional mindset. Importantly, the power of the individual professional to 
instigate change on a legal level stems, in large part, from their role as an expert witness.  
5.2 The Role of Expert Witnesses Within Judicial Analysis: The Importance of 
Changing Professional Sentiment 
 The Role of Expert Witnesses in the Breach Assessment  a)
In professional negligence cases, including veterinary negligence cases, it is very likely to be 
the case that courts rely on opinions given by expert witnesses.
14
 Indeed, the Bolam test was 
                                                 
10
 Margaret Brazier and José Miola, ‘Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Medical 
Law Review 85, 87. 
11
 [1998] AC 232.   
12
 ibid 242-243. 
13
 See: Jackson and Powell on Professional Liability (n7) 9. Courts have tended to develop the liability of 
professionals along their own, independent lines. There is, arguably, some continued chariness as regards the 
medical profession, however, as a result of Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] AC 1430, it is 
likely the medical profession will come under increasing pressure. 
14
 The exception would be where, for example, the act falls into the category of res ipsa loquitur or, as 
discussed previously, in medical negligence cases involving disclosure of risk, even though it is highly likely 
that courts will still regard expert opinion as an influential factor when determining breach.  
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initially developed because it was understood and believed to be the case that those working 
in the professional sphere possessed specialised skills which extended beyond lay, or even 
judicial understanding. Expert witnesses are expected to ‘give evidence based on his or her 
knowledge and experience of a subject matter, drawing on the work of others, such as the 
findings of published research or the pooled knowledge of a team of people with whom he or 
she works;’15 this is in addition to their own opinion given as an expert in their respective 
field(s). In an American case entitled Juhnke v Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 
Society,
16
 for example, it is stated that: 
Whether expert testimony is necessary to prove negligence is 
dependent on whether, under the facts of a particular case, the trier 
of fact would be able to understand, absent expert testimony, the 
nature of the standard of care required of defendant and the  alleged 
deviation therefrom.
17
 
  
For the expert, Rule 35.3 (1) and (2) of the UK Civil Procedure Rules further indicates that it 
is the duty of experts to help the court on matters within their expertise and that this duty 
overrides any obligation to the person from whom experts have received instructions or by 
                                                 
15
 Kennedy v. Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] 1 WLR 594, 609-610. See also: National Justice Cia Naviera SA v 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) [1993] FSR 563, 565-56 cited in Kennedy where Cresswell J 
stated the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses in civil cases as:  
 
 1. Expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be, 
 the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the 
 exigencies of litigation. 2. An expert witness should provide independent 
 assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to 
 matters within his expertise … An expert witness in the High Court should never 
 assume the role of an advocate. 3. An expert witness should state the facts or 
 assumption upon which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider 
 material facts which could detract from his concluded opinion. 4. An expert 
 witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his 
 expertise. 5... 
16
 6 Kan. App. 2d 744 (1981)  
17
 ibid. 
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whom they are paid.
18
 The court in the recent decision in Kennedy
19
 also made clear that 
whilst the expert witness may express an ‘opinion about whether, for instance, an individual 
suffered from a particular condition or vulnerability,’20 it remains the role of the court to 
come to decisions on ‘matters that are central to the outcome of the case.’21   
 
In the veterinary context, from the perspective of the claimant, it would be important that the 
expert comment not only on the clinical aspects of the case, but also on the potential for the 
claimant to have suffered harm related to the constitutive relationship and the position of the 
animal itself. As discussed in Chapter Four, when the animal’s best interest is compromised 
by a treatment decision made by the owner, for example, the veterinarian may be justified in 
departing from the owner’s wishes. Thus, it might also be the case that the expert provides 
testimony on behalf of a defendant veterinarian who acted in this particular way.
22
 
Problematically, as has already been highlighted numerous times throughout this thesis, how 
veterinarians approach their professional and legal obligations straddles a wide spectrum 
with some seeing themselves as paediatricians and others as simply garage mechanics fixing 
a machine.
23
 If the sentient constitutive property model and the duty requirements argued in 
the previous chapter of this thesis are to stand a chance of developing, then the evidence 
provided by expert witnesses needs to be consistent, at least insofar as they have professional 
knowledge and understanding of the constitutive relationship and the importance of 
                                                 
18
 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, Rule 35.3(1) and (2) 
<https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part35> accessed 18 May 2016. 
19
 Kennedy v. Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] 1 WLR 594, 612. 
20
 See: Pora v. The Queen [2015] UKPC 9 cited in Kennedy v. Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] 1 WLR 594, 612. 
Although Pora is a criminal case dealing with the criminal investigation of a rape, this principle applies 
generally to expert witnesses.  
21
 ibid. 
22
 See for example, the scenarios discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, in particular scenarios 1&3. See 
discussion in Chapter 4.4 and 4.5(b). 
23
 Bernard E. Rollin, An Introduction to Veterinary Medical Ethics: Theory and Cases (2nd ed., Blackwell 
2006). See also: Morgan, ‘Stepping up to the Plate: Animal Welfare, Veterinarians, and Ethical Conflicts’ (n2). 
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supporting the animal’s best interests. This consistency in approach is necessary given the 
importance attributed to the role of expert witness testimony in professional negligence cases 
and supports the argument made at the beginning of this chapter that a change in 
professional sentiment is needed before the arguments made thus far can take full effect.  
 
When considering the position of the courts regarding the role of expert witnesses, the 
judiciary should also take on board the points discussed above and be alive to the position 
adopted by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Bolitho to the effect that:  
 The court is not bound to hold that a defendant doctor escapes 
 liability for negligent treatment or diagnosis just because he leads 
 evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of 
 opinion that the defendant's treatment or diagnosis accorded with 
 sound medical practice.
24
 
   
Although Mulheron
25
 has noted the uptake of Bolitho to challenge expert opinion has been 
patchy, it must be remembered that ‘the importance attached to expert opinion...should not 
obscure the underlying basis for a finding that the defendant has been negligent.’26 Until 
professional sentiment, and thus expert testimony, is consistent in its approach to the 
veterinary relationship, there will remain a need for the judiciary to scrutinise evidence 
given to ensure it meets with standards of reasonableness, which is reflected in the premise 
                                                 
24
 Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, 241. There is some evidence that courts in the 
veterinary context may be paying too much deference to expert testimony provided in support of the defendant. 
Although in one respect it is good that the court was willing to engage so deeply with the professional opinion 
provided, I would argue the result arrived at points in the wrong direction, and rather represents a regression to 
a time where the status of the defendant’s witness seemed to in some way evidence the reasonableness of 
defendant veterinarian’s opinion. See: Calver v. Westwood Veterinary Group [2001] P.I.Q.R. P11. See 
discussion in Chapter 1.3(c)(i). 
25
 Mulheron, ‘Trumping Bolitho: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s “Gloss,”’ (2010) 69 Cambridge Law 
Journal 609. 
26
 Michael A. Jones, ‘The Bolam Test and the Responsible Expert,’ (1999) 7 Tort Law Review 226, 239. 
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that a veterinarian’s professional obligations stem from the nature of the constitutive bond 
between owner and animal, and the primacy of the animal’s best interests. Indeed, the need 
to scrutinise expert evidence exists even if or when the triangular veterinary relationship, 
including the prominence given to the animal’s best interests, is accepted. The main point, 
for present purposes, is that external scrutiny by the courts is especially important when the 
profession itself is in a period of transition; this will be more fully explored in the final 
section of this chapter.  
 An Incomplete Picture: The Need for a Profession-wide Change in Mindset b)
As things currently stand, although orthodox breach assessments and principles can 
accommodate the arguments made in throughout this thesis, there is no guarantee they will 
be appropriately applied. Bolam focuses heavily on expert evidence to negate a finding of 
fault and is therefore limited in this respect. Further, even with Bolitho in place, the risk of 
perpetuating old practice and old ideologies remains, given the inconsistent way in which it 
has been applied in recent case law.
27
 Although courts have shown themselves willing to 
interrogate expert evidence, it is uncertain what level of deference, if any, will be attributed 
to the veterinary profession given how few cases there are in the area and the transformative 
nature of the arguments submitted throughout this thesis.
28
 Much of the breach assessment 
also depends on the context in which the defendant’s conduct occurred, including the 
complex web of relationships which underlie it.
29
 Indeed, this would be particularly 
important when dealing with a veterinary negligence claim as the relationship between 
                                                 
27
 Mulheron, ‘Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s “Gloss” (n25). 
28
 Recall discussion in Chapter 1.3(c)(i) on the issue of deferring to the opinion(s) of a ‘distinguished expert in 
the field.’  
29
 Joanne Conaghan and Wade Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort (2nd ed., Pluto Press 1999) 53. 
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owner and animal exists on a broad spectrum,
30
 with the veterinarian’s duty adapting to fit. 
As Conaghan and Mansell note, however, this type of analysis is rarely undertaken and 
hence an important ingredient in the breach assessment is left out.
31
 Importantly, this 
uncertainty surrounding the breach assessment fails to serve animal patients, owners, and 
veterinarians.  
 
Miola is therefore correct to state of the breach assessment that ‘power is implicit in who 
gets to define what is ‘reasonable.’’32 When dealing with breach in veterinary negligence 
cases, it should be the case that the courts are the ultimate arbiters of what constitutes the 
reasonable standard of care, however, the first step needs to come from a shift in 
professional ideology and belief. Key in this scenario, then, remains the role played by other 
veterinarians. Without the profession largely on board with the changes advocated for, very 
little forward movement can realistically be made. The next two sections of this chapter, 
then, will focus on two inter-connected methods by which this change could be effected: the 
development of new professional guidelines which specifically speak to the changing nature 
of the veterinary relationship and a restructuring of the RCVS Council as the regulatory 
body tasked with developing and implementing professional guidance.  
5.3 The Role of Professional Guidelines in Negligence: Development and 
Application in Veterinary Negligence   
The purpose of this section is to discuss the primary way in which I argue professional 
mindset can be developed and altered in favour of the arguments made in this thesis. 
                                                 
30
 See, for example, the introductory discussion on the nature of the constitutive relationship in Chapter 
1.3(a)(i).  
31
 Conaghan and Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort (n29) 53.          
32
 José Miola, ‘The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence⎯ Still Reasonably Troublesome?’ in Janice 
Richardson and Erika Rackley (eds.), Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law (Routledge 2012) 135. 
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Underscoring much of the discussion in this section is the normative potential that 
professional guidelines carry in terms of their ability to effect change. In this regard, Lee 
states that ‘breach of regulation comes very close to feeding directly into the identification 
of common law breach...[and further, that these] external norms make clear pragmatic and 
epistemic contributions to the tort standard.’33 In this way, guidelines can provide pragmatic 
information on the availability of certain precautions,
34
 but also carry normative and 
epistemic potential by ‘encourag[ing] others to change their thinking and...reflect on how the 
profession is developing,’35 when considering what the reasonable professional ought to 
have done in the circumstances. These points will be elaborated in the sections that follow, 
however, what is important for present purposes is the dual purpose professional guidelines 
serve and in particular the normative potential that guidelines can carry, being a product of 
developing sentiment both at the professional, but also, importantly, the societal levels.
36
 In 
so doing, the guidance arguably comes to reflect an objective standard by taking seriously 
the expectations and interests of both public and private spheres. As I argue at the end of this 
section, the RCVS was largely unsuccessful in meeting this balance and so was unsuccessful 
in providing veterinarians with useful professional guidance.  
 The Nature of Professional Guidelines: Aspirations and Limitations      a)
Broadly understood, professional guidelines relating to the provision of medical care 
(including veterinary medicine) encompass two forms of guidance: professional or ethical 
and clinical or evidence-based. Clinical guidance, according to Campbell and Cranley Glass, 
                                                 
33
 Maria Lee, ‘Safety, Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context,’ (2011) 74(4) Modern Law Review 555, 572. 
34
 ibid 563. 
35
 Jerold Tannenbaum, Veterinary Ethics: Animal Welfare, Client Relations, Competition and Collegiality (2nd 
ed., Mosby 1995) 86. 
36
 For this last point on taking seriously societal viewpoint and also their shared values, see: Lee, ‘Safety, 
Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context,’ (n33) 578. 
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provides an “authoritative reference point”37 founded on evidence-based medicine and 
concerns matters of technical skill. Further, it is only when the profession accepts the 
standard as a scientific principle governing the proper performance of their duties will they 
accept the standard as determinative.
38
 Ethical guidance, on the other hand, can assist in 
determining the underpinning morality of professional decisions and behaviour, and 
illuminate principles valued in a given community.
39
 Because this chapter and indeed the 
thesis as a whole is about changing professional and legal sentiment with regard to the 
veterinary relationship, it is in the area of ethical guidance that this section will focus. From 
the outset, it should be noted that guidelines of this nature tend to reflect aspirational 
standards; however, as Campbell and Cranley Glass explain, in developing professional 
guidelines, professional bodies set practice guidelines that establish normative standards of 
conduct for members of the given professional body and that...these guidelines aim to 
establish the legal standard of care.
40
 Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, it is envisioned 
that discussion will be confined to guidance which could theoretically be applied in the 
veterinary negligence context
41
 and which would carry the potential to inform on both the 
professional and legal standard of care.     
                                                 
37
 Campbell and Cranley Glass, ‘The Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes, and Guidelines in 
Medical Practice and Research’ (n4) 478. 
38
 ibid [emphasis added]. See also: Ash Samanta, Michelle M. Mello, Charles Foster, John Tingle and Jo 
Samanta, ‘The Role of Clinical Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A Shift from the Bolam 
Standard?’ (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 321, 355. 
39
 Campbell and Cranley Glass (n4) 480. 
40
 ibid 477 quoting from: T.R. LeBlang, ‘Medical Malpractice and Physician Accountability: Trends in the 
Courts and Legislative Responses’ (1994) 3 Ann. Health L. 105. 
41
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 Development and Implementation of Professional Guidelines   b)
Although it is the case that professional guidelines can serve useful and productive ends, 
much of the guidance’s value and potential to effect a change in professional mindset 
depends on how the guidance itself is developed and implemented. One of the great 
advantages to professional guidelines is that they can react quickly to changing social and 
professional sentiment.
42
 As Brazier and Miola point out, where practice is evolving rapidly 
in a new speciality or sub-speciality of a profession, identifying responsible practice will be 
demanding.’43 Indeed, I would argue that this is similarly the case in any area of practice 
where evolution is happening rapidly; it need not be in a speciality area. Veterinary 
medicine is changing rapidly and these advances challenge previous practice and approaches 
to decision-making.
44
 Guidelines, it is submitted, can act as an objective marker against 
which the defendant’s actions can be assessed and can also reflect how the profession is 
developing in light of new ideals.  
 
At the beginning of this section an argument made by Campbell and Cranley Glass stated 
that whilst guidelines establish normative standards of conduct, these guidelines also aim to 
establish the legal standard of care.
45
 In this way, professional guidance aims to protect the 
professional from legal liability, but also inform patients, or others within the given 
relationship.
46
 Looked at in this way, professional guidance is forward-looking and though 
perhaps not universally accepted across the profession, is likely to indicate changing 
                                                 
42
 Campbell and Cranley Glass (n4) 476. Other advantages include, for example, their more flexible nature 
when compared to legislation, which is far more prescriptive and less amenable to change. 
43
 Margaret Brazier and José Miola, ‘Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (n10) 87. 
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sentiment.
47
 Although the orthodox, commercial approach still appears strongly influential 
in the veterinary context, both at a professional and legal level, there is certainly evidence 
that sentiments are changing.
48
 Fundamental to this shift is the acknowledgment of a 
triangular veterinary relationship and whilst there is evidence that acceptance of this model 
is growing,
49
 this development must be cultivated and the ideals entrenched in professional 
mindset. Unfortunately, to date, the triangular veterinary relationship has not been reflected 
in the professional guidance issued and therefore its ability to advise veterinarians on the 
professional and legal obligations stemming from this relationship is missing.  
 
With regard to the process of developing and implementing professional guidance, the first 
point must be that guidelines undergo a rigorous and robust development phase, taking into 
account opinions from diverse backgrounds outside of the veterinary profession to hold both 
professional and legal credence.
50
 In the process of developing the guidance, I agree with 
Shaw and Downie that:  
...decision-makers must meaningfully factor in others’ 
perspectives, thereby ‘enlarging their perspective’ beyond their 
own subjective intuitions. In this process, responding to others’ 
                                                 
47
 Tannenbaum (n35) 86.  
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 See for example: C. E. M. Batchelor, D. E. F. McKeegan, ‘Survey of the Frequency and Perceived 
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19. 
50
 Ash Samanta et al., ‘The Role of Clinical Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A Shift from the 
Bolam Standard?’ (n38) 355. A more detailed account of whose opinions should be factored into the 
development of guidance is considered in the next section. 
5. Assessing Breach of Duty 
235 
 
views and objections — especially to rejected views — is 
important.
51
  
 
Moving forward, the orthodox/commercial view of the veterinary relationship continues to 
play an important role within the profession and so whilst it is argued that the triangular 
relationship and best interests approach should feature as the overarching models, any move 
to change professional opinion and guidance should take commercial considerations and 
approaches into account.
52
 In this regard, for example, it may be beneficial for the RCVS to 
hold open consultations or forums for members of the profession to voice their opinion, in 
particular, on the idea of the constitutive relationship and the best interests approach. 
Importantly, consultations should also include opinions from outside the profession such as 
animal charities and animal welfare groups.
53
 Without this holistic consultation process, any 
suggested change would be likely met with scepticism and obstinance. It would also fail to 
take into account those veterinary relationships which still exist, for valid reason, on purely 
commercial terms.
54
  
 
Further, ‘to be meaningful, [development and implementation] must include consideration of 
the relative power of the parties, the reciprocal social obligations of [the professional] 
                                                 
51
 Jacquelyn Shaw and Jocelyn Downie, ‘Welcome to the Wild, Wild North: Conscientious Objection Policies 
Governing Canada’s Medical, Nursing, Pharmacy, and Dental Professions,’ (2014) 28(1) Bioethics 33, 45 
adopting Jennifer Nedelsky’s view on legitimate process as discussed in Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘The Reciprocal 
Relation of Judgement and Autonomy: Walking in Another’s Shoes’ in J. Downie and J.J. Llewellyn (eds.), 
Being Relational: Reflection on Relational Theory and Health Law (UBC Press 2011) 35. 
52
 In this regard, the commercial model would not necessarily reflect a “rejected view,” but a different approach 
which would still apply where the relationship is commercial in nature. 
53
 Examples of animal welfare groups could be the Universities Federation for Animal Welfare and the All-
Party Parliamentary Group for Animal Welfare.   
54
 This would apply where the relationship between owner and animal is not considered constitutive. This is 
more likely to occur in the agricultural context, but as discussed in Chapters 1.3(a)(i) and 3.5(c)(i), what 
matters is the relationship between owner and animal and so this could also occur where, for example, the 
owner is a dog breeder and views the dog merely as a commodity.   
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incurred by virtue of their monopoly, self-regulation, [and] clinical independence.’55 In this 
regard, then, power imbalances within the triangular veterinary relationship should be 
addressed and more consideration given to the constitutive relationship which can exist 
between owner and animal. Moreover, consideration should also be given to the continued 
importance and role of veterinary professionals in regulating their profession as well as their 
ability to exercise some degree of clinical and ethical independence. It would be unhelpful 
and counterproductive to, in one fell swoop, instigate changes which would remove 
significant amounts of professional discretion. Indeed, this would likely have a overall 
negative impact on the trust relationship between owner and veterinarian, which was 
considered so important at the duty of care stage and could further negatively impact the 
reflective thought processes which may initially lead veterinarians to question the 
commercial approach in the first instance. Practically speaking, where the guidance concerns 
a practice or a principle new to the profession, or where the principle is accepted by some 
members of the profession but not others, which is likely to be the case with the veterinary 
profession, the guidance ‘must be accompanied by other factors for it acquire normative 
status. For instance, guidelines must be widely disseminated to bring them to the attention of 
[veterinarians] and to allow for a discourse’56 on their effects on current practice and be well 
written and presented. In the end, the guidance will only be accepted by the profession if it is 
viewed as presenting an overall net benefit to the profession as regards the execution of their 
day-to-day practice.    
 
One final issue relates to the point made above that once developed, professional guidance 
aims to establish the legal standard of care. This is important as one of the primary aims of 
                                                 
55
 Jacquelyn Shaw and Jocelyn Downie, ‘Welcome to the Wild, Wild North: Conscientious Objection Policies 
Governing Canada’s Medical, Nursing, Pharmacy, and Dental Professions’ (n51) 46. 
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this thesis is to provide veterinarians with guidance which will inform them on the legal 
obligations. Maria Lee’s survey of the relationship between tort and regulation indicates that 
in some circumstances regulation (or guidance) tracks very close to expected tort 
standards.
57
 In this regard, Lee states that ‘sometimes breach of regulation comes very close 
to feeding directly into the identification of common law breach.’58 Further, mirroring the 
points made by Campbell and Cranley Glass, and Downie and Shaw, Lee states that the 
overall strength or authority of the guidance is enhanced when development of the 
regulation embraces multiple values and relies on a range of techniques, such as public 
consultation and social value judgments.
59
 Additionally, the substantive appropriateness of 
the regulation as determined by the courts in the given case is heavily dependent on the 
purpose of the guidance being consistent with the purpose of the tort action.
60
 Having said 
this, acceptance of professional guidelines as establishing the legal standard of care 
ultimately involves hearing expert evidence which corroborates the guidance.
61
 Thus, 
guidance will only be considered legally binding when acknowledged and accepted in court. 
This links in with the previous discussion on the importance of expert witnesses in 
professional negligence claims and how witness testimony impacts the breach assessment. 
As the final section of this chapter will highlight, courts have been willing to utilise 
professional guidance in their determination of breach and have also found that in some 
instances the General Medical Council (“GMC”) standard matches the tort standard.62 Based 
on this analysis, if the points discussed at the development and implementation stages are 
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 Maria Lee, ‘Safety, Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context,’ (2011) 74(4) Modern Law Review 555, 572. 
58
 ibid. 
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 ibid 574. 
60
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 Campbell and Cranley Glass (n4) 488. 
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complied with, guidelines issued by the RCVS carry the potential to be legally-dispositive, 
or come very close.  
 
Related to the issue of development and implementation is the content and language of the 
guidance itself. For without clear and specific guidance, which makes known the obligations 
owed by the professional, there is little chance of effecting change within the profession and 
little chance the courts would adopt such guidance as setting a legally-enforceable standard 
of care. With this in mind, the forthcoming sections will evaluate the content of the RCVS 
Code as compared to that produced by the GMC and argue that to affect professional 
mindset, greater clarity within the guidance consistent with that found in the GMC is 
necessary. 
 The Language and Content of Professional Guidance Issued by the GMC: The c)
Distinction Between Professional Duties (and Potential Legal Duties) and Merely 
Best Practice 
This section will explore the content and language utilised by the two sets of GMC guidance: 
Good Medical Practice
63
 and 0-18 Years: Guidance for all Doctors.
64
 Both represent the 
current official guidance on professional practice standards articulated by the GMC and, as 
will be seen, can reflect developments in the common law with regards to the legal standard 
of care expected of a medical professional. Guidance issued by the GMC is salient to this 
discussion as the RCVS explicitly stated that their goal in producing new guidelines was to 
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 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (GMC 2013). 
64
 General Medical Council, 0-18 Years: Guidance for all Doctors (GMC 2007).    
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bring the veterinary profession in line with the regulatory codes of analogous professions.
65
 
The GMC’s guidance in the field of paediatrics is particularly salient to this discussion. 
Paediatricians, for example, must advocate for a patient who may not be able to speak for 
themselves and must prioritise the best interests of the patient over the wishes and desires of 
the parent or guardian. Later, the current RCVS Code will be explored in relation to the 
conclusions reached here. It is submitted that, in contrast to the RCVS Code, the GMC 
guidelines not only provide a more clear and concise articulation of professional standards, 
but that the drafters included vital legal information gained from years of malpractice 
litigation in order to better protect and inform its doctors. Thus, not only do the guidelines 
issued by the GMC include detailed professional guidance to arguably prevent malpractice 
litigation before it happens, but also that the information has been specifically written with 
the aim of protecting doctors should they find themselves involved in a malpractice suit and 
their standard of care called into question by the courts. 
 
Looking specifically at the content of both the general and paediatric guidance, one 
important aspect which they both share is that the documents are prefaced with a very clear 
“key” to understanding the modal verbs must or should used throughout. For example, both 
sets of guidelines clearly state that when must is used before a statement, or the provision of 
guidance, that statement is to be viewed by the doctor as indicating an ‘overriding duty or 
principle.’66 For example, in the communication, partnership and teamwork section of the 
Good Medical Practice guidance, paragraph 49 states that:  
                                                 
65
 Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, ‘New Codes of Professional Conduct Launched,’ RCVS News 
(London, 12 April 2012) <http://www.rcvs.org.uk/news-and-events/news/new-codes-of-professional-conduct-
launched/> accessed 29 July 2015. 
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You must work in partnership with patients, sharing with them the 
 information they will need to make decisions about their care, 
 including: their condition, its likely progression and the options for 
 treatment, including associated risks and uncertainties...
67
 
 
Paragraph 32 of the same guidance also states that, ‘you must give patients the information 
they want or need to know in a way they can understand...’.68  
 
The key also states that guidance prefaced with the word should indicates information on 
how to fulfil an overriding duty, where an overriding duty would not apply, or where there 
are factors outside the doctor’s control that affect how the guidance can be complied with.69 
Thus, following the guidance in paragraph 19 which reads to the effect that a doctor must 
keep clear and legible patient notes, the provision also states, ‘you [the doctor] should make 
records at the same time as the events you are recording or as soon as possible afterwards.’70 
Thus, this latter statement gives guidance on how to fulfil the overriding duty. Framing the 
statement around the should modal also reflects the practical reality that a separate 
overriding duty may occur which could affect the execution of when notes can be 
realistically completed.   
 
                                                 
67
 ibid 16.  
68
 ibid 13. Note that the wording of the section resembles the dissenting opinion of Lord Scarman in Sidaway v. 
Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] AC 871, which dealt with the issue of 
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The argument that case law influenced how the GMC developed its guidance can be seen in 
the Introduction of the 0-18 Years: Guidance for All Doctors document. Paragraph 9 
explicitly states that, ‘the purpose of this guidance is to help doctors balance competing 
interests and make decisions that are ethical, lawful and for the good of children and young 
people.’71 Importantly, this statement indicates that one of the purposes of the paediatric 
guidance is to inform doctors on how to make medical decisions that accord with the law; in 
essence, therefore, to protect doctors’ professional and legal welfare. Providing such 
protection, it is contended, can only be effected if the GMC keeps itself abreast of legal 
developments, particularly within tort, and then updates its guidance to reflect those changes. 
 
What is evident, therefore, is an attempt to clearly and concisely define where a duty is owed 
to a patient and where one is not. The preface to both the Good Practice Guidance and 0-18 
Years Guidance can therefore be viewed as an attempt to define areas where doctors ought to 
interpret a professional duty with potential to create legally-enforceable effects and where 
such information is merely indicative of best practice recommendations. As emphasised 
earlier, it is due in large part to the extensive body of malpractice litigation that the GMC is 
able to more clearly define and conceptualise the modern role of a doctor in present-day 
society.   
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 Current Guidance Implemented by the RCVS: A Missed Opportunity  d)
In 2012, the RCVS introduced its new Code of Professional Conduct.
72
 As part of the 
official release statement two goals of the new guidance were highlighted: first to bring the 
RCVS Code into line with other analogous professions and second to ‘ensure the public and 
their animals continue to receive the level of professional service they have come to expect 
from veterinary surgeons.’73 I disagree, however, that these goals have been accomplished. It 
has been observed that:  
 Codes of ethics for veterinarians focus mainly on professional 
 conduct in relation to colleagues and clients, such as advertising 
 and the adoption of one another's clients. Meanwhile, the interests 
 of animals are considered implicit rather than being discussed 
 explicitly.
74
  
 
It is submitted that the new codes introduced by the RCVS follow a similar course and 
further, fail to address the complex issues surrounding decision-making within the triangular 
veterinary relationship. In its current form, a great deal of attention is paid to the commercial 
relationship between owner and veterinarian and the professional relationship between the 
veterinarian and other veterinarians and the RCVS itself; however, there is no mention of the 
owner-animal bond and scant reference to the best interests of the animal.
75
 Where these 
issues are mentioned, the discussion is so vague or inappropriate to be of any real assistance 
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to veterinarians facing difficult legal and ethical decisions. Moreover, of six categories 
addressed by the RCVS in the “Professional Responsibility” section, only one addresses the 
care of the animal.
76
 Importantly, then, because the Code lacks necessary clarity on how to 
balance competing interests, its ability to inform veterinarians and the courts is already 
severely limited. Therefore, whilst it may be the case that professional guidelines are 
traditionally aspirational in nature when compared to legal standards, my argument is that 
the RCVS Code as currently formulated fails to achieve any raising of standards whatsoever. 
 
It will be recalled that with the GMC guidance, both explicitly noted the different 
responsibilities that flowed from the use of must or should in a given statement of guidance, 
particularly the must modal which carried with it the imposition of a duty or overriding 
principle. It will also be recalled that the paediatric guidance specifically stated that one of 
the purposes of the guidance was to assist doctors who care for children to make balanced 
decisions that accorded with the law. The main impetus behind such explicit guidance, it was 
argued, was the recognition by the GMC that their responsibility lay not merely in the 
provision of best practice, but the provision of tailored guidance which would protect doctors 
in the event of malpractice litigation.   
 
In the RCVS Code, the modal verbs must and should are frequently found throughout the 
document. For example, paragraph 1.1 reads, ‘veterinary surgeons must make animal health 
and welfare their first consideration when attending to animals’77 and paragraph  
                                                 
76
 The remaining five sections deal with clients, the profession, the veterinary team, the public, and the RCVS. 
Although the section addressing animals does state that ‘veterinary surgeons must make animal health and 
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like this, lacking in specification, do little to assist veterinarians in complex situations. Further, the Supporting 
Guidance only addresses the animal in a relationship with its owner when the topic of euthanasia is discussed. 
77
 Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, Code of Professional Conduct (n72) 13 [emphasis added]. 
5. Assessing Breach of Duty 
244 
 
 1.3, ‘veterinary surgeons must provide veterinary care that is proper and adequate.’78 In 
addition to the important point that both paragraphs, I submit, are on their own ambiguous 
and lacking in specification,
79
 nowhere in the Code is it described what is meant by a 
veterinarian must; this is important when deciding whether a duty is being imposed or 
whether the provision merely outlining a best practice recommendation. The word should is 
also used, however, again, there is no explanation as to what the RCVS is trying to convey 
by its use. It would appear, based solely on the meaning the English language attributes to 
each, that must implies a stronger force of action than should, but this is nowhere stated in 
the Code. Further, and unlike the GMC guidelines, must is used for every piece of guidance 
in the Code; therefore, as it would seem unlikely that the RCVS intended to apply an 
overriding duty in every one of the contemplated scenarios, it could be argued that no duty 
applies at all.  
 
To address this concern, the RCVS ought to have produced guidance which clearly 
articulates a veterinarian’s professional obligations. Guidelines should not only inform 
accurately on the content and extent of professional duties owed, but also provide protection 
for practitioners to the extent that they aim to establish the legal standard of care expected 
within that profession.
80
 If guidelines are not produced with sufficient clarity and precision 
because words used are not specifically defined or information is thought to be too obvious 
to need stating, quality of care will almost certainly suffer. Unfortunately, the RCVS appears 
to have followed this path and produced a document which not only makes questionable 
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assumptions as to the extent and detail of guidance required, but also fails to address other 
areas of importance, such as the animal’s interest as a patient. 
 
Drawing from the discussion above, several propositions can be put forward to explain the 
RCVS guidance. First, the lack of clearly-delineated guidance illustrates that the RCVS 
believes its veterinarians do not require such information to competently and professionally 
carry out their obligations to an accepted standard. From this, it is further suggested that the 
Code was developed as a piece of professional etiquette,
81
 or at best, best practice literature 
only. Due to its lack of precision and specification, it could be argued that the Code does not 
contemplate protection for veterinarians in a legal forum. Whereas the GMC has access to a 
vast number of malpractice claims and has recognised the importance of staying current and 
in-step with societal and judicial developments, the RCVS has had almost no experience in 
the legal arena.
82
 Though the RCVS stated that they wished to emulate guidance produced 
by analogous professional bodies, the exclusion of this information in the Code indicates 
that, even on the most generous interpretation, the RCVS may not have contemplated the 
importance of providing such protections. Making such errors and assumptions, however, 
results in a situation where neither the owner of an animal nor the veterinarian knows what 
standard of care is expected, and the level of care received by the animal is ultimately 
brought into question.  
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Evidence of this point can be seen in the RCVS Fact sheets for the last five years. First 
inquiries by veterinarians into general practice standards soared from 40 inquiries in 2010 to 
766 in 2014.
83
 Thus, even as a piece of advisory literature only, the 2012 Code arguably falls 
short of the mark. This finding is affirmed in a recent statistical publication entitled, Survey 
of the Frequency and Perceived Stressfulness of Ethical Dilemmas Encountered in UK 
Veterinary Practice.
84
 In this study, the authors concluded first that veterinarians face a 
significant number of ethical dilemmas per week and that veterinary surgeons find these 
dilemmas highly stressful.
85
 Importantly, a second finding of the study was that ‘one of the 
reasons that veterinary surgeons may find these situations highly stressful is that they have 
not been given any guidance on how to make difficult ethical decisions.’86 What this 
evidence appears to show is that instead of utilising the professional guidance to, as 
Tannenbaum highlights, ‘encourage others to change their thinking and...reflect on how the 
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profession is developing,’87 the RCVS has simply codified customary professional practice 
in areas it believes to be important. Put another way, in areas concerning care and treatment, 
the Code establishes only the ordinary standard required, which in the veterinary context 
means that emphasis has been placed on commercial relations between veterinarians and the 
commercial relationship between owner and veterinarian. However, the RCVS Fact sheets 
and the statistical survey appear to indicate that the RCVS have missed the mark and failed 
to consider valuable information veterinarians need.
88
  
 
Secondly, complaints of inadequate care submitted by clients has risen steadily in the last 
four years. Indeed, in 2014, the number of complaints made regarding alleged inadequate 
care was approximately 352, up from 275 in 2011.
89
 Though perhaps not as drastic as the 
number of inquiries made by veterinary practitioners, any number close to or surpassing 300 
is quite significant in comparison to other areas considered by the study.
90
 This point 
emphasises not only that the RCVS has been receiving an increasing number of complaints 
and that this is a consistent trend, but also that the care delivered, even after the new Code 
was released, is not always meeting clients’ expectations. This point was confirmed in a 
DEFRA Response, which noted that owners of companion animals are becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied with the level of veterinary care delivered.
91
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With such a narrow focus and objective seemingly in mind, the RCVS Code can indeed be 
seen as a missed opportunity. In cases where a code merely reproduces professional custom 
or etiquette as the RCVS has arguably done, ‘one may question whether [guidelines of this 
nature] ever result in changing professional norms.’92 I agree and submit that although the 
RCVS promised a more modern set of guidelines to reflect changing expectations, in the 
end, the guidance has left veterinarians uncertain of how to fulfil the standard of care 
expected, clients are becoming increasingly disappointed and, most importantly, the animal 
patients are caught in the middle, potentially receiving sub-standard care. Having said this, it 
is submitted that none of the changes to the guidance advocated thus far could be effectively 
introduced if the regulatory body itself fails to see the importance of this and take the steps 
necessary to effect change. The next section of this chapter will analyse the extent to which 
the current regulatory structure of the RCVS provides a solid foundation from which to 
introduce the changes advocated for and argue that if the guidance is to reflect the changing 
nature of the veterinary relationship, the Council too must evolve.   
5.4 The Role of the RCVS in Effecting Change within the Veterinary Profession: 
Gaining Insight and Addressing Gaps 
It will be recalled that in introducing new guidance in 2012 the RCVS had two goals in 
mind: to bring the RCVS Code into line with other analogous professions and to ensure that 
‘the public and their animals continue to receive the level of care expected from their 
veterinarian.’93 Although it was argued that the RCVS was largely unsuccessful in 
attempting to meet these goals, a further issue lying at the heart of the argument that the 
veterinary profession must undergo a profession-wide change in sentiment is to what extent 
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the RCVS, as the sole regulator for the veterinary profession, is capable of undertaking this 
task. I argue that in its current form, the RCVS Council would be unable to effect the 
changes necessary to take greater account of the animal’s best interests and inform 
veterinarians as to their potential legal liability stemming from a claim in negligence.  
 
The first part of this section will analyse the current regulatory model governing human 
medicine. As an analogous profession, reforms in this area can act as a framework from 
which to assess the future of veterinary regulation. Central to this discussion is to what 
extent, if any, the RCVS should be modelled after the GMC. It is initially submitted that 
despite certain differences that exist between the GMC and RCVS as official regulators, 
valuable lessons can be learned from recent changes made to the GMC; specific attention 
will be given to council representation and the influential role that lay involvement plays in 
modern professional regulation. It is submitted that an equal representation of lay and 
professional members within the RCVS Council would provide the foundation necessary to 
affect professional mindset in favour of the specific aims of this thesis. At this point it 
should be recalled that one of my purposes for addressing professional regulation and the 
role of councils within a regulatory framework is to address ways in which veterinarians can 
be better informed as to their legal obligations arising in negligence. As the body responsible 
for creating professional guidance, councils represent a voice through which societal and 
professional expectations are articulated.  
 
The final section will address a specific area of professional importance, namely best 
interests, and look to how the RCVS has interpreted this assessment within its guidance. 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that acting in the best interests of the animal should be 
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fundamental to how veterinarians approach their practice and the lens through which the 
courts should view the veterinary relationship and construct the duty of care. However, best 
interests received almost no attention in the latest guidance issued to veterinarians. In 
addition to highlighting this missed opportunity for forward-thinking reform, this final 
section will demonstrate some ways in which the RCVS could have incorporated best 
interest reforms and, in the process, elevated the position of the animal within the veterinary 
relationship. 
  Learning Lessons from the GMC: Tracing the Road to Council Reform a)
Before discussing the composition of the GMC’s Council, it is important to address its 
principal role. This will not only provide a more clear understanding of the Council’s role 
within society as the country’s primary medical regulator, but it will also provide a 
comparator from which to analyse the jurisdiction of the RCVS. Currently, the GMC derives 
its power solely from statute, originally the Medical Act 1858, now the Medical Act 1983 (as 
amended).
94
 The Council’s primary objective is, simply, to protect, promote and maintain the 
health and safety of the public.
95
 The GMC is therefore responsible for keeping an updated 
register and licences for all practitioners,
96
 and set the extent of knowledge and skill required 
to obtain UK qualification.
97
 Importantly, the GMC is also responsible for setting standards 
and guidelines of good medical practice and ethics,
98
 and investigates situations where a 
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complaint about a doctor’s fitness to practice has been made or where the GMC itself 
instigates the investigation.
99
  
 
In terms of Council representation, just under fifteen years ago, the GMC Council had one 
hundred and four members, of which a near entirety were doctors: fifty-four were elected by 
those on the medical register, twenty-five were fully registered medical practitioners 
appointed by the Royal College and various universities and, of the remaining spaces, up to 
half could be medically qualified and were appointed by the Queen on advice from the Privy 
Council.
100
 This was not only a considerably large Council with arguably little to no 
executive accountability, but one in which, of the one hundred and four members, up to 
ninety-one (87.5%) were medical practitioners or trained in the science of medicine.
101
 This 
high degree of self-regulation was, however, not to be and the proceeding years saw radical 
changes in the structure and governance of the GMC.  
 
It is not relevant for the purposes of this section to go into great depth as regards the 
motivations which lie behind the current structure of the GMC Council; however, some 
explanation is helpful insofar as it provides insight into areas which could foreseeably affect 
the RCVS in the future; as the well-known adage goes, history repeats itself. The goal here is 
to take a pre-emptive stance to reform, recognising not only that societal views are changing 
with regards to the legal and ethical standard of care expected of veterinarians, but also that 
                                                 
99
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providing veterinarians with as much useful information as possible could prevent instances 
of sub-standard or improper care from the start.  
 
The catalyst behind the current re-structuring of the GMC Council finds its genesis in three 
incidents; combined they showed not only to the public, but also the government, that the 
GMC, and doctors generally, were unable to self-regulate to a sufficient standard. In 2012, 
the Law Commission published a consultation paper on the regulation of health care 
professionals, which summarised these incidents.
102
 One of the stated reasons for this change 
from self-regulated profession to greater state oversight was a shift in government policy.
103
 
This can be seen in the creation of clinical regulatory bodies which produce guidelines on 
certain areas of clinical decision making such as the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (“NICE”), and also instances of government de-regulation in the push to 
achieve greater market liberlisation.
104
 Secondly, the Commission noted three events within 
the medical community which had far-reaching, serious consequences and which toppled 
public confidence in the profession generally. In order of occurrence, they are: the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary Inquiry which investigated unacceptably high rates of infant death after 
cardiac surgery; the Alder Hey Inquiry which investigated unauthorised incidents of organ 
and tissue retention following the deaths of children while under hospital care; and lastly, the 
Shipman Inquiry which followed the criminal investigation of Dr. Shipman who murdered 
two-hundred and fifteen of his patients by injecting them with lethal amounts diamorphine 
(also known as heroin).
105
 Last, and most importantly, the Commission noted ‘shifting social 
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and political attitudes which have reflected a decline in trust in expert and governing elites to 
safeguard public interests.’106 This incident is particularly interesting as it reflects a changing 
social perception of a profession and that as a result of that change people are taking a more 
proactive role with regards to the level of care they receive. As will be discussed in greater 
depth shortly, owners demanding higher levels of care for their animals
107
 is arguably the 
strongest catalyst for reforming the RCVS and the veterinary profession generally.  
 
It is also important to emphasise that the GMC itself has not always been viewed in a 
positive light and, until recently, its relationship with other bodies such as the British 
Medical Association — the official trade union and voice of British doctors108 — was 
strained to say the least.
109
 Commentators and practitioners were critical of the way in which 
the GMC operated, arguing that its paternalistic ideology, antiquated structure, lack of 
respect for patients’ rights, and its secrecy and complacency about poor practice contributed 
to a falling public confidence. More importantly, these practices allowed the overall standard 
of care provided by the profession to fall by failing to act quickly enough against poorly 
performing doctors.
110
 As the discussion in the previous section revealed, a combination of 
increased stress levels, in part attributed to the lack of professional guidance outlining 
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professional obligations
111
 and an increasing number of complaints received by the RCVS 
regarding the level of care received,
112
 it is certainly arguable that indicators exist showing 
similar cracks are starting to surface within the RCVS.  
 
Particularly relevant for the purposes of this chapter, an example of a GMC reform which 
did not initially meet expectations can be seen in how the Council was composed. After a 
controversial vote of no confidence from the British Medical Association in 2000, the GMC 
sought to restructure itself in the hopes of maintaining public confidence and rebuilding 
professional confidence. One of the main criticisms leading to the vote was the lack of 
patient protection and involvement in the provision of medical care.
113
 In 2002, the GMC 
responded by increasing the number of lay members sitting on the Council from 25% to 
40%, however, this change was not well-received. Both the 2004 Fifth Report of the 
Shipman Inquiry
114
 and the 2007 White Paper on Trust, Assurance and Safety: The 
Regulation of Healthcare Professionals
115
 stated that further reforms to the GMC 
composition needed to be implemented, with the 2007 report recommending parity between 
professional and lay membership. Reforms in 2008 saw 50-50 membership created.  
 
In a press release issued by the GMC in November 2012, the Council stated that further 
reform would occur in January 2013 reducing the number of Council members from twenty-
                                                 
111
 Batchelor and McKeegan (n48). 
112
 See RCVS Fact Sheets (n83). 
113
 Celia Hall, ‘Scandals bring vote of no confidence in GMC’ The Telegraph (London 30 June 2000) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/1345729/Scandals-bring-vote-of-no-confidence-in-GMC.html> accessed 
19 April 2013. 
114
 Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Health, The Shipman Inquiry 
Fifth Report, Safeguarding Patients, Lessons from the Past – Proposals for the Future (Cm 6394, 2004) para 
163 < http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090808154959/http://www.the-shipman-
inquiry.org.uk/images/fifthreport/SHIP05_COMPLETE_NO_APPS.pdf> accessed 12 December 2012.      
115
 Secretary of State for Health, Trust, Assurance and Safety – The Regulation of Health Professionals in the 
21st Century (Cm 7013, 2007) paras 1.10- 1.12 <http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7013/7013.pdf> accessed 7 December 2012. 
5. Assessing Breach of Duty 
255 
 
four to only twelve.
116
 Importantly, the rationale for reducing the current GMC Council can 
easily be applied to the current RCVS Council with the aim of creating a tighter, more 
accountable and transparent regulatory body. Both the Law Commission in its consultation 
paper
117
 and the Secretary of State for Health in her White Paper Report on Trust, Assurance 
and Safety – The Regulation of Health Professionals in the 21st Century118 recommended 
that a smaller board-like model of appointed professional and lay members be preferred over 
a large, elected and, arguably, inefficient body. This, according to the reports, would result in 
a body which is more accountable to the government and other councillors, and also require 
consistent attendance and a high level of commitment from Council members.
119
 Ultimately, 
the goal in reforming membership was to achieve more efficient, transparent, and targeted 
regulation.
120
 
 
Thus, the GMC, like many professional regulatory bodies, has endured its own set of 
growing pains. In response to a growing lack of confidence from both practitioners and the 
public, the GMC initiated reforms which now ‘deliver greater independence, transparency 
and accountability, while still being workable and legitimate in the eyes of medical 
professionals.’121 As discussed in the next section, the current structure of the RCVS mirrors 
that of the GMC before its extensive reform. Although proposals have been submitted to 
change this in the future, important issues such as lay involvement continue to be an issue of 
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concern.
122
 Importantly, the RCVS could have adopted the current structure of the GMC and 
this would have acted as a good first step, reflecting both the changing sentiments with 
regards to the level of care expected by animal owners,
123
 and an acknowledgment that all 
professional bodies ought to be regulated to a standard which reflects modern professional 
responsibilities and duties.  
 Changing the RCVS: Using Lessons Learned from the Human Medical Context and b)
the GMC   
i. The Regulatory Landscape: Understanding What and Who is being Regulated  
Lessons learned in the human medical context can provide valuable insight into the reform 
objectives of the veterinary profession. Central to establishing this point in the veterinary 
context is first understanding what and who is being regulated. Discussion of why parity is 
important forms the subject matter of the next section. 
 
In general terms, it is the combination of a high degree of specialised expertise focused on 
the execution of a public good and a high level of autonomy which marks not only the 
qualities consistent with a profession, but also justification for self-regulation.
124
 In practice, 
this creates a type of social contract whereby trust is given to the profession to regulate 
themselves in a way which preserves not only the integrity of the profession, but also the 
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professional (and legal) relationships entered into.
125
 For a considerable amount of time 
since its inception, the GMC faced a ‘relatively compliant state’ which was non-
interventionist
126
 and a public which was resistant to legally challenging medical decision-
making. However, the various high-profile scandals discussed previously which involved 
the care of some of society’s most vulnerable, alongside a shift of patient perspective toward 
the provision of medical care and the doctor patient relationship forced a change in how the 
profession as a whole was regulated.
127
 In particular, the public were increasingly less 
trusting of the medical profession
128
 and were prepared to litigate perceived breaches of 
duty. In addition, government, whose role it is within the bargain to ‘control the 
individualism which may be viewed as counter-productive to society’129 intervened to 
redress increasing power imbalances which existed between doctors and patients. In short, 
the GMC had breached its side of the contract. 
  
In terms of what is being regulated, then, unlike the RCVS which has multiple regulatory 
and professional focuses,
130
 the GMC’s primary objective is to protect, promote and 
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maintain the health and safety of the public.
131
 This may seem an obvious point, however, 
unlike non-human animals, discourse surrounding human patients centres around the idea of 
the sanctity of human life, regarding this principle as the basis from which to endow patients 
with basic human rights including the right to life, but also protected interests dealing with 
bodily integrity.
132
 As a result, regulation which was once focused on professional 
collegiality, now focuses heavily on the care provided to the individual patient. To stay 
informed as to how to best meet those expectations, doctors are advised by the GMC itself 
and, increasingly, the courts, to stay abreast of current guidance.
133
 It was arguably this shift 
in emphasis to a more patient-centred approach and the breaches of trust discussed above 
which drove (and continues to drive) regulatory change in the direction of patient safety and 
autonomy.  
  
By comparison, the RCVS’s regulatory body is considerably smaller in size, however, the 
College as a whole possesses a more complex power structure as it acts as both professional 
regulator and representative,
134
 unlike the GMC and BMA. Further, and again unlike human 
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medicine, because of the commercial dynamic found in veterinary relationships, owners are 
in much stronger position to demand a particular type of treatment, whether it be euthanasia 
or, for example, a less costly and less effective treatment option. Keeping with the 
commercial model, because the animal itself is still considered an object of property and thus 
the potential for actionable negligence quite low, the impetus to change the guidance and 
focus on the animal and constitutive relationship is arguably not as pressing for the RCVS. 
Lastly, it must not be forgotten that there are different types of veterinarian and different 
types of human-animal relationship. Whilst some veterinarians believe strongly in putting 
the animal patient at the centre of the relationship (the paediatric model), others treat the 
relationship as commercially-centred (the garage mechanic model).
135
 This may depend not 
only on the inclinations of the veterinarian, but also the owner of the animal and, recalling 
discussion in Chapter Three, the animal’s purpose. Importantly, these variations create a 
very different regulatory environment than that of the human medical context and would 
need to feature in reforms undertaken by the RCVS. Having said this, veterinarians are still 
bound by the same social contract entered into by other professions. According to Rollin, 
‘veterinarians, like all other professionals, have obligations to society in general. Society 
grants professionals special privileges...[and] gives a considerable degree of autonomy to 
professionals.’136 Ultimately, the successful discharge of these obligations is entrusted to the 
veterinary profession because both legislators and the lay public lack the requisite 
knowledge necessary to do so. Problematically, however, it is only the commercial-centred 
approach which is currently being regulated, leaving the animal and the constitutive 
relationship discussed throughout this thesis unaccounted for.     
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The reasons for this current state of affairs are arguably to be found on the one hand a lack of 
state intervention and on the other the inability of the RCVS to regulate with multiple 
objectives in mind. With regards to state intervention, unlike the GMC, the RCVS has been 
privy to far less intervention. It is likely the case that this stems from the position of animals 
as property under the law, as opposed to a legal subject, and the state’s desire to promote a 
liberal economy, which includes the freedom of parties to enter into private relationships free 
from governmental oversight.
137
 For the purposes of this thesis, property is private, as are the 
commercial relationships considered. Further, the dual role that the RCVS serves as both 
regulator and professional representative arguably gives rise to conflicts of focus as between 
the veterinarian, client, and animal with the result that the RCVS’s most recent attempt to 
produce professional guidance has led to a disproportionate focus placed on professional 
collegiality and client relations.
138
      
 
Importantly, however, the point that veterinarians have yet to experience professional 
scandal or face negligence litigation on a larger scale should not place the profession in a 
position of thinking that regulatory reform is unnecessary. Indeed, Fox cautions that any 
form of complacency on the part of the profession or the RCVS as regulator should be 
resisted and that a failure to initiate structural reform ‘leaves the veterinary profession in a 
potentially vulnerable position due to its continued dependence on individuals fulfilling ill-
defined professional obligations.’139 In the worst case, the RCVS and veterinary profession 
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as a whole face the possibility of having reforms externally forced upon them,
140
 
compromising their ability to have a say in the evolution of their profession. In this way, 
Fox’s statement supports the argument that despite some of the differences discussed above, 
valuable lessons can still be learned from the regulatory history and experience of the GMC. 
As the next section will discuss, council composition reflects a reform undertaken by the 
GMC which should be adopted by the RCVS.     
ii.  The Importance of Lay Representation in Driving Professional Change 
Lay representation takes many different forms in professional regulation. In some cases, lay 
representatives sit on disciplinary panels, or sometimes act as official Lay Observers. 
‘Whatever the role of the lay participants, there is clearly an international trend towards 
enhancing their number and effectiveness in the regulation of profession[als].’141 In 
considering the role of lay representatives in professional regulation, Devlin and Heffernan 
note that consideration should be paid to the ‘necessary qualifications for appointment 
[...and] their relative numbers so that they are an effective and critical mass, not just 
tokens.’142  
 
Importantly, lay representation featured as a primary objective within Trust, Assurance and 
Safety as it helps ensure that purely professional concerns are not thought to dominate the 
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Council’s work,143 to command public confidence,144 and to better reflect the society on 
whose behalf [doctors] operate.
145
 In addition to these considerations, it could also be argued 
that including lay representation goes some way to eliminating the mystical quality that 
doctors, veterinarians, and other professionals possess as a result of their specialised 
knowledge. As Mangan notes, although ‘there is interaction [between lay individual and 
professional] (purposeful though it is), there remains an inherent aloofness perpetuated by a 
mystification of the knowledge possessed by the professional.’146 Lay involvement in the 
regulatory process is therefore important in breaking down the metaphorical wall that exists 
between professional and lay public to achieve a more open, trusting dialogue. It is 
submitted the same arguments can be applied in the veterinary context in providing a 
rationale for significantly increasing lay membership within the RCVS Council. This 
argument is particularly pressing given that a recent consultation run by DEFRA indicates a 
lack of lay representation on the RCVS Council is having an adverse effect on its reputation 
with the public,
147
 and that the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 ‘does not include a statutory 
requirement for lay people to be included in the Council.’148     
 
Having said this, unlike the GMC’s twelve-member committee, of which 50% are now lay 
members, the RCVS Council is currently comprised of forty-two members, thirty-three 
(78.5%) of whom are practising veterinary surgeons.
149
 Recalling Shaw and Downie’s 
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argument that alternative perspectives are crucial to the re-development of guidance to more 
accurately reflect changing sentiment,
150
 one area in which the RCVS could make positive 
regulatory change would be in the size and composition of its council. Although it must be 
remembered that unlike the GMC, which is a wholly independent regulatory body with 
multiple, independent branches, itself regulated by the Professional Standards Authority for 
Health and Social Care,
151
 the RCVS is a body whose principal responsibilities lie not only 
in professional regulation, but also support for the veterinary profession.
152
 According to a 
recent DEFRA consultation, this places the RCVS in a unique position and that, as such, 
parity between veterinary professionals and lay individuals should be questioned.
153
 There is 
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There is also a separate argument here that the human medical profession is currently being over-regulated and 
that as a result doctors are losing their ability to exercise their own judgment in making certain medical 
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some weight to this argument. The RCVS is unique in its position and whilst I would submit 
that ultimately the best way to resolve this tension would perhaps be to separate professional 
support matters from regulatory, this would require larger-scale reform to the Veterinary 
Surgeons Act 1966 and is therefore perhaps better viewed as a long-term regulatory goal that 
extends beyond matters relating to the negligence liability of veterinarians. 
 
As it stands, I agree with DEFRA that the regulatory structure places the veterinary 
profession in a unique situation, but disagree that this should frustrate legitimate attempts to 
develop the profession along modern lines. There are cogent reasons, explained above, 
which prompted the human medical profession to change. These reasons apply equally to the 
veterinary context and if the arguments made in this thesis are accepted, as I think they 
should, and (as discussed below) the desires of the profession to become well-placed, ethical 
decision-makers within the veterinary relationship are to be taken seriously, then strong 
involvement from both the professional and the lay population is required. Thus, a smaller 
council with parity between professional and lay, and with members drawn from diverse 
backgrounds provides the foundation from which to start the process of modernising the 
veterinary profession.   
 
Turning then to who should feature on the RCVS Council apart from veterinary practitioners, 
it is submitted that a combination of animal welfarists and academics would provide the 
Council with a diverse, but also targeted opinion. This will be discussed in greater detail 
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below, for present purposes, it is important to note that in a recent report detailing the future 
ambitions of the veterinary profession, it was highlighted that 89% of veterinarians feel their 
largest contribution is to animal health and welfare.
154
 Indeed, ‘veterinary leadership on 
animal welfare was the most important goal cited for 2030.’155 Further, when asked to 
envision their profession in fifteen years’ time it was stated that:   
 All veterinary surgeons have a good knowledge of animal welfare 
 issues —  including how these should be assessed and ethically 
 appraised – and feel equipped to articulate the profession’s unique 
 role here. [Further,] ethical decision-making, in both veterinary 
 and animal ethics, is mainstreamed and all vets are skilled in moral 
 decision-making.
156
  
For the purposes of this chapter and indeed this thesis as a whole, it is submitted that though 
laudable, this statement needs to find a counterpoint in the law. This endeavour requires, as a 
starting point, a breadth of professional and lay council opinion devoted to a re-articulation 
of professional guidance. Thus, it would arguably be beneficial to include members from 
official organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(“RSPCA”). Organisations like the RSPCA work to ensure the welfare and ethical treatment 
of animals within society and could contribute specialised evidence-based knowledge on the 
welfare of companion and farm animals outside of the clinical context.
157
 Moreover, the 
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RSPCA would arguably be in good position to comment on societal trends affecting animal 
ownership and welfare. 
 
In addition to this, it is submitted that academic involvement on the Council should be 
refined. As it currently stands, two members from each veterinary school sit on the 
Council.
158
As part of the aim to become a more targeted and proportionate
159
 regulator, it has 
been suggested by DEFRA and the RCVS that the new Council should see a significant 
reduction in the numbers of serving academics.
160
 If recommendations made by the 
Veterinary Legislative Group in 2009 are accepted, university representation would fall to 
one individual holding a veterinary degree.
161
 More recent proposals, however, have 
suggested a rise in university participation, but that members should come only from 
veterinary schools.
162
 It is submitted that either course should be strongly resisted. Going 
forward, there needs to be a voice on the Council which can speak to the rapidly-evolving 
legal and ethical issues surrounding the triangular (not bipolar) veterinary relationship, and 
ways in which the profession can be developed to meet this change. To this end, academic 
involvement, specifically in the areas of law and bioethics, should be encouraged. 
Importantly, bioethicists and legal academics working in areas such as Tort, with specialist 
expertise in veterinary negligence, understand not only the principles which constitute 
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positive and negative medically-related professional obligations, but are familiar with 
important legal and ethical constructs which this thesis has argued should animate the 
veterinary relationship, such as best interests. As this thesis has sought to highlight, the 
triangular veterinary relationship is complex. Ethical and legal questions frequently occur in 
tension with one another. Academics working specifically in negligence understand the 
nature of professional and legal obligations, the doctrine which underpins relevant legal 
principles, and the relationships that are created within the professional context.
163
 This 
knowledge places bioethicists and legal academics specialising in professional negligence 
and medical law in a unique position to be able to inform on the development of professional 
guidance.       
 The Best Interests Approach: The RCVS versus the GMC    c)
Although it is not contested that at a base level a veterinarian owes to their clients and 
patients the duty to practise veterinary medicine in such a manner so as to meet the standards 
expected of the profession,
164
 when the regulatory body that develops the standards has 
fallen ‘significantly out-of-step with the arrangements in place at other professional 
regulators and Royal Colleges,’165 what is produced will be unlikely to adequately protect 
and inform all parties involved. An example of this, I argue, is found in how the RCVS 
Council addressed the animal patient’s welfare, in particular, their best interests. 
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This final section, then, will focus on best interests and how this construct could be 
practically developed to feature more prominently within professional guidance. As this next 
section and final section of this chapter will discuss, courts increasingly look to professional 
guidance to inform them as to the expected standard of care; therefore, guidance in this area 
could prove particularly helpful, in conjunction with expert testimony.  Although I argue a 
best interests approach is central to how veterinarians ought to approach their legal and 
professional obligations and how the courts approach veterinarians’ legal duties, it was only 
briefly addressed in the new RCVS guidance. It was highlighted in Chapter Two of this 
thesis that power and knowledge imbalances are inherent in the veterinary relationship and 
that understanding the tensions that result from the triangular veterinary relationship are vital 
to understanding the role of the veterinarian and the courts in ensuring the interests of the 
vulnerable party are protected.
166
 Embracing a best interests approach is interlinked with this 
approach, serving as a prioritising mechanism for the benefit of the animal, which can be 
utilised both in how the negligence inquiry is framed, but also, importantly, in formulating 
the veterinarian’s duty of care and expected standard of care.   
 
Within the RCVS guidance, however, best interests is only mentioned in four areas: the 
transportation of sick and/or injured animals, artificial insemination, the provision of 
telephone advice, and when the owner lacks capacity. Although the issue of capacity and 
consent in the veterinary context raises interesting questions, for the purposes of this thesis, 
this section would be unlikely to play a key role. Whilst sections 75 and 76 in the GMC 
guidance
167
 for doctors and sections 8-9 and 12-13 for paediatricians reference when the best 
interests assessment must be undertaken and how to undertake it, there is no assessment 
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which allows veterinarians to determine whether or when it would be professionally 
permissible to act in the best interests of the animal, or how a best interests determination is 
to be arrived at. Recalling the link that professional guidance aims to establish the legal 
standard and can track closely to it,
168
 this lack of detailed and applicable guidance in this 
area paints the picture that the RCVS believes its veterinarians do not require such 
information to competently and professionally carry out their legal obligations to an 
accepted standard. However, this does not appear to correspond with growing professional 
sentiment which sees the veterinarian’s greatest contribution being to animal health and 
welfare,
169
 nor with empirical evidence, which indicates a growing need for professional 
guidance on expected standards
170
 and practice-related dilemmas.  
 
Looking pragmatically at how best interests could be incorporated into new professional 
guidance for the benefit of veterinarians, as discussed throughout this thesis, the best 
interests assessment should be holistic in approach, taking into account both quality and 
quantity of life issues, including the owner’s wishes and capabilities. In this way, a best 
interests assessment in the veterinary context could be similar in structure to the test found 
in s.4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
171
 the Welfare Checklist found in s.1(3) of the 
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Children Act 1989, and the best interests assessment found in para 12 of the 0-18 Years: 
Guidance of All Doctors issued by the GMC. Legislation and guidance concerning children, 
however, is arguably best suited to the veterinary context as this guidance looks to 
protection of the child and is alive to aspects of vulnerability, whilst also being grounded in 
ideals relating to obligation and responsibility.
172
 Including a best interests assessment 
within the RCVS professional guidance in line with that found in guidance concerning the 
best interests of children would arguably have gone some way to acknowledging and 
resolving issues surrounding the animal’s position of exclusive dependence173 within the 
veterinary relationship.
174
  
 
Making these changes would also allow courts to utilise the RCVS guidance when 
determining issues of breach in a veterinary negligence claim where the best interests of the 
animal was at issue. For example, in the previous chapter which considered various duty of 
care scenarios, one of the more complicated concerned the veterinarian acting against an 
owner who was unable to come to the treatment decision which would have promoted the 
animal’s best interests. Acting against those wishes, the veterinarian acts for the animal’s 
best interest and euthanises the animal. The owner in this scenario would certainly be 
entitled to sue a veterinarian in this circumstance, however, official guidance that makes the 
animal’s best interests of primary importance alongside expert testimony supporting the 
conduct of the veterinarian may result in a finding that the defendant did not breach her 
                                                                                                                                                      
relevant to the treatment of adults may not sit well with those questions relating to children. See: Portsmouth 
Hospitals NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2005] 1 WLR 3995, 4023. 
172
 Jo Bridgeman, ‘Because we Care? The Medical Treatment of Children’ in Sally Sheldon and Michael 
Thomson (eds.), Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Law (Cavendish 1998) 97. 
173
 Jane Stapleton, ‘The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law,’ (2003) 24 Australian Bar Review 135, 142. 
174
 See discussion in Chapter 2.4(b). 
5. Assessing Breach of Duty 
271 
 
expected standard of care.
175
 Importantly, without this information, veterinarians (and 
courts) would be lost. Situations like this are obviously emotionally-charged and, from a 
legal perspective, highly fact-sensitive. Guidance here should be aimed at providing targeted 
information and support, much like the GMC guidance on best interests, but also allowing 
sufficient space for the veterinarian to make decisions based on a robust balancing exercise, 
supported by clear professional guidance.   
5.5 The Role of the Courts as Final Arbiters of the Standard of Care 
Once it is the case that professional sentiment broadly supports the changes advocated for 
thus far, the courts, as final arbiters of the standard of care,
176
 stand in a better position to 
scrutinise the cogency of expert opinion and develop the law in line with the arguments 
made in this thesis. Key to this assessment, however, is to what extent the breach assessment 
is one that ought to set a normative standard and how courts could utilise professional codes 
to advance this perspective.     
 Breach: Setting a Normative or Descriptive Standard           a)
In any professional context there is the possibility that courts decide standards based on 
current practice. In this regard, standards are set which, although consistent with the 
evidence given by the defendant and her experts as to what they do, removes the normative 
component from the breach assessment and ultimately allows the profession to set its own 
standard.
177
 Importantly, this is different from establishing standards stemming from 
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reasonableness. Where this latter standard is sought, the court is able to retain its role in 
determining what conduct is acceptable.
178
  
 
Speaking to the veterinary profession, Soave notes that the standard of care to be met by 
veterinarians is to ‘use the ordinary and reasonable degree of skill and care expected from 
the average licensed professional.’179 This statement, taken as a whole, is somewhat 
contradictory as it blends descriptive and normative standards, without differentiating 
between the two or reaching a conclusion as to which is required of the veterinarian. To 
Norrie, there is more at play here than merely semantics; the words used distinguish two 
very different standards: ordinary refers to what professionals do and is descriptive, whilst 
reasonable refers to what should be done.
180
 The concern, here, is that courts would opt for 
the less demanding standard when determining questions of breach; indeed, this is arguably 
the standard articulated in the RCVS guidance discussed previously. It is submitted that 
when confronted with these two options, the court should hold the defendant to a reasonable 
standard and develop the legal standard expected, intervening where, for example, a 
veterinary expert clearly embraces an outmoded practice inconsistent the arguments made 
throughout this chapter and the aims of this thesis.    
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As Montrose argued almost sixty years ago, ‘the question of negligence is one of what ought 
to be done in the circumstances, not what is done in similar circumstances by most people or 
even by all people.’181 It may be the case that judges are attracted to the descriptive standard, 
however, it is argued that this should be resisted. Even if more modern guidance is issued 
which reflects the triangular veterinary relationship and the best interests of the animal, and 
professional sentiment has altered to reflect this, external scrutiny and regulation by the 
courts is still necessary to ensure reasonable standards are being complied with. 
Furthermore, failing to adopt a normative standard in the breach assessment carries the risk 
of that information gap persisting whilst also allowing old practices to continue 
unchallenged. A crucial part of changing the professional mindset and advancing the 
veterinary profession, I argue, rests with the judiciary and its ability to set the reasonable 
standard of care expected. Importantly, that standard should be one which reflects a 
normative standard of care. 
 
An example of this type of analysis being undertaken in the medical context can be seen in 
the recent Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board,
182
 where 
the majority of the court found that the standards set by the GMC regarding disclosure of 
risk, although higher than the standard ordinarily practiced by the profession, was the correct 
standard to be adopted. It was reasoned that:  
 …the guidance issued by the General Medical Council has long 
 required a broadly similar approach [an open dialogue between 
 patient and doctor, which allows the patient to come to an 
 informed decision about treatment]. It is nevertheless necessary 
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 to impose legal obligations, so that even those doctors who have 
 less skill or inclination for communication, or who are more 
 hurried, are obliged to pause and engage in the discussion which 
 the law requires. This may not be welcomed by some healthcare 
 providers; but the reasoning of the House of Lords in Donoghue v 
 Stevenson [1932] AC 562 was no doubt received in a similar way 
 by the manufacturers of bottled drinks.
183
  
 
Although Montgomery concerned the issue of disclosure of risk, which has arguably 
developed along different lines than treatment and diagnosis,
184
 I argue that because of the 
animal’s position of exclusive dependence and vulnerability within the veterinary 
relationship and the ethically and legally complex nature of veterinary decision-making that 
exists, the court could take a similarly forward-thinking approach. Indeed, this would 
especially be the case when dealing with best interest assessments undertaken by 
veterinarians.  
 Utilising Professional Guidance as a Tool to Clarify the Reasonable Standard of b)
Care Expected       
Where there is disagreement or uncertainty in the experts’ opinions, guidance can be utilised 
as a tool to more closely scrutinise the expert evidence and provide objective footing to 
advance the legal standard of care in a particular direction. As Maria Lee states, 
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‘...guidelines...provide a source of ‘reasonableness’ other than practice, which might either 
compete with or support that practice.’185 In this regard, Samanta et al.186 make the argument 
that clinical guidelines can, in essence, act as a tool utilised by the courts to help evaluate 
breach.
187
 The authors state that the first step is to determine whether the expert evidence 
given at trial is Bolam-defensible, meaning that guidelines could be utilised either to 
‘conclude that the conduct is such as no reasonable doctor could have held, and prima facie 
the defendant has failed to meet the standard of care’188 or, conversely, that the defendant’s 
conduct was such that a reasonable doctor could have acted similarly. The second stage, the 
authors contend, is to determine whether the defendant’s conduct or departure from the 
guidance was Bolitho-justifiable. Here, the authors draw on the speech of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Bolitho itself where it was stated that:  
 ...the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of 
 opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a 
 logical basis. In particular, in cases involving, as they often do, the 
 weighing of risks against benefits, the judge before accepting a 
 body of opinion as being responsible, reasonable or respectable, 
 will need to be satisfied that, in forming their views, the experts 
 have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and 
 benefits and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter.
189
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If the guidance is capable of contributing to this type of assessment, then it follows from 
Samanta et al.’s argument that it is capable of informing on the reasonable standard of care. 
Following guidance which aims to facilitate proper decision-making on both a professional 
and legal level by taking into account, for example, the magnitude of risk
190
 and the gravity 
of potential harm would arguably demonstrate that the expert has directed herself to the 
determination of professional expectations. For the courts, this guidance could be utilised as 
an objective tool to measure expert opinion and serve as a reminder that ultimately ‘it is the 
court’s function to judge, not to take refuge in bodies of professional opinion.’191 A similar 
point was also raised by Brazier and Miola that:  
 In claims for medical negligence the emergence of sources of 
 neutral and independent guidance on good practice will empower 
 judges to utilise Bolitho and assess whether the opinion advanced 
 by each party's experts is logical and defensible.
192
 
  
Recalling Mulheron’s statement that the judiciary’s uptake of Bolitho has been patchy, the 
message that professional guidance can be utilised as an objective tool to check or balance 
opinion advanced by experts is an important one. Two case law examples can be used to 
demonstrate this point. 
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First, in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland,
193
 the court had to decide whether Anthony Bland, 
who had suffered catastrophic physical injury at Hillsborough, should be kept on artificial 
feeding. Anthony Bland had been in a persistent vegetative state (“P.V.S”) since his injury 
and there was no hope of this reversing. As artificial feeding is regarded as a form of 
medical treatment, the Trust sought a declaration by the court confirming that it would be 
lawful to withdraw life support in this instance. In his judgment, Lord Goff considered 
guidance found in a Discussion Paper on Treatment of Patients in Persistent Vegetative 
State, issued by the Medical Ethics Committee of the British Medical Association.
194
 His 
Lordship stated that: 
 Study of this document left me in no doubt that, if a doctor treating 
 a P.V.S. patient acts in accordance with the medical practice now 
 being evolved by the Medical Ethics Committee of the B.M.A., he 
 will be acting with the benefit of guidance from a responsible and 
 competent body of relevant professional opinion, as required by 
 the Bolam test.
195
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There are two additional points to be said about the use of the BMA guidance in this context. First, it will be 
recalled that the weight guidance is given in a particular case is closely connected to the specific issue 
considered by the case at hand (Lee, (n33) 575). Here, the issue at hand was certainly a legal one, but also a 
strongly ethical one. Thus, the use of guidance developed by the BMA’s Ethics Committee on the topic of PVS 
was particularly salient. Second, the only standard that needed to be met was the one set by Bolam (ie. the 
profession), so again, utilising guidance by the BMA seemed particularly instructive. Whether guidance would 
now need to be taken from a more objective source, for example, the GMC, to meet with Bolitho is uncertain, 
but arguable. 
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Second, in R (On the application of Oliver Leslie Burke) v. General Medical Council
196
 the 
Court of Appeal had to decide whether guidance issued by the GMC entitled, ‘Withholding 
and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Treatments: Good Practice in Decision-Making,’ 
contravened Mr. Burke’s article 2, 3, 6, 8 and 14 rights under the ECHR. Mr. Burke was 
suffering from a degenerative brain condition, which, in its final stages, would likely render 
him fully dependent on others to provide care. Throughout, Mr. Burke expressed his desire 
to have his care continued and for ANH to continue, even if or when he lapsed into a coma. 
At first instance, it was held by Munby J. that the GMC guidance was unlawful and 
contravened his Article rights.
197
 The Court of Appeal, however, reversed Munby J’s 
decision upholding the common law construction that a ‘doctor has a positive duty, so long 
as the treatment is prolonging the life of the patient, to provide ANH in accordance with the 
patient’s expressed wishes.’198 As the GMC guidance did not depart from this standard, 
there was no reason to declare it unlawful.
199
 According to Samanta et al. this implied that:  
 …in the context of withholding or withdrawing life-supporting 
 treatment in the incompetent patient, a doctor’s practice in acting 
 in conformity with guidance from a responsible professional body 
 would be in keeping with reasonable practice.
200
  
 
Admittedly, the conclusion arrived at by Samanta et al. is slightly different than the 
argument introduced above in that it appears it was the guidance itself that was being 
challenged in Burke. Although this appears the case, in reality, the guidance was still being 
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used to assess the standard of care question. Having said this, in both cases the court utilised 
professional guidance to determine not only the scope of a medical practitioner’s 
professional duty, but also the legal. In Bland, for example, Lord Goff clearly stated that 
complying with the ethical guidance issued by the BMA meant that the practitioner would 
similarly meet the legal standard established by Bolam and likewise in Burke that the legal 
standard mirrored the professional standard established in the GMC guidance. 
 The Courts Helping to Drive Regulatory Reform c)
Just as the courts can utilise professional guidance as a tool to determine the reasonable 
standard of care, so too can courts highlight that a gap in existing professional guidance 
exists. With a responsive regulatory council, this information can be taken on board and used 
to refine or develop new guidance in line with changing social expectation.  
 
An example of the GMC applying litigation lessons to its guidance can be seen in the 
doctrinal and professional development of the best interests test in children that lack 
capacity. Arguably, the move to develop the best interests test now in place began in earnest 
with the case of Charlotte Wyatt
201
 — a case discussed earlier in Chapter Four of this 
thesis.
202
 Although the decision in Wyatt is somewhat contested, I use it here only to 
demonstrate the professional and legal development of a best interests approach in relation to 
the standard of care expected by medical practitioners. Recalling the facts, Charlotte was 
born premature and as such, suffered from extensive health problems and disabilities. It was 
the judgment of the medical team supervising Charlotte’s care that if she entered into a 
critical state, it would be in her best interests not to resuscitate. Charlotte’s parents, on the 
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other hand, wanted every effort undertaken to preserve her life. In the court’s decision, it was 
held that the best interests of the child were paramount, however, a review of the best 
interests case law revealed a confusing and inconsistent approach to assessment.
203
 In its 
reasoning, the court undertook a thorough examination of the case law with regards to the 
various tests which had been applied and concluded that:  
 In making [the decision of what is in the best interests of the child] 
 the welfare of the child is paramount, and the judge must look at 
 the question from the assumed point of view of the patient...The 
 term "best interests" encompasses medical, emotional, and all 
 other welfare issues. The court must conduct a balancing exercise 
 in which all the relevant factors are weighed...
204
 
 
Further, the court stated that in determining the best interests of a child, caution in the 
application to children of factors relevant to the treatment of adults should be exercised,
205
 
however, at the time, there was little more to work from.     
  
Importantly, what emerged was that a gap in the professional guidance provided to 
paediatricians existed and that this posed a present and serious issue for doctors and medical 
teams wanting to stay on the right side of the law when making complex decisions regarding 
the medical care of a child. It was arguably this hole in the guidance, along with the 
introduction of the Children Act in 2004 and the Laming Inquiry
206
 into the death of young 
Victoria Climbié who was physically abused and neglected until eventually succumbing to 
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her injuries, which prompted the GMC to begin the process of developing professional 
codes.
207
 In 2007, the 0-18 years: Guidance for all Doctors was introduced. The new 
guidance specifically highlights the singular importance of the best interests principle and in 
sections 12 and 13, expands upon the holistic assessment adopted in Wyatt. Importantly, 
what this shows is the ability of regulatory councils to act quickly and develop guidelines 
which reflect quickly-changing professional, legal, and societal expectation. Further, the 
development of the 0-18 Years: Guidance should be viewed within the larger regulatory 
environment. It will be recalled from the previous section that the GMC was facing scrutiny 
from the public and that a more representative and responsive GMC Council was being 
developed. Presently, then, courts and paediatricians now have a more accurate idea of what 
is occurring within the profession, what the professional, and importantly, what the legal 
standard of care includes. This development within the law reflects not only the evolutionary 
nature of negligence, but also the central role that courts play within it.  
5.6 Conclusion   
For most professions, ‘the common law standard of care evolves collaboratively through 
codified regulations, prevailing societal notions of reasonableness, and the current consensus 
of the actor’s professional peers.’208 This quote highlights the interconnected and 
multifaceted nature of the breach assessment in a professional negligence claim. Although it 
was argued that the first step in changing the standard of care to meet the expanded 
obligations argued for in this thesis has to come from the profession itself, it is the courts 
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that remain the ultimate arbiters of the standard of care.
209
 Central to this development is the 
increasingly important role of professional guidance both to inform veterinarians as to their 
changing obligations, but also to assist the court by providing an additional source of 
objective and current information.  
 
In the veterinary context, however, although the RCVS stood in a position to modernise the 
delivery of veterinary care and reflect a more holistic account of the veterinary relationship, 
including the best interests of the animal, movement in this direction was not achieved. As a 
result, its most recent attempt to reform and modernise the RCVS Code is, I argue, more 
accurately characterised as a missed opportunity. Invaluable lessons could have been taken 
from the human medical profession, however, the experience of the GMC appears to have 
been largely ignored. Problematically, as evidenced by fact reports issued by the RCVS, this 
increasingly leaves veterinarians uncertain as to the standards they are meant to achieve and 
clients increasingly displeased with the standard of care delivered.
210
 In essence, this 
collaborative process does not yet exist in the veterinary profession.  
 
More broadly, organisations such as the Veterinary Defence Society are extremely reluctant 
to reveal any information on the nature of veterinary negligence claims or how many 
negligence-related claims are initiated against veterinarians, thus leaving the picture further 
obscured.
211
 It would be unwise, however, for the veterinary profession to ignore the past 
experiences of analogous professions. Though the changes advocated here are not 
straightforward and would take time to implement, it is submitted they present the best way 
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forward for veterinarians, owners, and animals. At the heart of professional regulation and 
the breach assessment performed by courts lies an obligation to ensure that both the 
professional and the profession as a whole are accountable, and that decisions made are 
transparent. Thus, to ensure proper weight is given to the triangular veterinary relationship 
and ensure that veterinarians are better informed about their legal obligations, regulatory 
changes aimed at achieving a more representative RCVS Council and guidance which 
prioritises information pertaining to constitutive relationship and the best interests of the 
animal should be adopted.
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has two primary aims. First, to advocate in favour of changes to the law and 
professional guidance that would see veterinarians better informed as to their legal 
obligations stemming from the triangular veterinary relationship and second, to argue that so 
far as possible, veterinarians should act to protect the best interests of the animal within that 
relationship.  
 
Since undertaking this thesis, the veterinary profession has slowly started its own process of 
reform. The recent Vet Futures Project, for example, highlights that the veterinary profession 
‘has experienced a period of rapid change in the environment within which it operates.’1 In 
response, the project was initiated in partnership with the RCVS and British Veterinary 
Association so that veterinarians could be involved in ‘shap[ing their] own future.’2 As I 
have argued in this thesis, however, the scope to create holistic change will always be 
limited if important questions about changing the veterinary profession are only addressed 
by veterinarians themselves. Many of the questions relating to whose interests in the 
veterinary relationship matter or how competing interests should be balanced are, I submit, 
legal questions that are best captured through the lens of a negligence action.  
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As Chapter One highlighted, historically, once it had been largely accepted by the animal 
owning populous that it was veterinarians who were best placed to determine the best 
interests of an animal, as opposed to lay “experts,” focus within the emerging profession 
shifted to veterinarians meeting the evolving needs of their clients. Multiple external forces 
such as the intensification of farming practices, the sharp increase in companion animal 
ownership and a growing distrust of the professions, however, weakened the profession’s 
ability respond to their clientele. Problematically, the increasingly disparate ways in which 
clients experience ownership and the ways in which veterinarians personally approach their 
professional role created a tension which prompted what is now considered the primary 
question of veterinary ethics: whom does the veterinarian serve, the animal or the owner?
3
 
Are veterinarians paediatricians or garage mechanics?
4
 This tension continues to the present 
day. In response, I have argued that in order to provide veterinarians with the guidance 
needed to resolve this dilemma, the question also has to be considered from a legal 
standpoint and that going forward, both the law and the veterinary profession should adopt 
the paediatric perspective which focuses on the triangular relationship and the importance of 
advocating  in favour of the patient’s best interests. 
 
Chapter One, however, went on to highlight that because of the prominence given to the 
breach assessment in existing veterinary negligence case law, very little legal guidance exists 
for veterinarians. Instead, the heavy emphasis placed on breach means that each decision is, 
in essence, confined to its own facts. The decisions in these cases give the impression that 
courts are capable of reasoning veterinary negligence cases; however, it was argued that as 
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regards the actionable damage suffered and duties that may have been owed, the negligence 
inquiry was addressed in a very narrow, confined way, addressing only commercial 
concerns. The more illuminating question of veterinary liability arising from the damaged 
relationship between owner and animal, as opposed to the animal’s economic value, remains 
unanswered. In this way, then, decisions reached by the courts concerning veterinary 
negligence have served only to entrench the idea that the veterinary relationship is solely 
commercial in nature and supports the view that Lord Scott espoused in Rees, namely that 
the relationship between owner and animal is as between owner and property; subject and 
object. The remainder of the thesis set out to present a solution through which a relationally-
robust veterinary negligence claim could be argued. This approach calls for increased legal 
guidance on the state of the veterinary relationship, the legal obligations stemming from this 
relationship and, in keeping with the paediatric model, forwarding the best interests of the 
animal patient.  
 
As a way of framing the discussion, I first set out the lens through which I argued veterinary 
negligence should operate; this was the purpose of Chapter Two. When presented with novel 
questions relating to damage or the duty of care, courts often look at negligence’s theoretical 
underpinnings to help guide and ground their reasoning.
5
 It was argued, however, that the 
three dominant models found in negligence jurisprudence and case law could not be utilised 
as explanatory models to help give effect to or ground veterinary negligence claims premised 
on a paediatric approach. The primary obstacle shared by the corrective, distributive, and 
rights-based models was to be found in their strict adherence to a structurally binary 
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relationship between claimant and defendant in which both parties possess legal personality. 
Therefore, regardless of whatever laudable aims these theories seek to achieve, all are 
premised on a requirement that automatically removes from consideration the position of the 
animal, thus failing to promote the second aim of this thesis.  
 
Even if animal interests could be considered, it was argued that the privileging or ranking of 
human interests over those of the animal would likely result in the animal’s interest being 
secondary in distributive justice and rights-based analyses, thus failing to forward the best 
interests of the animal. Dealing specifically with a rights-based perspective, it was argued 
that this position failed on a number of additional grounds. First, the definitional ambiguities 
which accompany rights-based discourse and the antagonistic nature of rights being held 
against or over another
6
 contribute nothing of value to a veterinary negligence claim and 
were instead argued to be detrimental to its development along relational lines. More 
pressing, however, the rights-based approach was incapable of adequately explaining hybrid 
damage constructions, which I submitted were integral to conceptualising a veterinary 
negligence claim and meeting the dual aims of the thesis. 
 
In the alternative, it was argued that an instrumental approach, in which the courts aim to 
protect the interests of the vulnerable party should be adopted. At first glance, adopting an 
instrumental approach appeared incongruous to the strongly relational, duty-centred 
approach to the negligence inquiry I presented in the first chapter. In this regard, it was 
highlighted that instrumentalist approaches, according to Keating, fail to capture the nature 
of a negligence claim, which must look backward to the wrong that was committed not 
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forward to the social impact of a particular decision.
7
 I, however, rejected this view of 
instrumentalism and instead took on board West’s assertion that ‘a robust instrumentalism 
should illuminate—  and surely should also interrogate—  all the ways in which law impacts 
upon harm...’.8 With this in mind, I argued that an instrumentalist account which views the 
court’s role as protecting the vulnerable satisfies West’s argument and addresses Keating’s 
concerns. Following this account means that courts would look backward to the nature of the 
relationship that existed between the parties at the time of the tort, but also forward to 
address changes in social norms. Thus, harms are interrogated, as are the relationships that 
give rise to them.  
 
It was argued that this approach mirrors van Rijswijk’s account of Lord Atkin’s decision in 
Donoghue v. Stevenson
9
 to the extent that his decision reflects a relational analysis centred 
on proximity (embodied in the neighbour principle), but also serves an instrumental means 
insofar as it addressed growing power imbalances between consumers and manufacturers 
characteristic of increasing market industrialisation. This discussion led to an explanation of 
the vulnerability approach adopted and to a doctrinal analysis of the various ways in which 
courts had either tacitly or explicitly utilised a vulnerability-based approach in their 
reasoning. Put simply, my approach to vulnerability, as discussed in Chapter Two, adopts 
and expands upon its doctrinal usage. It is based on relational imbalances which place the 
claimant or a third party in a position of disempowerment or dependence. In this way, 
vulnerability and best interests are linked in the mutual premise that their relevance is to be 
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found in cases where ‘a level of paternalism is necessary, or at least justified.’10 Although 
academic commentary has addressed the possibility of vulnerability acting as an underlying 
determinant or rationale in tort cases, the accompanying analysis is sparse.
11
 Therefore, 
section 2.4 of this chapter was devoted to developing and analysing this under-theorised area 
within negligence jurisprudence. Utilising Stapleton’s discussion on exclusive dependence, 
whereby the individual is wholly dependent on another’s care,12 it was submitted that this 
could be expanded to accommodate the position of the animal within the veterinary 
relationship. Animals, in this regard, are vulnerable being exclusively dependent on both 
their owner and their veterinarian for their proper care and emotional wellbeing.   
 
Evidence of the vulnerability-based reasoning I adopt can been found in instances where the 
damage claimed is not straightforward
13
 and where the duty of care analysis is complicated 
by multiple party scenarios.
14
 In many cases, some form of professional-lay relationship is 
also present. I therefore agree with Stapleton’s conclusion on the role of vulnerability in 
negligence that it acts as a centralising feature
15
 linking otherwise disparate pockets of 
liability. I also endorse points raised by Manderson regarding proximity that ‘a distinct 
capacity to control particularises the defendant, while a distinct vulnerability to harm 
particularises the plaintiff’16 and Vines that proximity ‘operate[s] not only inside a category 
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of negligence, but also outside whichever category of negligence was being considered.’17 
Drawing on these arguments, I concluded that it was through these various proximity 
inquiries that vulnerability could be most robustly considered. In this way, the use of 
vulnerability-based reasoning could be extended on both a macro level capable of guiding, in 
an instrumental way, the negligence assessment as a whole, and also on the micro level 
within the duty of care assessment. Applying this to the veterinary relationship, I contend 
that in deciding negligence cases involving veterinarians, judges should explore the nature of 
the relationship between owner and veterinarian utilising vulnerability in assessing the duty 
of care owed. Importantly, unlike other theoretical approaches to negligence, the best 
interests of the animal can be considered on the macro, instrumental level, giving effect to 
the recognition of the changing veterinary relationship and the animal’s exclusive 
dependence. 
 
With the vulnerability framework in place, Chapter Three went on to consider the damage 
requirement in a veterinary negligence claim. The current approach taken by the courts in 
veterinary negligence case law views the animal as a commodity with an ascertainable 
market value. It was accepted, following Liebman, that ‘we should not expect judges to 
adopt far-reaching...arguments that fundamentally challenge anthropocentrism.’18 However, 
positive change could be effected by adopting a new form of hybrid property damage based 
on Radin’s theory on property and personhood and Prialux’s conception of hybrid forms of 
damage. What differentiates this model from Priaulx’s, however, is that the hybrid element 
focuses on the spectrum between property and psycho-social harm, as opposed to personal 
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injury and psycho-social harm. This chapter sought to contribute in a new way to this 
developing area of scholarship by expanding the idea of damage hybrid claims to include 
property, whilst taking on board both Conaghan’s argument that relational losses have been 
largely overlooked by tort
19
 and Nedelsky’s articulation of property that it figures as the 
strongest literal and figurative symbol of individual, masculine ideas of autonomy.
20
  
 
The sentient constitutive property (“SCP”) model itself, it will be recalled, focuses on 
Radin’s theory of constitutive property and the role that property can play in developing our 
own personhood. Here, constitutive property is described as being closely bound up with 
personhood because the property forms part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing 
personal entities in the world.
21
 Thus, property that is constitutive in nature lacks a 
commodity-based value and to be separated from this property harms or destroys the self.
22
 
Building on Radin’s argument, I argued that the theory relating to constitutive property is 
stronger when the relationship between owner and animal is considered because it 
contemplates a relationship with property that can interact and reciprocate emotion. 
Sentience under SCP, therefore, requires more than an ability to feel pain or suffer, and 
depends instead on a relationship between owner and animal, which contributes a benefit to 
a central aspect of the lives of each;
23
 both must therefore actively participate and contribute. 
Key to the SCP argument, then, is the point that the type of animal is irrelevant. Therefore, 
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because the SCP model is focused on the nature of the relationship and its ability to classed 
as constitutive in nature, the owner may suffer actionable damage whether the animal 
involved is a dog, a horse, or a cow.       
 
Although SCP is not the first property model put forward which contemplates advancing 
owner-animal relationships within the law, this chapter revealed the deficiencies of other 
existing models similar in scope to SCP. In particular, it was noted that unlike SCP which 
looks to the strength of relationship between owner and animal, Matlack’s model focuses on 
the type of animal concerned and surrogate decision-making, whilst Hankin’s focuses solely 
on the type of animal concerned as justification for increased damage awards. Importantly, it 
was argued that centring a model on the type of animal unfairly privileges traditional 
companion animals, such as dogs and cats. Within this analysis, I also criticised the inability 
of these models to work within a negligence framework, despite both authors claiming this 
was possible. Lastly, it was argued that accepting the SCP model would be an evolutionary 
step, representing nascent innovation occurring within property law. As evidenced by Attia v 
British Gas
24
 and Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust,
25
 courts are willing to 
reason cases creatively in the face of novel arguments.  
 
Looking beyond the confines of my thesis to the development of negligence on a broader 
scale, an area that would benefit from increased academic and judicial scrutiny is the 
actionable damage requirement. Whilst Chapter Three highlights that courts have 
demonstrated a willingness to act creatively and find new categories of property, for 
example, in sperm, when this is placed alongside other novel areas of damage relating to 
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personal injury, such as wrongful conception and educational negligence, there is an 
argument to be made that courts should now be more explicit about the process undertaken 
to elevate a harm to a protected interest or recognised form actionable damage. In essence, 
the once well-defined categories of personal injury and property damage appear to be losing 
their straight edge. Yet, there is very little consensus from the judiciary about how, for 
example, autonomy-based and relational forms of damage, in particular, can be explained 
within the actionable damage requirement. Traditionally, neither have been protected in 
negligence, however, a number of recently-decided cases,
26
 whilst going against orthodoxy, 
conversely offer little detailed analysis on the damage point.  
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that the experience of negligence law is one of 
reformulation and evolution, but that the process does not always follow a linear path.
27
 The 
reformulation phase is vital and serves to drive the law forward,
28
 however, movement 
toward a coherence which articulates what interests negligence protects is also vital. What 
harms matter in negligence and why
29
 are perennial questions that require dedicated and 
explicit attention. These questions centre on complex issues relating to our subjective 
experience of existing in the world and what should be considered a vicissitude of modern 
day life and what goes beyond this to constitute damage. These autonomy-based and 
relational harms raise questions of proximity at the damage stage; autonomy looking (in 
general terms) at protecting one’s freedom and chosen detachment from something or 
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someone and relationality looking at protecting one’s attachment or connection to someone 
or something (whether voluntary or involuntary). Looking to the future, I would argue that 
courts should look to start forming a separate category of damage based on relational harms 
and that instead of turning to rights-based arguments or legislation, courts should look to 
their own reasoning to determine its boundaries and whether a new, exceptional duty 
category is also needed— perhaps in line with the duty construct argued in this thesis. 
 
Chapter Four, then, turned to the duty of care requirement. Duty, it will be recalled, holds a 
central place within the holistic negligence inquiry I argue for and so I reject the position that 
the duty owed is singular in nature, demanding only that the defendant act reasonably in her 
dealings with the claimant. Importantly, the singular construction denies the central role 
relationality plays within negligence. Within the veterinary context, the court’s use of Hedley 
Byrne
30
-type reasoning to impose a duty has the dual negative effect of further entrenching a 
commercial approach to the veterinary relationship, which this thesis rejects, whilst also 
giving effect to the singular duty approach.
31
 Instead, it was argued that duties are relational 
and relationship-specific.
32
 To this end, when making findings as to the duty of care, I 
supported Oliphant’s position that courts should look to the individual factors of the case at 
hand and to normatively-relevant considerations which point to or reveal underlying values 
within the law.
33
 Central to the assessment is that it should reflect norms which already have 
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currency on certain shared social understandings.
34
 Therefore, duty should reflect both inner 
aspects of relationality as between claimant and defendant and outer social understandings. 
In this way, duty can be seen to correspond with the instrumental view of negligence 
discussed in the second chapter in that a strong duty model should encompass assessments 
addressing both elements of principle and pragmatism, morality and instrumentalism, and 
that this does not weaken the concept of duty, rather, it strengthens it.    
 
The second argument advanced in the duty chapter revolved around the veterinarian’s 
acceptance of a case. In this regard, once the veterinarian accepts a case, I argued that 
positive duties of care arise both to the owner and to the animal. Importantly, this duty is not 
absolute. Because veterinary medicine lacks an equivalent to the NHS, it was determined 
that veterinarians cannot be compelled to act where, for example, the owner is unable to pay 
for what may turn out to be the best, but also most costly, treatment. However, the point that 
a veterinarian comes under a positive duty of care to an animal impacts the argument made 
in the first chapter of this thesis, namely that veterinarians should adopt a paediatric 
approach to the care of the animal and in this regard should seek to act in the animal’s best 
interests. Thus, for example, where the owner seeks treatment that is both futile and will 
increase the animal’s suffering, the veterinarian’s positive duty to the animal requires that 
she refuse this course and act in the animal’s best interests. Thus, the owner’s instructions or 
wishes will not always be dispositive. It was highlighted that adopting this course of 
argument would have a significant impact on the veterinary profession, however, for the best 
interests argument to be legitimate, it has to be the case that veterinarians are able to act to 
protect the animal. Where the decision to act is well reasoned and balanced, veterinarians 
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should be protected from legal sanction. To assess best interests, it was argued that 
veterinarians should look to both quality and quantity of life considerations, the wishes of 
the owner, the animal’s telos35 and that such an assessment would be in line with balancing 
exercises currently undertaken in cases involving children.
36
  
 
The last component of the duty analysis looked to disclosure of risk. At the heart of this 
discussion was determining what model should guide courts deciding disclosure of risk cases 
in the veterinary context. It was argued that although the recent Supreme Court ruling in 
Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board
37
 has provided doctors with a firm articulation of 
the duty owed by doctors when disclosing risks and later the standard they must achieve to 
avoid breaching their duty, the court’s reasoning behind the re-articulation, namely to 
promote a strong patient autonomy model premised on the view that patients are 
consumers,
38
 ought to be strongly resisted in the veterinary context. Importantly, there 
already exists a strong commercial element to the veterinary relationship. As such, I argued 
that in order to achieve the two aims set for this thesis, the commercial approach should be 
rejected. Instead, efforts should be directed to developing a shared decision-making model 
between owner and veterinarian, which does not simply pay lip service to owner 
participation, but rather centres on a holistic discussion encompassing unbiased and 
complete information on the animal’s condition and treatment alternatives. The owner’s 
knowledge of her animal and its lifestyle is also crucial to the shared decision-making model 
advocated.     
                                                 
35
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Finally, Chapter Five focused on the issue of breach. Central to developing the breach 
analysis was determining how the courts, as final arbiters of the standard of care,
39
 could 
continue to develop the law and give further effect to the arguments made throughout this 
thesis. Before courts could make decisions as to the expected standard of care, however, the 
integral role that expert witness testimony continues to play in professional negligence 
litigation means that in addition to a willing judiciary, broad professional support for the 
triangular veterinary relationship and best interests has to be in place. Thus, a change in 
professional mindset from a commercial-based to best interest-based model would be 
needed. To effect this change, it was submitted that new professional codes of conduct which 
reflect a more nuanced and varied approach to the provision of veterinary care
40
 and take on 
board the triangular relationship and best interests approach should be introduced and widely 
disseminated. Although the RCVS introduced new codes only four years ago, it was argued 
that they ultimately fail to deliver on their goal of bringing the veterinary profession in line 
with other analogous professions and instead only serve to continue the priority attributed to 
commercial interests. Further, any recommendations made within the guidance were viewed 
as just that, best practice recommendations. The argument for new codes, therefore, serves a 
dual aim. First, as professional guidance can reflect both evolving sentiment within the 
profession itself,
41
 for example to a best interests-based approach, and track very close to 
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expected tort standards,
42
 new guidance could assist in developing professional mindset and 
provide professional guidance as to legal obligations.
43
 Secondly, new professional guidance 
could also be utilised by the court as an additional tool, alongside both expert testimony and 
the defendant’s evidence, to assess whether the defendant met the expected standard of 
care.
44
 
 
To effect this change, however, it was argued that the RCVS Council required reform if 
updated guidance was to reflect the arguments made above. Importantly, it was submitted 
that valuable lessons could be learned from reforms made to the GMC. Here, it was 
highlighted that after a series of scandals and government papers detailing changing 
expectations and areas of professional concern, the GMC reformed its Council by lowering 
member numbers and introducing parity of lay membership to reflect the need for a smaller, 
more accountable membership base. During this same time, new guidance, in particular the 
0-18 Years Guidance,
45
 was introduced which took on board changing social sentiment and 
lessons learned from previous litigation. Thus, the guidance was specifically developed ‘to 
help doctors balance competing interests and make decisions that are ethical, lawful and for 
the good of children and young people.’46 As regards the veterinary profession, it was argued 
that the RCVS should not wait for similar issues to befall them and that complacency
47
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should, in essence, be transformed into pre-emptive action. Evidence taken from RCVS data 
already illustrates that veterinarians are increasingly concerned about practice standards and 
that complaints from clients regarding inadequate care are rising.
48
  
 
To address this, it was argued that the RCVS Council should be reduced in size and contain 
50-50 lay-professional membership. Lay involvement in this regard should represent a 
diverse range of non-clinical expertise, in particular the participation of legal and bioethical 
academics as a way of addressing matters relating to legal and professional obligations and 
best interests. Whilst this may seem like an extensive reform agenda for the RCVS, it was 
argued that the Council actually stands in a strong position in that they can learn from the 
reform choices made by analogous professions, in particular the medical profession. In 
effect, the Council can choose those decisions made by analogous professions in the past 
which it believes will have the greatest overall benefit to their profession. In this way, 
veterinarians can have a say in the future of their profession, as opposed to running the risk 
of having ‘reforms externally forced upon them.’49 From here professional guidance, which 
has the ability to be developed quickly in response to changing professional and social 
sentiment, can be utilised to reflect the arguments made in this thesis. With these ideas in 
place, the chapter concluded with the argument that courts could then assume their role as 
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arbiters of the expected standard of care and that in this regard, ‘the question of negligence is 
one of what ought to be done in the circumstances, not what is done in similar circumstances 
by most people or even by all people.’50  
 
In the introduction of this thesis, I cited Lord MacMillan’s famous quote that ‘the categories 
of negligence are never closed.’51 Negligence, as a body of law, is continually undergoing 
evolutionary change and this is due in large part to the realisation by the judiciary that, ‘the 
criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life.’52 It 
has been my endeavour in this thesis to demonstrate that animal ownership has become 
increasingly complex and that to reflect this change, the law as it relates to negligence must 
evolve. In this way, I hope to have contributed to research being done on relational harms by 
bringing to the fore a form of gender un-specific harm linked to property damage, therefore 
expanding the reach of relational harms beyond physical harm, whilst at the same time 
addressing how our approaches to duty, breach, and negligence as a whole can be developed 
and adapted to meet this new perspective. Taking all of this on board, an expanded view of 
veterinary negligence which gives effect to the more nuanced ways in which owners relate to 
their animals can be largely supported within existing negligence frameworks. Thus, in both 
theory and practice, the dual aims set out in this thesis are achievable. All that is required is 
for courts to approach novel arguments in creative, flexible ways and to develop existing law 
compassionately.
53
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